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On February 10, 1869, Tennessee Governor William G. “Parson” Brownlow 
tendered his resignation as he prepared to take his seat in the United States Senate, to 
which his Radical allies in the General Assembly had elected him in the aftermath of the 
1867 state election.  On resigning, Brownlow expressed full confidence in DeWitt C. 
Senter, the man who would succeed him.  Stunningly, six months later Brownlow’s 
Radical party verged on collapse after its Conservative rivals captured control of the 
General Assembly in the August 1869 state election.  The new legislature speedily 
repealed many of the enactments of the five years of “Brownlowism” and called for a 
constitutional convention.  That convention met in January 1870 and produced a new 
state constitution in less than six weeks.  The Radicals’ pleas to Congress and President 
Ulysses S. Grant for federal intervention fell on deaf ears.  Conservatives and ex-
Confederates crushed the Radicals in the August 1870 judicial and November 1870 
gubernatorial and legislative elections.  With the election of Governor John Calvin 
Brown, a former Confederate general and Ku Klux Klan member, Tennessee’s 
Reconstruction era ended.   
 
This study explores the last chapter in Tennessee’s Reconstruction, which took 
place between February 1869 (Brownlow’s resignation) and November 1870 (Brown’s 
election).  During that pivotal period, Tennessee’s political parties converged and then 
dissolved into intraparty factionalism, which had profound consequences for white 
Radicals and the state’s freed people.  How these political developments came about is 
the central historical question addressed in this dissertation, which fills a glaring gap in 
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The American Civil War shook the South to its core and triggered numerous aftershocks.  
In 1865, in some ways, the war remained unfinished.  In the North, the war shifted from the 
battlefield to the political arena, where the contestants debated the nature of Reconstruction.  In 
the South, in addition to fierce political arguments, Civil War aftershocks spawned a savage 
climate in which the war continued to claim casualties—both black and white, Unionist and 
Rebel.  White Unionists and the freedmen struggled in the face of Confederate opposition.  
Indeed, Reconstruction constituted both a military and political continuation of the Civil War.  
“This war ain’t over,” Ringo, the former slave in William Faulkner’s The Unvanquished, astutely 
observed after the surrender of the Rebel armies.  “Hit just started good.”1     
 Tennessee’s Reconstruction era, in particular, proved a turbulent one.  However, certain 
commonalities in Tennessee’s post-Civil War experience and that of the other former 
Confederate states existed: a desperate struggle among Radicals, Conservatives, and the ex-
Rebels for control of state government; a campaign of terrorism that targeted white Radicals and 
blacks, and the quest of freedmen for social, political, legal, and economic equality.  On the other 
hand, Tennessee’s Reconstruction experience was in some ways unique.  First among the former 
Confederate states to be readmitted to the Union, Tennessee avoided the Military Reconstruction 
program imposed by Congress in 1867.  Despite this, Tennessee became the first Southern state 
                                                 
 





to enfranchise all black men.  The Radicals who controlled the state government employed the 
state militia to police elections, protect recently enfranchised blacks, suppress paramilitary 
terrorism, and thwart their political opponents.  Rather than achieving reconciliation, 
Tennessee’s Reconstruction drove a deeper wedge between the state’s Unionists and former 
Confederates.           
 In Tennessee, the war and its aftermath brought to the forefront men unaccustomed to 
practicing the art of political compromise.  Confederate governor Isham G. Harris and Union 
military governor Andrew Johnson, although veteran politicians, governed during the war with 
an authoritarian style of leadership.  Harris trampled on the state constitution and aligned 
Tennessee with the Confederacy before the state officially seceded while Johnson wielded 
unprecedented power (conferred by President Abraham Lincoln) in an effort to reestablish civil 
government in Tennessee.  Johnson achieved his mission.  However, as he departed for 
Washington to commence his new role as Lincoln’s vice president, he left behind a state torn by 
war and political disorder.  Tennessee’s postwar governor, William G. “Parson” Brownlow, 
exacerbated tensions between Unionists and the former Confederates.  Schooled in the art of 
invective as a circuit-riding Methodist preacher and partisan newspaperman, Brownlow brought 
to the governorship his own special blend of vituperation and uncompromising politics; in doing 
so, he stoked Tennessee’s superheated postwar atmosphere.2    
                                                 
 
2 The most recent studies of Isham G. Harris and Andrew Johnson during the Civil War are Sam Davis 
Elliott, Isham G. Harris of Tennessee: Confederate Governor and United States Senator (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2010), and Paul H. Bergeron, Andrew Johnson’s Civil War and 
Reconstruction (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2011).  Brownlow is long overdue for a new 
biographer.  E. Merton Coulter’s work remains the best available study of the Parson’s life; see E. Merton 
Coulter, William G. Brownlow: Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands (Chapel Hill: University of 





 Governor Brownlow’s resignation in February 1869 offered some hope of reconciliation, 
an end to nearly a decade of bitter partisan warfare.  Having engineered his election to the United 
States Senate, Brownlow turned over power to his successor, DeWitt Clinton Senter, speaker of 
the Tennessee Senate.  On resigning, Brownlow expressed full confidence in Senter, 
proclaiming, “My regrets, on retiring, would be greater were it not that the gentleman who will 
succeed me for the remainder of my official term . . . is a loyal man, capable, tried and trusty, 
who is sound in his principles, and who will steadfastly adhere to them upon the platform of the 
Union Republican [i.e., Radical] Party of Tennessee.”  But Senter, like many wartime Unionists 
before him, had begun to break with his party’s leader over the administration’s proscriptive 
measures.  Once in the governorship, Senter signaled a departure from the extreme partisanship 
of his predecessors, a possibility of compromise.  Yet he struggled to stay afloat amid the strong 
political tides generated during the autocratic administrations of Harris, Johnson, and 
Brownlow.3           
 The era of Reconstruction in Tennessee came to an impromptu—but decisive—close 
with Brownlow’s departure, or so goes the traditional narrative.  According to this version of 
events, Senter, with no warning, broke with the Radicals and cast his lot with the Conservatives.  
Historian Roger L. Hart observes that from the viewpoint of the anti-Radicals, Senter deserved 
the lion’s share of the credit for “redeeming” Tennessee from Radical rule.4   
 Yet Tennessee’s Reconstruction did not cease with Senter’s ascension to the 
                                                 
 
3 Resignation of the governor, February 10, 1869, in Robert H. White, Stephen V. Ash, and Wayne C. 
Moore, eds., Messages of the Governors of Tennessee, 11 vols. to date (Nashville: Tennessee Historical 
Commission, 1952-), 5: 652-53. 
4 Roger L. Hart, Redeemers, Bourbons, and Populists: Tennessee, 1870-1896 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 





governorship.  Senter neither colluded with nor abdicated power to the former Confederates.  
Rather, he sought to achieve the impossible: to inject the essence of democracy—compromise—
into Tennessee politics.  At this tumultuous period in Tennessee’s history, no one could have 
governed in a way that was acceptable to all—Radicals, Conservatives, ex-Rebels, and the 
freedmen.  At best, unable to bridge the political divide, Senter proved an unwitting redeemer 
whose policies hastened the end of Tennessee’s Reconstruction.     
 Confident that Senter would continue the Radical Reconstruction program that he had 
initiated, Brownlow received a shock when, shortly after his departure from Tennessee, his 
protégé relaxed voting restrictions.  Six months later, in the August 1869 statewide elections, the 
Conservatives triumphed over the Radicals.  The new legislature began to dismantle the Radical 
state, repealing nearly five years of “Brownlowism” one act at a time.  The legislature 
furthermore acceded to the anti-Radicals’ call for a constitutional convention, and in early 1870 a 
new state constitution was drafted.  The Radicals’ desperate pleas to Congress and President 
Ulysses S. Grant for federal intervention went unheeded, and in the August 1870 judicial and 
November 1870 gubernatorial and legislative elections Conservatives and ex-Rebels crushed 
their Republican opponents.  With the election of Governor John Calvin Brown, a former 
Confederate general and Ku Klux Klan member, Tennessee’s Reconstruction ended. 
 Tennessee’s redemption came by a number of steps, both small and large.  Combined, 
those steps led to unanticipated, as well as anticipated, consequences.  Each step in the struggle 
that pitted Radicals and the freedmen against Conservatives and ex-Rebels for control of the state 
government presented a different set of challenges with different potential solutions.  The 
outcome of each step dictated the next step’s range of possible responses, and the possible 




 This study analyzes a series of political events and violent incidents that took place 
within a limited space and time: Tennessee, from the late winter of 1869 (Brownlow’s 
resignation) to the fall of 1870 (Brown’s election).  These closing acts of Tennessee’s 
Reconstruction unfolded in partisan newspapers, meetinghouses, and courtrooms, as well as in 
the state legislature, at the constitutional convention, and at the ballot box.  Over that span of 
twenty months, Tennessee’s Reconstruction era came to a close and the New South era began. 
 During this pivotal period, Tennessee’s political parties converged and then diverged, 
eventually dissolving into intraparty factionalism, all of which had profound consequences for 
Radicals and the freedmen.  A stalwart West Tennessee Radical, postmaster, and school 
superintendent, Dr. William H. Stilwell was caught in the storm that swept Radicalism from 
power.  From his vantage point in Humbolt, Gibson County, Stilwell saw ominous clouds on the 
horizon in the summer of 1869: “All this revolution has come upon us like a clap of thunder in a 
clear sky!”  Following the ratification of the new state constitution in late March 1870, Stilwell 
exclaimed that “All is lost! When I saw rebel leaders take freedmen by dozens to the polls, I 
knew the worst had come.  And we foresaw all.  Will Congress help us or not?  If not, farewell to 
all hope for the Union.”  And yet, Stilwell and many other steadfast Radicals persisted in the 
notion that they could enlist congressional Republicans to intervene.  Only with Brown’s election 
did Reconstruction in Tennessee come to a close.  As Radicalism retreated for the most part into 
the mountains and valleys of East Tennessee in the winter of 1870-1871, Stilwell, politically 
stranded in West Tennessee, asked, “Is all hope of Reconstruction gone?”  How these political 
developments occurred and what were the consequences of this momentous shift in power are 




of Tennessee’s Reconstruction.5         
While in some respects told well by earlier historians, the story of Tennessee’s 
Reconstruction is long overdue for reexamination given significant changes in both nineteenth-
century United States political historiography and Southern studies.  With the exception of 
Thomas B. Alexander’s Political Reconstruction in Tennessee (1950), none of the book-length 
studies of Tennessee’s Reconstruction—all but one of which were written prior to Alexander’s 
book—say much about the immediate post-Brownlow era.  Though he offered some interesting 
insights, even Alexander touched only lightly on this key transitional period.  For the most part, 
historians have been drawn to Brownlow’s administration and have skimmed over Senter’s.  In 
this outdated narrative of Tennessee’s Reconstruction, the state’s history is too neatly divided 
between Brownlow and Senter, Reconstruction and the New South.  Yet, in fact, there was a 
remarkable degree of continuity from secession through redemption.  One wonders how 
Tennessee’s Reconstruction era managed to escape not only the sweeping tide of late twentieth-
century revisionism but also post-revisionism.  This study corrects this historiographical 
deficiency by offering the first full-length reevaluation of the final months of Tennessee’s 
Reconstruction.6              
                                                 
 
5 William H. Stilwell to John Eaton, Jr., June 10, 1869, March 28, 1870, January 30, 1871, John Eaton 
Papers, Special Collections, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.  For an excellent study on 
Republicanism in southern Appalachia in the post-Civil War era, see Gordon B. McKinney, Southern 
Mountain Republicans, 1865-1900: Politics and Appalachian Community (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1978). 
6 Thomas B. Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1950); James W. Fertig, The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1898); John R. Neal, Disunion and Restoration in Tennessee (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 
1899); James Welch Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1934); Coulter, William G. Brownlow; Benjamin H. Severance, 
Tennessee’s Radical Army: The State Guard and Its Role in Reconstruction, 1867-1869 (Knoxville: 





Reconstruction-era political labels can be confusing.  Scholars have applied different 
names to the factions within the national Republican and Democratic parties as Reconstruction 
underwent numerous twists and turns prior to the 1874 Democratic sweep.  Political labels in 
Tennessee can be particularly confusing.  At the onset of the Civil War, Tennessee divided 
between Unionists and secessionists.  Prior to the firing on Fort Sumter, Unionist sentiment 
predominated, although the secessionists, led by Governor Harris, constituted a strong minority.  
Much of Tennessee Unionist sentiment was conditional.  The Conditional Unionists opposed 
taking Tennessee out of the Union, but only so long as Lincoln and the Republicans refrained 
from coercing the seceded states of the deep South.  After Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s subsequent 
call for 75,000 troops to put down the rebellion, the Conditional Unionists flipped and became 
secessionists.  Over the course of the war the remaining Unionists fractured into two factions: the 
Conservative Unionists and the Unconditional Unionists.  Johnson’s tenure as military governor 
from early 1862 to early 1865 did much to create this rift.  Determined to achieve his mission to 
set the state on the path to civil government and reunion, Johnson governed with an iron fist.  His 
stringent loyalty oaths and his hard line toward Confederate sympathizers exacerbated tensions 
among Tennessee’s Unionists.  However, the most significant source of division among the 
Unionist coalition was the Lincoln administration’s adoption of emancipation as a war aim.  In 
the wake of the Emancipation Proclamation, Rhoda Campbell Williams of Knoxville wrote to 
her son, “[Lincoln’s] policy has been such as to drive hundreds of men in the South into the rebel 
army, who would today be for the Union if they had not been convinced that his purpose is to 
crush the South and make us all slaves. I am as firm in my [Union] principles as ever, but never 
will I sanction the abolition policy of Abraham Lincoln.”  In contrast, the Unconditional 




the Republican party.  As the war progressed, it degenerated into a grisly internecine war, 
especially in the mountains and valleys of East Tennessee.  The Unconditional Unionists became 
radicalized as they endured abuse at the hands of the Confederate government and their Rebel 
neighbors.7             
The collapse of the Confederacy and the ensuing struggle to restore civil government in 
Tennessee further radicalized these Unconditional Unionists, who, with the inauguration of 
Brownlow as governor, adopted with pride the Radical label.  To be sure, these Tennessee 
Radicals never wholeheartedly embraced Northern Radicalism as their political faith, nor did 
they fully abandon Southern cultural values.  They did, however, enact proscriptive measures 
designed to ensure a “loyal” electorate and keep former Confederates from regaining political 
power by restricting the franchise to Unionists.  The Radical-dominated legislature passed a 
franchise law in June 1865 that denied the former Confederates the vote for five years and 
established a voter registration system administered by county court clerks.  The Conservative 
Unionists, ready to welcome the ex-Rebels back as citizens, favored a policy of reconciliation 
and presented the Radicals and the voters of Tennessee with a formidable slate of candidates in 
the August 1865 congressional elections—the first trial of Radicalism.  The election resulted in a 
draw, with Radicals and Conservatives each winning four seats, but only after Governor 
Brownlow threw out enough “fraudulent” votes in one district to secure the seat for Radical 
Samuel Mayes Arnell, the principal author of the franchise law.  In early 1866, popular 
                                                 
 
7 Rhoda Campbell Williams to Rufus Morgan Williams, November 15, 1864, John and Rhoda Campbell 
Williams Papers, Calvin M. McClung Historical Collection, Knoxville; Peter Maslowski, Treason Must 
Be Made Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee, 1862-65 
(Millwood, New York: KTO Press, 1978), 34-151; Mark A. Weitz, “‘I Will Never Forget the Name of 
You’: The Home Front, Desertion, and Oath Swearing in Wartime Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical 





condemnation of the Radical program resulted in a Conservative sweep in the county elections 
outside of the Radical stronghold of East Tennessee.  Those congressional and county elections 
sent a clear message to the Radicals: substantial Conservative opposition to Radical 
Reconstruction existed in Tennessee.  Moreover, evidence of illegal voting revealed loopholes in 
the state statute and registration system that needed to be closed.8          
 The Radicals had no legal means to deprive the Conservatives of the vote; however, they 
managed to silence their opposition in the legislature through various parliamentary maneuvers, 
thereby prompting a number of Conservative lawmakers to resign their seats in a move to 
prevent a quorum on key Radical measures.  Brownlow reacted swiftly, calling a special election 
to fill the vacant Conservative seats.  The election proved an embarrassment to Brownlow.  
Twelve Conservatives who had resigned were returned to their seats while the Radicals won only 
four of the eighteen vacant seats.  The election results notwithstanding, Brownlow saw to it that 
the Conservatives were excluded and the Radicals admitted, thus securing a bare quorum to push 
through a new franchise act in May 1866.  That law disfranchised all former Confederates, 
voided previous voter registration certificates, and created commissioners of registration for each 
county.  Appointed by the governor, those election officials examined all eligible voters, who 
were required to present two witnesses to testify to their loyalty, and rejected any whose loyalty 
was in any way suspect.  A clause in the franchise act permitted the commissioners to hear 
evidence contrary to the testimony offered on behalf of an applicant.  Thus empowered, the  
                                                 
 
8 Tennessee General Assembly, Public Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, 1st sess. (1865), chap. 
16, 32-36; Samuel Mayes Arnell, “The Southern Unionist,” unpublished manuscript, n.d., Special 
Collections, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 272-77; Alexander, Political Reconstruction in 
Tennessee, 18-112; Kathleen R. Zebley, “Unconditional Unionist: Samuel Mayes Arnell and 





commissioners disfranchised many likely Conservative voters.9      
Brownlow worried as Conservative opposition to his administration mounted.  To bolster 
the party’s strength, a few leading Radicals pressed the governor to announce his support for 
black suffrage.  “[W]e need their help, in the coming election, to secure us a sure victory. . . .  
There is no use, in allowing our prejudices to control us any longer,” insisted Congressman 
William B. Stokes.  “It is a fixed fact, they will vote & it is only a question of time.”  But many 
Radicals—Brownlow included—were reluctant to confer the right to vote on blacks.  Stokes, a 
potential rival for the 1867 gubernatorial race, won the support of the party’s hardliners when he 
publicly announced that he favored extending the suffrage to the state’s approximately forty 
thousand adult black males.  As black suffrage gained traction among leading Radicals, 
Brownlow had a change of heart.  “[N]ow is the time for Tennessee to show to the world,” he 
declared in January 1867, “that she belongs to the advance guard on the great question of equal 
suffrage. . . . Without their votes, the State will pass into disloyal hands, and a reign of terror . . . 
will be the result.”  The governor’s conversion from prewar racist proslavery ideologue to 
postwar radical defender of black suffrage stirred up dissension among the Radicals, driving 
some into the Conservative fold.  But in early 1867, when Radical legislators introduced a bill 
granting black men the right to vote, it passed in short order.  The bill enfranchised forty 
thousand people.  Tennessee thus became the first Southern state to establish biracial democracy 
in the aftermath of slavery.10   
                                                 
 
9 Tennessee General Assembly, Public Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, 2nd sess. (1865-66), 
chap. 33, 42-48; Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 98-112. 
10 William B. Stokes to John B. Brownlow, December 26, 1866, E. E. Patton Papers, Calvin M. McClung 
Historical Collection, East Tennessee History Center, Knoxville; Message to the Senate and House of 
Representatives, January 23, 1867, in White, Ash, and Moore, eds., Messages of the Governors of 
Tennessee, 5: 546; Kyle Osborn, “Reconstructing Race: Parson Brownlow and the Rhetoric of Race in 




Black suffrage constituted one of the strongest Civil War aftershocks that rattled 
Tennessee.  Whites bristled at any assertion of black independence.  They were particularly 
rankled by the sight of blacks voting at the ballot box.  In a letter to his father, Samuel Fain, a 
Conservative from Rogersville in Hawkins County, confided that “I had a vote, and I tell you it 
was hard for me to vote side by side with a negro.”  Racial tension escalated as ex-Rebels, 
excluded from the political process, sought recourse in the politics of force.  Disguised in robes 
and hoods, and riding under the cover of darkness, these vigilantes spread terror among their 
foes—blacks active in politics and whites allied with them.  Their goal became to overthrow the 
Radical Republican state government, restore Democratic party power, and reestablish white 
racial hegemony.  The Radicals reacted by building and funding their own army, the Tennessee 
State Guard.  Its primary purpose was to uphold Brownlow’s administration and provide 
protection for Radicals and freedmen.11        
 Such was the political scene on February 25, 1869, when Brownlow relinquished the 
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THE BREACH: JULY 1868-FEBRUARY 1869 
 
As a light mist fell on Maury County, the evening calm was punctuated by the thundering 
of rapid hoof-beats.  A squad of United States soldiers led by Brevet Major C. H. Frederick of 
the 45th United States Infantry raced along the Duck River to investigate the human remains that 
had washed up on the riverbank.  Earlier that evening, two black men, wishing to conceal their 
identities, arrived at Frederick’s headquarters in Columbia to report that they had found the body 
of a white man while fishing at Booker’s Ferry Bridge, two miles below town.  Frederick, 
thinking that the remains might be those of a private detective whose mysterious abduction by 
the Ku Klux Klan had been reported in newspapers nationwide, led the recovery party.  On 
arriving at Booker’s Ferry, he and his men dismounted and began searching below the bridge 
where they had been told they would find the body.  They soon found the remains wedged 
between two large logs.  Stepping across one of the logs, Frederick slipped and fell into the river.  
After rescuing their commander, the soldiers dragged the body out of the water.  By the light of a 
lantern, Frederick examined the terribly disfigured remains.  All traces of hair had disappeared 
from both the face and head.  The man’s nose was missing and both ears had apparently been 
nibbled by fish.  Much of the outer skin had decayed and peeled off; what skin remained was a 
dark blue color, suggesting that the body had been submerged in the water for some time.  The 
man’s hands were bound behind his body with a linen handkerchief.  A rope about two feet in 
length was tied around his neck with a noose at the other end that evidently had slipped off from 




discovered that the man had been shot through the top of his head.  The bullet, creating a hole 
nearly large enough to insert a thumb, apparently lodged somewhere in his head since there was 
no indication of an exit wound.  Frederick sent word to William Wood, the town’s coroner, to 
conduct an immediate examination.  He also dispatched soldiers to round up people who had 
been acquainted with the missing detective, to identify the body.  This last measure, however, 
was merely protocol.  The man’s clothing, a scar on the right side of the upper lip, and a few 
items found on the body, particularly two golden rings and a diamond cross lapel pin, were 
evidence enough that Frederick had found Seymour Barmore, the missing detective.1         
 Nearly six weeks earlier, in the late hours of January 11, 1869, Barmore had boarded a 
train at Pulaski, in Giles County, bound for Nashville.  He took a seat in the rear coach and, 
covering himself with a shawl and drawing his cap down over his eyes, went to sleep.  He had 
been summoned to Pulaski as a witness in the trial of two black men charged with robbery.  
However, his visit to Pulaski served a dual purpose.  For months, the former special agent for the 
United States Treasury Department had been employed by Governor William G. Brownlow to 
expose and destroy Ku Kluxism in Tennessee.  In spite of the state’s stringent anti-Ku Klux law, 
Brownlow had failed to convict a single Klansman.  Determined to win his personal war against 
the Klan, Brownlow adopted the tactics employed by other Southern governors, hiring special 
agents to infiltrate and obtain hard evidence on the Klan.  Evidently, Barmore managed to worm 
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his way into a Klan den and, after testifying at the Pulaski trial, actually attended a Klan meeting.  
Barmore had earlier boasted of breaking up the Klan to guests at the Nashville St. Cloud Hotel, 
where he stayed.  Somehow the Klan was warned of the spy in the midst and a telegraph 
message was sent to the nightriders of Maury County to intercept Barmore on his way back to 
Nashville from Pulaski.2         
 As the train pulled into the depot at Columbia in the early hours of January 12, conductor 
Thomas Moore stepped off the train and onto the icy platform.  As he assisted several ladies 
down the steps of the car, he saw a masked man in the distance approaching with rapid strides.  
When the man asked to let him pass, the conductor stepped aside.  Suddenly, a number of other 
disguised men surrounded the train.  Two hopped up into the locomotive with pistols drawn and 
told the engineer that they “now had other conductors who directed the movements of the train.”  
At the rear, four masked men entered the car in which Barmore slept.  Passing along the aisle, 
they examined each passenger. When they found Barmore, one of the men thrust the muzzle of 
his pistol into the detective’s side, rousing him from his slumber.  He told Barmore to get up, 
saying that he and his associates wanted to talk with him outside.  Barmore stood but feigned 
lameness.  Grabbing him arms, the intruders dragged him from the train.  Barmore offered no 
further resistance as they put him on a horse.  The whole party of masked men then rode off on 
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horseback into the night with their captive.  The incident was over in less than three minutes.  
Left among Barmore’s belongings on the train was a silver-headed cane and a carpetbag, which, 
when opened by railroad officials and police investigators in Nashville, contained a full Ku Klux 
disguise.3           
 In the wake of Barmore’s abduction, newspapers throughout the nation speculated about 
his fate.  One report claimed that he was discovered dangling from a tree a few miles from where 
he had been kidnapped, while another claimed that his remains had been fished out of the Duck 
River at Williamsport, several miles downriver from Columbia.  Alleged eyewitness accounts 
placed the missing detective in each of Tennessee’s three grand divisions—West, Middle, and 
East—at the same time.  The Athens Post reported that he spent several days traipsing around the 
gold mines of Coker Creek in Monroe County.  One of the more bizarre rumors placed him in 
Mississippi purchasing cotton.4         
 Tennessee’s Conservative and Democratic newspapers cast doubt on Barmore’s 
abduction.  “Our quiet big town was thrown into quite a fever of excitement by the sensational 
story in the Nashville newspapers,” remarked the editor of the Columbia Herald.  “So much 
news proving entirely without foundation, the people became at last quite skeptical, and believed 
nothing. . . .  If there is one witness to testify in the affirmative, there is much strong 
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circumstantial evidence on the negative side.”  The Knoxville Daily Press and Herald wondered 
“if, indeed, we can believe any report about [Barmore].”  Some papers denied the existence of 
the Klan altogether.  Others, while acknowledging its existence, insisted that it had nothing to do 
with Barmore’s disappearance, suggesting that the abduction was not a political act but merely 
brigandage.  “[E]verything done in mask now-a-days is perpetrated by the Ku Klux,” the 
Nashville Union and American commented sardonically.  “If a bank is robbed, a rape committed, 
a dead man found, or any other crime perpetrated, it is directly laid to the charge of the Ku 
Klux.”  But as reports of Klan outrages multiplied in the weeks following Barmore’s abduction, 
and Governor Brownlow threatened to call out the State Guard to restore peace, anti-Radical 
editors increasingly found themselves on the defensive.5                  
 While Major Frederick’s troops transported Barmore’s remains to Columbia, news that 
the detective’s body had been recovered raced ahead to Nashville.  Governor Brownlow got the 
report in the waning hours of February 20 and immediately expanded his war on the Klan.  He 
imposed martial law in nine Middle and West Tennessee counties (Giles, Jackson, Lawrence, 
Marshall, Maury, and Overton in Middle and Gibson, Haywood, and Madison in West) and 
directed state adjutant general Joseph A. Cooper to deploy the State Guard, Tennessee’s Radical 
army, to preserve the peace and enforce the laws (see Figure 1).6       
 Why Brownlow selected these particular counties is something of a mystery.  Not all 
were hotbeds of Klan activity; and the list did not include certain counties that were hotbeds,  
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such as Bedford, Lincoln, and Rutherford in Middle Tennessee and Dyer and Obion in West 
Tennessee.  Radical state representative W. P. H. Turner of Lawrence County expressed his 
astonishment on seeing his “peaceable, quiet and law-abiding” county included in Brownlow’s 
proclamation: “I am at a loss to know why troops should have been quartered upon the people of 
my county without consulting their immediate representative.”  Partisan politics does not seem to 
have been a factor in Brownlow’s selections.  It is possible that his aim was simply to deploy the 
State Guard over a wide region.  Whatever his purpose, the reaction among those directly 
affected by the proclamation and the anti-Radical press was swift and denunciatory.  The 
Knoxville Press and Messenger described Brownlow’s proclamation “as the wild utterance of an 
insane man.”  “The proclamation means, if it means any thing, civil war,” declared the editor of 
the Nashville Republican Banner.  “It is a last desperate move,” the “crowning infamy of his 
gubernatorial administration.”7             
 The Nashville Republican Banner questioned not only Brownlow’s timing—he had only 
five days remaining in office—but also his motives for saddling Senter with the burden of 
martial law: “Mere party courtesy would have suggested that so weighty a question should have 
been left to the decision of his immediate successor, since the latter will have to bear the 
responsibility and odium of the fatal step.”  The Knoxville Daily Press and Herald suggested that 
the Brownlow camp thought Senter insufficiently Radical: “The prime object in calling out the 
militia and in the declaration of martial law was to embarrass Senter and force him into the 
Brownlow policy.”8           
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 Few, however, publicly doubted Senter’s fidelity to Brownlow and the Radicals.  The son 
of a prominent East Tennessee Methodist preacher and Whig, Senter quickly scaled the political 
ladder, winning a seat in the lower house at the age of twenty-seven in 1857.  When Tennessee 
seceded from the Union, Senter, unlike most other Unconditional Unionists, retained his seat in 
the legislature, despite voting against the secessionist majority on numerous issues.  Professing 
to represent Tennessee’s Unionists, Senter even followed the General Assembly to Memphis in 
February 1862 when it and Governor Isham G. Harris fled Nashville to escape capture by Union 
forces.  The legislature adjourned a month later and Senter made his way back home to Grainger 
County.  With tens of thousands of Union and Confederate troops occupying Tennessee, his trip 
was fraught with danger.  In April 1862, Senter stumbled on Confederate pickets and was taken 
prisoner.  For the next six months, Confederate officials moved him around Tennessee, Alabama, 
and Georgia before finally releasing him on his posting a four-thousand-dollar bond and taking 
an oath not to bear arms against the Confederacy.  Even at home, Senter could not rest easy.  A 
detachment of Rebel troops took him prisoner, yet he managed to escape while the men were 
plundering his home by overpowering his guard and jumping out a window.  East Tennessee was 
also the scene of unrelenting guerrilla warfare between Union and Confederate partisans.  As a 
prominent Unconditional Unionist, Senter was frequently harassed by Confederate guerrillas.  
On one occasion, he was pursued and his horse was shot from under him; however, he reached 
Union lines by swimming the Holston River.  Following the restoration of civil government in 
Tennessee, Senter served two consecutive terms in the state Senate and in his second term was 




framing the legislative agenda and supporting some of the administration’s most controversial 
policies, including Rebel disfranchisement and black enfranchisement.9   
While Radical and anti-Radical newspapers agreed that Senter was a partisan stalwart, a 
close examination of his voting record indicates that he was not consistently in the Radical camp.  
In fact, Senter and a minority bloc of moderate Republicans repeatedly aligned with 
Conservatives when the question of extending rights other than suffrage to blacks surfaced in the 
Senate.  They opposed black court testimony, jury service, and office-holding, as well as the 
recognition of pre-Civil War slave marriages, protection of laborers’ wages, the right of blacks to 
make and enforce contracts and to sue and be sued, and the desegregation of railroad and street 
cars.  Although he voted in favor of black enfranchisement in February 1867, Senter’s speeches 
and a series of parliamentary maneuvers he engineered to obstruct and defeat equal rights 
legislation during the previous session suggest that his vote for black suffrage was based on 
political necessity rather than personal conviction.  On numerous occasions he openly clashed 
with John Trimble of Davidson County, one of the most extreme Senate Radicals.  When 
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Trimble introduced a bill in October 1865 providing for the gradual enfranchisement of blacks, 
Senter accused him of opening Pandora’s Box: “There is trouble in this question, and, if 
introduced, it will, before the session is over, shake this body from its centre to its 
circumference.”  Anticipating that such legislation might split the Unionists, especially East 
Tennesseans, who overwhelmingly opposed equal rights for blacks, Senter called on Trimble and 
other Middle and West Tennessee Radicals to exercise restraint.  “You will go too far, mark it, 
just as [the secessionists] went too far in 1861,” he insisted.  “[G]ive us time, and soon we shall 
catch up with the tone of public opinion. . . .  Don’t urge the question on the people just now.  
The Union party needs all the strengthening it can get.”  Like Conservatives and Democrats, 
Senter and a majority of East Tennesseans believed that if blacks were granted equal rights, 
Southern freedmen would flock to the state.  While Tennessee’s Republican party was born amid 
the tumult of war and Reconstruction, achieving power by Rebel disfranchisement and sustaining 
it with black suffrage, the moderate, centrist wing of the party intended it to be a bulwark against 
social and legal equality.10           
 Senter’s legislative record notwithstanding, his sphinx-like silence preceding the 
inauguration fueled speculation.  Conservative and Democratic newspapers ran numerous 
editorials comparing and contrasting Brownlow and Senter.  Some concluded that Senter, even at 
his worst, would be an improvement over his predecessor.  According to the Memphis Daily 
                                                 
 
10 Nashville Daily Press and Times, April 21, 22, 24, October 6, 18, 20, 21, 1865, April 26, 27, May 2, 6, 
26, 1866; Nashville Republican Banner, April 26, 1866; William G. McBride, “Blacks and the Race Issue 
in Tennessee Politics, 1865-1876” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1989), 41-43, 84-86, 100, 104, 
115, 231-35, 241-42, 249, 252-53; Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, The Negro in Tennessee, 1865-1880 
(Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, Inc., 1941), 16-18; Michael Perman, The Road to Redemption: 
Southern Politics, 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 43-48; McBride 
and Robison, Biographical Directory of the Tennessee General Assembly, 1: 737-38.  The opposition of 
East Tennesseans to the extension of rights to blacks supports Gordon B. McKinney’s conclusion that 
mountain white Republicans accepted the end of slavery but resisted laws intended to grant equal or 




Appeal, Senter possessed neither the “will or the capacity for evil that has rendered Brownlow’s 
rule the subject for execration in all succeeding generations.”  The Nashville Republican Banner 
noted that “The prospective Executive maintains a rigidly Grantonian silence on the [policy he 
will pursue as governor], but those who are best acquainted with his views intimate that he will 
be as moderate in the use of his official powers as is compatible with the safety and interest of 
the ‘party.’”  Most, however, abjured prophecy and resolved simply to wait and see what Senter 
would do.11           
 If the Brownlow camp had indeed called out the militia to ensure that Senter upheld its 
policies, as the Knoxville Daily Press and Herald suggested, they were perhaps impelled not by 
uncertainty about Senter’s course but by a desire to stem the hemorrhaging of Radical power.  
Personal ambition and petty jealousies had plagued the Radical party since the election of 
Brownlow to the United States Senate by the General Assembly in 1867.  Numerous 
Republicans who had been excluded from political races by Brownlow Radicals, or defeated by 
them in a race, felt betrayed and therefore distanced themselves from the Brownlow camp.  As 
these embittered Republicans began to jockey among themselves for the 1869 election, intraparty 
factional rivalries emerged.  Some of the party’s hard-liners, led by General William B. Stokes, 
organized an alliance in opposition to the Brownlow Radicals.  Blindsided by Brownlow’s last-
minute decision to enter the U.S. Senate race, Stokes, who had coveted the seat himself, 
alienated himself from the governor when he refused to withdraw his name from the contest.  
Stokes believed he had earned the seat after campaigning tirelessly for the governor’s reelection.  
Other Republicans, such as Secretary of State Andrew Jackson Fletcher and influential party 
leader Leonidas C. Houk, who were denied seats in the U.S. Senate and House respectively, 
                                                 
 





adopted moderate positions on several key issues in an effort to attract anti-Radical support.12 
 Intraparty factional rivalry intensified in the summer of 1868 when the governor called a 
special session of the General Assembly to combat the Ku Klux Klan’s violent campaign of 
counter-Reconstruction.  Tennessee’s State Guard had suppressed Klan activities during the 
campaign of 1867, but had by no means destroyed the organization.  Indeed, the Guard had spent 
most of its time chasing ghosts and rumors while the Klan went underground.  Subsequently, the 
General Assembly, fooled into thinking that the Klan no longer posed a threat and seeing no 
point in maintaining an expensive army that had no enemy to fight, repealed the militia act and 
disbanded the State Guard.  But no sooner had the Guard demobilized than the Klan’s deception 
became apparent.  Emerging from the shadows, the Klan unleashed a reign of terror in 1868 that 
provoked Brownlow to reconvene the General Assembly.  Determined to neutralize the Klan, he 
issued a forceful message to the legislators, chastising them for letting themselves be duped into 
repealing the militia law while rebellious elements were biding their time, secretly arming 
themselves with the aim of overthrowing the state government and carrying Tennessee in the 
presidential and congressional elections.  He requested the State Guard’s reactivation and an 
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anti-Klan law that carried the death penalty.  Sensing a softening on the franchise issue among 
Northern and Southern Republicans in the wake of Republican presidential candidate Ulysses S. 
Grant’s call for sectional harmony, Brownlow admonished the legislators not to consider the 
removal of the former Confederates’ political disabilities during the extraordinary session.  In 
closing, he warned that if they failed to take decisive action, they would be responsible for the 
fate of every loyal Tennessean intimidated, driven from home or ballot box, or “butchered in 
cold blood.”13            
 The governor’s provocative message elicited a predictable anti-Radical response.  The 
Nashville Republican Banner denounced Brownlow’s “bloodthirsty manifesto” as yet another 
attempt to “fulminate his wrath against his imaginary enemies, the ghostly Kuklux Klan.”  
Tennessee Conservatives blanketed President Andrew Johnson’s desk with pleas to relieve them 
of Brownlowism.  Columbia resident A. O. P. Nicholson feared that the governor’s declaration 
of war would “inevitably result in a wide-spread & bloody collision.”  Some called on the 
president to send in the United States Army, and further urged him to replace General George H. 
Thomas, commander of U.S. forces in the region, with someone less prejudiced against them.  
“[Thomas] is the tool of Brownlow and the most vindictive Radical we know of,” insisted Robert 
A. Bennett and William Wright of Gallatin.  Conservative petitions also flooded the state 
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legislature.  The most noteworthy of these was signed by thirteen former Confederate generals, 
all suspected Klan members, four regarded as high-ranking officers.  Denying any association 
with terrorism, they pledged to use their influence to uphold the law and preserve order in their 
communities.  Reactivating the State Guard would not bring peace, the generals asserted, and 
might even provoke another civil war.  Maury County farmer Nimrod Porter summed up the 
sentiment of many anti-Radicals: “Brownlow is mad.”14    
 Governor Brownlow dismissed the Confederate generals’ petition as an attempt by 
“unreconstructed Ku Klux rebels and their sympathizing supporters” to derail the passage of a 
militia bill.  Radical postmaster and school superintendent William H. Stilwell of West 
Tennessee agreed: “What does this rebel attempt to intimidate—that’s the word, disguise it as 
they may—the Legislature, & stop it from arming the State [mean]?  Will they succeed?  Will 
they find enough members weak enough, silly enough to be hoodwinked, & turned aside from 
the great, & vital purpose for which they were convened?  Are not the evidences palpable as the 
rocks of the Capitol Hill, that all this stir in the rebel camp is only a ruse?”15      
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the timing and sincerity of “these peaceful & law abiding ex rebel Generals.”  “No, they Run all,” he 
wrote.  “They winked at all, & gloated over the fondly hoped for result.  Gloss it as they may, disclaim 




 The extraordinary session of the Thirty-fifth General Assembly was a significant 
milestone on Tennessee’s road to redemption.  The factional struggle in the state Republican 
party was publicly exposed in debates that were often heated and occasionally mean-spirited.  
While the legislators brooded over the threat of civil war, several moderates and a few prominent 
Radicals joined the chorus of Conservatives endorsing universal suffrage as a solution to the 
crisis.  In a highly unexpected move, and in spite of his plea to the General Assembly not to 
remove political disabilities during the current session, the governor gave universal suffrage 
advocates a boost when, eight days into the session, he submitted a supplementary message 
containing Nashville Judge John M. Lea’s “plan of settlement” to end Reconstruction.  Exclusion 
of former Confederates from the ballot box, Lea argued, was the chief issue roiling the state’s 
political waters.  It had been proper to restrict the restoration of civil government to the loyal 
element, said Judge Lea, but now the need for proscription had ceased.  If the franchise 
restrictions were lifted following the 1868 election, a lasting reconciliation might ensue and 
secret political organizations such as the Rebel Ku Klux Klan and the Radical Loyal League 
would disband.  Since the Tennessee Supreme Court had recently held that the franchise law was 
a part of the state constitution, Lea urged the adoption of a constitutional amendment 
commissioning the General Assembly to serve as a constitutional convention that would have the 
power to repeal disfranchisement.  Judge Lea’s proposal would undergo some modifications as 
universal suffrage gained momentum, but the core of it became the 1869 state election’s key 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
the bloody deeds that have been done.  Do they not publicly proclaim their power over the rank & file of 
the ex rebel soldiery?  Do they not publicly declare that they can & will control the soldiers of their late 
commands, & cause them to keep the peace, & obey the laws in the future?  Yes, they promise all this, 
conscious of their ability to do it—but, they will control the disloyal only on condition that no State 
Guards, no large body of militia shall be called out!”  See William H. Stilwell to John Eaton, Jr., August 





issue.16             
 Brownlow’s apparent endorsement of Lea’s plan sent shockwaves throughout Tennessee.  
“The Devil Not So Bad As He Is Painted,” exclaimed the rabidly anti-Brownlow Nashville 
Republican Banner in an editorial headline.  “[Brownlow] has shown more liberality and fairness 
than some of his political brethren.”  Brownlow biographer E. Merton Coulter argued long ago 
that the governor agreed to submit Lea’s plan not because he really approved it but because of 
his high regard for the judge’s integrity and loyalty to the Union.  Brownlow was indeed fiercely 
loyal to his friends; however, it is quite possible that the governor really did endorse the plan, if 
only because he sensed that numerous Republicans were trending toward support for 
Confederate reenfranchisement and, bowing to its inevitability, he was trying simply to delay it 
until the next legislative session, after the 1868 election.17      
 The aftershocks caused by Brownlow’s message and Lea’s plan revealed the extent of the 
Republicans’ intraparty conflict.  On August 4, Judge James O. Shackelford of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court and several other prominent citizens arrived at the state capitol bearing a petition 
with over four thousand signatures from Davidson County.  It urged Brownlow to call a state 
constitutional convention for the sole purpose of restoring the franchise to the former 
Confederates.  An intense debate erupted when Thomas A. Kercheval of Davidson moved that 
Shackelford be permitted to address the House.  Eventually, Shackelford was permitted to speak, 
but only after numerous Radicals tried to stop him with parliamentary maneuvers.  Advancing to 
the speaker’s desk, Shackelford delivered an address that was brief but was perhaps one of the 
most poignant of Tennessee’s Reconstruction. “The time, I feel, has come,” he said, “when all 
                                                 
 
16 Tennessee General Assembly, House Journal, 35th General Assembly, extra sess. (1868), 45-47; 
Tennessee General Assembly, Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, extra sess. (1868), 71-75;  White, 
Ash, and Moore, eds., Messages of the Governors of Tennessee, 5: 619-22. 




citizens of Tennessee should be restored to those rights and privileges they inherited from their 
fathers, and which your predecessors, under the powers delegated to them from considerations of 
public policy, thought it expedient, for a time, to deprive them. . . .  The supremacy of the State 
Government is now too well established to be shaken; the Ship of State has been brought back to 
her ancient moorings. Then let us restore to all equal rights and privileges. This will bring 
peace—blessed peace to our divided population.”18      
 The significance of the moment was lost in the firestorm of Conservative and Democratic 
condemnation of the Radicals’ behavior.  The anti-Radical press decried the Radicals’ 
contemptuous treatment of a Supreme Court judge, but neglected to ponder the profound 
implications of a Supreme Court justice coming out in favor of universal suffrage.  Although the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, in its 1866 decision in Ridley v. Sherbrook, had upheld the state’s 
right to grant or deny a citizen the right to vote, numerous challenges to disfranchisement 
remained in the state’s legal pipeline, notably State v. Staten.  How the court would deal with 
these cases remained to be seen.19        
 On August 10, several moderates and Radicals read petitions from their constituents 
protesting the militia’s reactivation and calling for the repeal of the franchise law.  Later in the 
afternoon, William F. Prosser of Davidson County offered a resolution to extend the franchise to 
the former Confederates, arguing that disfranchisement “was never intended to be permanent, but 
transitory, depending for its limit of life altogether upon the conduct of those who had acted in 
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such a way as to bring themselves within its provisions.”  Prosser insisted that the ex-Rebel 
soldiers would imitate the example of their former leaders, the generals who had recently 
pledged to uphold the state’s laws and preserve the peace.  Although carpetbaggers were 
generally unpopular among Tennesseans of both political parties, Republican hard-liners were 
particularly prejudiced against non-natives such as Prosser, a Pennsylvanian who had settled near 
Nashville following his service as an officer in the Union army.  Denounced as “bummers and 
office seekers,” non-natives often found refuge by aligning with moderates as Republican party 
conflict intensified.20            
 While the first few weeks of the session were mostly spent wrangling over the franchise 
law, party leaders did move forward on the two key points outlined in Governor Brownlow’s 
message—enacting a stringent militia enforcement law and a punitive Ku Klux Act.  The House 
and Senate agreed to divide the tasks, with the former assuming responsibility for drafting a 
militia law and the latter an anti-Klan bill.  But Republican factionalism soon intruded.  
Moderates and Radicals found little common ground on the militia bill.  Some Republicans were 
reluctant to reactivate the State Guard for fear that Brownlow intended to impose military rule.  
A number of moderates joined Conservatives in calling on President Johnson to employ the 
United States troops garrisoned in Tennessee and adjoining states to preserve peace.  They 
pointed to a July 30 letter to moderate congressman Isaac R. Hawkins of Carroll County from 
Secretary of War John M. Schofield stating that federal forces could “readily be made available . 
. . to suppress any insurrection against the [state] government.”  Most Republicans dreaded the 
financial strain on the state treasury that would result from extended State Guard operations.  
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Saddled with more than $40 million in debt, Tennessee ranked second only to Virginia among 
indebted states.  The Guard’s 1867 activities had cost the state $100,000, and militia opponents 
argued that a remobilization might be even more costly.  Another contentious issue was the use 
of black troops, who had comprised nearly a quarter of the 1867 State Guard.  Many Republicans 
feared that remustering Brownlow’s Radical army, especially if any of the troops were black, 
would trigger a full-scale civil war.  Furthermore, several moderates had by now embraced the 
strategy of winning support among respectable white Southerners.  Fully aware of the extent of 
Klan violence, these cooperationists believed that the best way to restore law and order was to 
ally themselves with prominent Conservatives and act with them.21      
 Radical lawmakers became more reluctant to take action as the session went on and anti-
militia sentiment and the Conservatives’ movement to attract moderate Republican support for 
reenfranchisement gained momentum.  With the state Republican convention scheduled to meet 
in Nashville on August 12-13, most seemed anxious to ascertain the wishes of the party.  Unable 
to attend due to his feeble health, Governor Brownlow implored Republicans to seek party unity: 
“At a time like the present a true man would rather sacrifice his own interest and submit to 
forego his own personal claims than to imperil the success of the cause on which so much 
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depends, by insisting upon them.”22          
 The convention’s first day proceeded harmoniously for the most part.  Radical leaders 
achieved a semblance of party unity by dominating the proceedings, quelling any signs of 
division.  Brownlow Radicals and Stokes Radicals worked hand-in-hand to draft and adopt a 
resolution that garnered unanimous support.  Tennessee Republicans endorsed Grant’s 
nomination for president and the platform adopted at the Republican national convention, 
pledged to sustain Governor Brownlow’s administration, upheld the rights of non-native 
residents, and rejected repudiation of the state debt.  Addressing the two most controversial 
issues that had surfaced in the special session, the delegates agreed to postpone further 
consideration of the franchise issue and called on the legislature to pass “an efficient militia bill.”  
To win over legislators concerned about the state’s financial crisis, the convention proposed that 
the taxpayers of Klan-infested counties should pay for the State Guard’s remobilization.  With 
General William Stokes and Reverend Thomas H. Pearne, a close friend of the governor, at the 
helm of the Committee on Resolutions, the Radicals achieved their main goals—stiffening the 
resolve of hesitant Radicals and redirecting attention from the franchise question toward militia 
enforcement and Ku Klux legislation.23       
 Having rallied their base, Tennessee’s Radicals pressed to complete the extraordinary 
session’s business.  That task was made easier by the incessant activities of the Ku Klux Klan.  
Klan violence strengthened the Radical element in Tennessee’s Republican party.  Indeed, 
Radical hard-liners sought to use the Klan’s reign of terror to counter the party’s centrist 
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strategy.  Even as the legislature’s Joint Military Committee was concluding an extensive 
investigation into Klan violence in the state, collecting more than eighty affidavits from former 
Union soldiers, freedmen’s school teachers, and blacks, the masked nightriders launched a 
campaign that not only spread throughout Middle and West Tennessee but also reached into 
portions of East Tennessee.24         
 One of the more violent encounters occurred just before the Republican state convention 
convened.  In the early hours of August 12, a band of six armed and masked men rode up to the 
Hickman County home of Lewis Powell, a black Union League member known to the Klan.  
Powell fled in fear for his life.  Hiding in a barn a hundred yards from his house, he could not see 
the scene unfold as his wife confronted the men.  Three of them dismounted and demanded food 
for themselves and their horses.  Shielding her three young daughters, Powell’s wife protested 
that they were poor and had little even for themselves.  The three dismounted men stepped 
forward and opened fire.  Hearing the gunfire, Powell rushed back to the house.  The masked 
men fled into the night.  Powell found his wife lying on the porch; two bullets had penetrated her 
lungs, killing her instantly.  Powell’s daughters relayed a warning from one of the masked 
marauders to their father: “No damned Union League niggers should rule the country.”25 
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 As the fall elections approached, the Klan directed its efforts toward intimidating 
Republican voters.  Lt. Col. Fred S. Palmer, a Freedmen’s Bureau agent in Memphis, reported 
that “There is not . . . a doubt but that the conservative, or democratic party, intend, at the 
coming election, to prevent, either by chicanery, intimidation, or violence, the freedmen from 
voting any other than their ticket.”  John Wilson, a Bureau agent in Johnsonville, warned that 
white Southerners “are talking loudly of voting by force, and not letting the negroes vote at 
all.”26   
Armed with plentiful evidence of the Klan’s intentions, House Radicals moved swiftly to 
pass the militia bill.  On August 25, the Military Affairs Committee reported the bill and 
recommended its passage.  Anti-militia bill lawmakers rallied behind Republican Martin T. 
Ryder of Shelby County, who submitted the committee’s minority report.  Ryder called attention 
to two laws on the statute books that gave the governor and sheriffs the necessary power to 
protect Tennesseans from outlawry.  Moreover, Ryder argued, there was no need for the militia 
because President Johnson and Secretary Schofield had promised federal troops to aid the state 
government.  Discussion then degenerated into a frivolous debate over printing copies of the 
majority and minority reports.  William Bosson of Rutherford County, who had championed the 
services of federal troops throughout the session, asked a combative Radical colleague why he 
was so afraid of the minority report being printed.  “What we want is light, all the information 
that we can obtain on this vital subject,” said Bosson.  “It is only by such means that we can have 
united and intelligent action.”  East Tennessee Radical Newton Hacker engaged Ryder in a fierce 
exchange, accusing him and his supporters of acting against the interests of the Republican party.  
Pointing to the recent murder of two Unionists at the hands of Klansmen in Franklin, Hacker 
                                                 
 





asserted that “the signs of the times were not as black and portentious [sic] then [i.e., when the 
earlier laws were passed] as they are now.  The laws then passed have not been found to meet the 
emergency.”  With the tension in the House chamber becoming thicker by the minute, lawmakers 
agreed to adjourn.  The next day, Radicals pulled the plug on anti-militia opposition and moved 
for a vote.  After a brief series of parliamentary maneuvers to table the bill, fifty-one Radicals 
passed it over the objection of seventeen members.27       
 While waving the “bloody shirt” had in recent years proved useful for both Northern and 
Southern Republicans, it was now failing to work its magic in Tennessee.  Enacting a militia bill 
was proving much more difficult for Brownlow and his party than it had the previous year.  
Instead of uniting Tennessee Republicans, the issue of responding to Klan violence was 
exacerbating the party’s factional discord.28      
 Brownlow and Radical hard-liners were confident that with Speaker Senter at the helm 
the Senate would pass the militia bill in short order.  However, a widely published interview 
containing warlike statements by former Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest that 
appeared shortly after the passage of the House militia bill unnerved moderate Republicans.  
Speaking to a reporter for the Cincinnati Commercial, Forrest, a titular leader of the Ku Klux 
Klan, denied that he belonged to the organization.  Yet he professed sympathy for it, describing 
it as a “protective, political, military organization” in support of the Democratic party.  Forrest 
claimed that he had counseled peace and had pledged, along with several other former 
Confederate generals, to preserve order and uphold the laws of the state if the militia was not 
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called out.  Although he deemed the Radical state government illegitimate, he declared himself 
“willing to submit to it for a time, with the hope that the wrong might be righted peaceably” by 
legislation.  Still, he believed that the government’s oppression of the disfranchised class was 
growing worse by the hour.  Forrest admitted that he opposed black suffrage under any 
circumstances, but he promised that if blacks were willing to work with and enfranchise the 
former Rebels, then he would accept their enfranchisement: “I have no powder to burn killing 
negroes. . . .  I would sooner trust [the black man] than the white scalawag or carpet-bagger.”  
When asked whether a conflict could be avoided if Brownlow called out the militia, Forrest 
replied, “if the militia are called out, we can not but look upon it as a declaration of war.”  We 
will respond, he vowed.  “There will be war, and a bloodier one than we have ever witnessed. . . .  
Not a Radical will be left alive.”29          
 Forrest’s statements infuriated Radicals and alarmed moderate Republicans.  Some 
moderates were persuaded that reactivating the State Guard would do more harm than good.  
Instead, they proposed sending a joint legislative delegation to President Johnson to urge him to 
send troops to Tennessee.  Radical lawmakers were particularly incensed when House moderates 
lobbied their colleagues in the Senate to derail the militia bill.  Speaking on behalf of House 
Radicals, Newton Hacker asserted that the movement to call on the president for federal troops 
“has done more than anything else to retard the passage of an efficient military bill, and is today 
being paraded everywhere through the rebel press as a sign that we are backing down.”  
Moderate Republicans had shirked their duty, according to Hacker.  “This Legislature,” he 
declared, “presents a most humiliating spectacle to the world.”30     
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 Meanwhile, the factional struggle carried over into the Senate as Senter traded verbal jabs 
with moderate Republican Adrian Van Sinderen Lindsley of Davidson County.  On August 31, 
Senter delivered an impassioned plea to Senate Republicans to pass the militia bill before dealing 
with a resolution to call on President Johnson for federal troops.  It was unlikely, he declared, 
that Johnson would act to restore order in Tennessee until all “loyal men are driven from the 
ballot-box and rebel rule and ruin are forced upon us.”  After a lengthy debate on the resolution, 
Senter then excused himself.  Late in the day’s proceedings, and with few senators remaining in 
the chamber, Lindsley seized the opportunity to respond to the absent speaker:  “It almost breaks 
my heart, and I feel that I could shed tears of blood, to hear . . . such a declaration as that [Senter] 
did not want the militia to put down Kuklux, to suppress lawlessness and preserve peace, but to 
surround the ballot-box with armed men.”  The following day Senter rose in his own defense, 
insisting that he was in favor of calling out the militia solely to preserve the peace and uphold the 
law and declaring that “such a version [of my sentiments] as that given by the gentleman from 
Davidson (Mr. Lindsley) is, at this time, and under these circumstances, calculated to do me 
injustice.”  This confrontation with Lindsley was neither the first nor last time that Senter would 
be forced to fend off a Republican challenge to his position as a party leader.31    
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Reconstruction in Tennessee, 188-89.  General Forrest’s statements also alarmed Conservatives seeking to 
build support among disillusioned Republicans.  James B. Bingham, editor of the Memphis Bulletin, 
informed President Johnson that Forrest’s “unwise statements . . . have caused much apprehension here, 
lest their influence in the Northern States may injuriously affect our friends.”  See James B. Bingham to 
Andrew Johnson, September 8, 1868, in Graf, Haskins, and Bergeron, eds., Papers of Andrew Johnson, 
15: 34.    
31 Nashville Republican Banner, September 1, 2, 3, 1868; McBride and Robison, Biographical Directory 
of the Tennessee General Assembly, 2: 534.  In the months leading up to Senter’s assumption of the 
governorship, several Republicans began plotting to undermine him.  The Brownlows responded with an 
editorial defending Senter: “He deservedly enjoys the undivided confidence of the loyal people of the 
State. He is one of the rising young men of the State, one to whom the loyal people of the State look with 
pride and confidence. That Col. Senter should be denounced and traduced by men of the Republican party 
is, to us, a matter of profound astonishment. Such, however, is the case. The only cause for this, in our 




 Tennessee’s Radicals were deeply disappointed with the legislature’s lack of progress.  
They had left the Republican state convention convinced that they had shored up support among 
Republican lawmakers for both a militia and a Klan bill.  The House had managed to pass the 
militia bill within two weeks of the convention; however, the publication of Forrest’s bellicose 
remarks and a surge in Klan activity now threatened to derail Brownlow’s agenda.  
Conservatives successfully lobbied battle-weary moderates to consider the United States Army 
as an alternative to the State Guard.  This strategy stalled action on both the militia and Ku Klux 
bills in the Senate.32            
 After nearly seven frustrating weeks, and amid growing concern among Tennessee 
Republicans over the party’s future, several Radical lawmakers indicated a willingness to 
compromise on a few key provisions, particularly the death penalty for convicted Klansmen, to 
win over hesitant moderates.  With the impasse resolved, the Radicals pressed forward with a 
vote on the anti-Klan bill.  It passed by fifteen to seven.  The House quickly followed suit, 
passing the bill by forty-six to twenty-one.  Officially entitled “An Act to Preserve the Public 
Peace,” it imposed stiff penalties on Klansmen, defined as anyone who joined or aided the 
organization as well as anyone who willfully interfered with the electoral process.33   
 The Radicals next moved to bring the militia bill to the Senate floor.  The considerable 
opposition in the House to the Klan bill (twenty-one negative votes) compared to the militia bill 
(seventeen) disturbed some Radical lawmakers, for the former bill should have been less 
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objectionable to anti-Radicals than the latter.  With opposition to the State Guard gaining 
momentum among moderates and even a few Radicals fearful of another civil war and worried 
about the cash-strapped treasury, Senate Radicals amended the bill to restrict the governor’s 
power to declare martial law by requiring the consent of any affected district’s circuit judge and 
attorney general, its senator and representatives, and ten “unconditional Union men, of good 
moral character.”  Speaker Senter pleaded with his colleagues to support the House bill and not 
to hamstring the governor’s power to declare martial law.  “It is our last hope of refuge,” he 
proclaimed.  He warned the members that if they failed to pass the bill outlaws and assassins 
would run roughshod throughout Tennessee.  In closing, Senter acknowledged that Klan violence 
and the Conservative movement had intimidated Republican lawmakers: “Gentlemen may tell 
me that the militia will bring bloodshed.  The want of it has brought bloodshed.  They may tell 
me it will bring a reign of terror throughout the country.  The want of it has brought terror 
throughout the State.  [I] would rather be bankrupt in everything else than in government.  What 
is your money worth when your State is turned over to assassins?”34      
 Despite Senter’s call, some Radicals were not willing to risk losing additional Republican 
votes.  The Radical amendment proved decisive as the militia bill passed fourteen to seven.  For 
the sake of party unity, Senter supported the amended bill.  The next evening, the House 
consented to the amended bill by a vote of forty-five to thirteen and it became law.  Officially 
entitled “An Act to Enforce the Laws of the State,” it authorized the governor to reorganize, 
equip, and call into service the State Guard.  Six days later, Brownlow reactivated his Radical 
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army.  However, given the opposition among moderate and even some Radical legislators, as 
well as the U.S. government’s promise of federal troops to sustain Tennessee’s state government, 
the governor opted not to deploy the State Guard for now.35              
 The anti-Radical Nashville Republican Banner decried the “needless and tyrannical 
measures” enacted by Brownlow’s “legislative henchmen.”  Klan violence was only a pretext for 
this noxious legislation, the editor claimed; the Radicals’ real objective was to control the ballot 
box by intimidation and to seduce Tennessee blacks and turn them into “disciplined and armed 
voters.”  However, Conservatives predicted, the militia and anti-Klan laws would fail to deter the 
former Rebels from resorting to every remedy short of bloodshed to hurl Radicalism from power.  
With a few exceptions, Tennessee Klansmen adopted a wait-and-see approach while working 
closely with prominent Conservatives and Democrats to prevent the deployment of Brownlow’s 
Radical army.  As reports of Klan violence waned in the fall of 1868, Conservative and 
Democratic forces began developing a nonviolent electoral strategy, one that sought to create an 
intersectional party of the political center that could attract the discontented ranks of Tennessee’s 
Republican party.  “From this hour,” proclaimed one Conservative, “the campaign will begin in 
dead earnest.”36          
 Brownlow Radicals hailed the passage of the militia and Klan bills as key victories for 
the administration.  However, a closer examination of the extraordinary session reveals quite the 
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opposite.  Although the Radicals commanded strong majorities in both houses, they failed to pass 
either bill easily.  The session dragged on for nearly seven weeks.  Besieged by a campaign of 
intimidation, mired in debt, and plagued by Republican factionalism, the Radicals were 
compelled to compromise with moderates on several issues.  Two crucial concessions were 
limiting the governor’s power to declare martial law and removing the death penalty for 
convicted Klansmen.  An analysis of the voting reveals a troubling development for the Radicals.  
Although East Tennessee lawmakers were nearly unanimous in support of the Klan bill and the 
final militia bill, Middle and West Tennessee members voted collectively for the bills by thirty-
five to twenty-one and twenty-two to twelve respectively.  Despite their concessions, the 
Radicals struggled to attract moderate votes.  Most moderates, even those who had benefited 
politically from the State Guard in 1867, remained fearful of sparking another civil war.  The 
Radicals could rightly claim one major victory—they had managed, for now, to stifle further 
consideration of universal suffrage.37         
 The extraordinary session exposed factional differences in Tennessee’s Republican party, 
but there was even more trouble brewing.  A breach in the ranks of Memphis Radicals at the 
Republican state convention was a harbinger of fatal conflict within the Radical faction itself. 
 The rift between native-white and Northern-born Radicals in Shelby County originated in 
September 1867, when Radical James M. Tomeny, the United States marshal for West 
Tennessee, filed suit in chancery court to collect debts owed by Lucien and John Eaton, former 
Union soldiers from New Hampshire who had settled in Memphis following the war and founded 
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the Radical Memphis Post.  Tomeny, a political chameleon courting moderate Republicans, 
aligned with James B. Bingham, publisher of the Conservative Memphis Bulletin, and Samuel B. 
Beaumont, the Radical superintending commissioner of the Memphis Metropolitan Police, along 
with other enemies of the Eatons, to put the Post out of business.  The Post was a very influential 
Radical organ.  The Eatons allied with Judge Barbour Lewis, a New England-born Radical 
lawyer who had also settled in Memphis after the war.  Lewis conspired with judges friendly to 
the Eatons to win a favorable judgment for the cash-strapped Post.  With the Post secured from 
further litigation, the Eaton-Lewis coalition became a formidable opponent to potential rival 
Radical or Conservative organizations.38      
As one crisis passed for the Eatons, another arose.  The Eaton-Lewis organization sought 
victory in the 1868 Memphis mayoral contest over the Tomeny-Beaumont organization.  After 
their first choice dropped out of the race, the Eaton-Lewis camp backed Dr. P. D. Beecher, who 
commanded the support of the city’s blacks.  Beecher’s candidacy forced the Tomeny-Beaumont 
faction to switch candidates in favor of an independent, Colonel W. H. Fitch, Jr., an intrepid 
proponent of black interests who commanded respect from both factions.  As the two Radical 
organizations battled one another, the Conservatives bided their time.  With three days remaining 
until the election, the Conservatives nominated former congressman John William Leftwich, 
who went on to defeat both Radical candidates with a majority of 350 votes.  General Gordon 
Granger, commanding officer of the U.S. troops stationed in Memphis on election day, 
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telegraphed President Johnson: “Memphis redeemed. . . .  Free White Suffrage Vindicated.”39   
 Licking their wounds, the Eaton-Lewis forces prepared for a showdown with the 
Tomeny-Beaumont organization in the November 1868 eighth congressional district race.  They 
would face a more formidable foe in this contest because the Memphis Bulletin was now under 
the managerial and editorial control of Tomeny.  When the Shelby County Radicals met in 
convention on July 21, H. E. Hudson, an Eaton-Lewis supporter heading the Resolutions 
Committee, instructed the delegates to the eighth congressional district Radical convention at 
Brownsville to cast their votes for General William Jay Smith.  The Tomeny-Beaumont camp 
immediately bolted from the convention and agreed, on the following evening, to support the 
incumbent, David A. Nunn.  The Democratic Memphis Appeal bellowed, “Hurrah for the great 
fraternal Radical party!  Our time will soon come now, for when thieves fall out, honest men get 
their due.”  At the eighth district Radical convention, the division among Memphis Radicals 
spread to the county delegations.  General Smith garnered the support of delegates from 
Hardeman and Tipton counties while those from Haywood, Madison, McNairy, and Fayette 
counties aligned with Nunn.  Memphis Mayor John Leftwich, the Conservative candidate for the 
eighth congressional district, confidently reported to President Johnson that the Conservatives 
could carry the district and possibly the state “if allowed a fair show even under the present 
odious [franchise] laws.”  As a consequence of the breach in the Radicals ranks, he said, several 
Radicals had pledged their support to the Conservatives and it appeared some blacks intended to 
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do likewise.  Leftwich gleefully proclaimed, “the radicals themselves have split into atoms.”40  
 The Eaton-Lewis and Tomeny-Beaumont camps began a vigorous campaign for the 
eighth district seat that aggravated the enmity between the two.  The disease of division began to 
spread throughout West Tennessee in the weeks leading up to the August Radical state 
convention in Nashville.  Despite the Radicals’ best efforts to preserve harmony, the Memphis 
Republican intraparty struggle spilled over into the convention’s proceedings.  General Stokes 
pleaded, “Let these rival factions settle their difficulties in Shelby County.”  Party leaders then 
assumed control over the proceedings and adjourned the convention.  The rift in the Shelby 
County Radical ranks permitted the Conservative Leftwich to win on election day.  But 
Governor Brownlow exercised executive power to cast out enough votes in two anti-Radical 
counties to give the victory to Smith and the Eaton-Lewis camp.41    
 Shelby County was not the only place where Radical factions fought one another.  
Davidson and several other counties had also sent two rival delegations to represent their 
congressional district at the state convention.  In each case the delegations contested the claims 
of the other, delaying the convention’s business.  The appearance of a number of rival 
Republican delegations throughout Tennessee with the potential of obstructing the state 
convention was an ominous development for the party.42    
 Discontent among Tennessee’s black voting population also portended trouble for the 
Radicals.  More than sixty years ago, historian Thomas Alexander concluded that the “freedman 
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was remarkably tractable in Tennessee” and that he “was never an acceptable partner to the 
Radicals in politics.”  This so-called Dunning school interpretation, which Alexander adopted, 
prevailed until the first waves of revisionism swept over Tennessee’s Civil War-era 
historiography in the mid-1970s.  Recent scholarship has demonstrated that blacks not only 
played an active role in breaking the bonds of slavery but also sought full equality before the law 
and participated actively in politics in the postwar years.  Their votes, in addition to the 
disfranchisement of former Confederates in some states, provided Southern Republicans with 
electoral security.  Yet their political participation also presented Southern Republicans with 
difficulties, as blacks contested with whites for control of the party.  The result in Tennessee, as 
elsewhere in the South, was a Republican party torn by factionalism that consequently struggled 
to marshal its full strength to combat its political opponents.43    
Tennessee’s freedmen faced numerous obstacles in their path to independence, poverty 
and white racism among them.  In the spring of 1865, when Tennessee’s Unconditional 
Unionists restored civil government, black political activity was poorly coordinated and the 
freedmen were shut out of the constitutional convention.  In August 1865, black leaders, 
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primarily ministers and urban professionals, published a call for a “colored convention.”  The 
convention’s delegates were predominantly blacks from the state’s four major cities: Memphis, 
Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga.  A majority pressed for immediate access to the ballot 
box; however, a vocal minority argued that blacks should educate and otherwise improve 
themselves before demanding suffrage.  In the end, the convention adopted a resolution in favor 
of pressing the Radical-controlled state government to adopt black suffrage.  In the face of 
growing Conservative opposition, the disillusionment of some Radicals over Brownlow’s 
proscriptive measures, and the appearance of violent white clandestine organizations in the 
South, a more aggressive black leadership emerged in the summer and fall of 1866 that 
demanded full equality.  In February 1867, Governor Brownlow pushed his party to adopt black 
enfranchisement, although more as a practical political maneuver than as a response to the 
freedmen’s demands.  Once Tennessee blacks secured the right to vote, thus gaining real political 
influence, they immediately called on the Radical legislature to lift restrictions on jury service 
and office-holding.  As the Radicals grudgingly responded to the freedmen’s demands, some 
native white Unionists abandoned Tennessee’s Republican party.  The alliance of Tennessee 
white Radicals and blacks, while never fully harmonious, endured because the two needed one 
another to accomplish their goals.44  
The high tide of black political power during Tennessee’s Reconstruction spanned a 
period of approximately seventeen months between February 1867 and July 1868.  During this 
period the Conservatives made a bid for the black vote.  But by the fall of 1868, Conservatives, 
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aligned with Democrats, reversed course and called for the establishment of a party based on 
white supremacy.  Meanwhile, the freedmen launched a concerted campaign to win local, 
county, and state offices and sought a leading role in the Republican conventions.  Some 
Republican leaders, however, expressed concern that the party was too closely identified with 
blacks, arguing that the exercise of black political rights while a majority of whites were 
disfranchised was the cause of the decline in Republican ranks.  Some moderate Republicans 
defected to the Conservatives; others abstained from voting on legislation demanded by blacks.  
Many Republicans simply took the freedmen’s votes for granted and appealed only for white 
votes.45       
Increasingly, black leaders spoke out publicly against the Radical leadership.  In late July 
1868, Randall Brown, a prominent Nashville black recently elected to the Davidson County 
court, addressed an assembly of freedmen in the courthouse.  “You all, gentlemen, voted for 
Brownlow.  What has he done for you?  He may be a clever man; I hope he is; but what has he 
done for us?  He has been governor a long time.  He has appointed about one hundred and twenty 
men to office, and has never put a colored man in office.”  Brown held office by virtue of local 
election; if it were left up to Brownlow, he claimed, he would not be in this position.  He told the 
crowd that he owed his own election to the Northern Radicals who had come south and relieved 
blacks from bondage.  “I tell you, gentlemen,” said Brown, “it is in the blood of a Southern man 
not to mix with the Negro; he won’t do it.”  Some discontented blacks went so far as to sign 
petitions to the legislature demanding universal suffrage.  When Radical Lynville M. Mynatt of 
Knox County denounced those who signed such petitions as Rebels, W. B. Offutt, a Tullahoma 
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barber, responded in the Nashville Republican Banner: “I am a colored man, have always voted 
with the radical party. . . .  You stigmatize the signers of that petition as rebels and traitors whose 
hands are red with loyal blood.  For one, I say you have stated what is false, for I know of many 
prominent radicals here both white and colored whose names are appended thereto and who 
cordially indorse [sic] the spirit and sentiment of the petition.”  The resentment among many 
blacks caused some Conservatives to think they still had a chance to win the black vote.  “They 
are properly estimating radical influence,” John Leftwich informed President Johnson, “and are 
determined to be influenced by them no longer.”  Despite their frustration with Brownlow and 
the legislature, however, Tennessee blacks clung to the Republican party.  Able neither to leave 
the party nor control it, Tennessee black Republicans became, in effect, second-class partners.46    
 Given Brownlow’s control of voter registration and the dispersal of twenty companies of 
federal troops throughout Middle and West Tennessee to oversee the balloting, few doubted 
Republican success in the 1868 presidential and congressional contests.  On election day there 
were no reports of any serious trouble at the polls.  Ulysses S. Grant carried the state over 
Horatio Seymour by a better than two-to-one margin.  However, a close examination of the 
election returns reveals the extent to which Republican factionalism, Klan violence, and a 
general movement in favor of universal suffrage had eroded Tennessee’s Radical party.  Grant 
received 17,406 fewer votes in November 1868 than had Brownlow in August 1867.  Even 
though the Conservatives endured a crushing defeat in the Tennessee presidential contest, 
Seymour got four thousand more votes than had Emerson Etheridge, Brownlow’s Conservative  
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gubernatorial challenger in August 1867.47         
For Tennessee Republicans the election results were unmistakable and alarming.  The 
party suffered a dramatic decline in voter turnout in Middle and West Tennessee counties 
terrorized by the Klan (see Table 1).  Fear of Klan violence undoubtedly kept thousands of black 
voters away from the polls.  Whereas Brownlow had dispersed the State Guard over more than 
half of Middle and West Tennessee during the 1867 election, federal soldiers under the 
command of General George H. Thomas mostly remained in their garrisons on election day.  
Abiding by President Johnson’s strict order not to interfere with, but merely to sustain, 
Tennessee’s civil authorities, U.S. forces made no effort in the weeks preceding the election to 
enforce the anti-Klan law.  Consequently, in 1868 Republican ballots declined by nearly 12,500 
in the counties that had been policed by the State Guard in 1867.  The Conservative gains were 
mainly a product of Republican intraparty strife.  Discontented Republicans defected to the 
Conservative ranks because they did not want to be associated with black and Radical Northern 
interests.  Powerful external forces bent on crushing Radicalism combined with internal party 
strife may have raised hopes of victory among Conservatives and some enfranchised Democrats, 
contributing to increased voter turnout.  Though the Republican party still controlled Tennessee, 
the election of 1868 proved a heavy blow to Radicalism as its control was less secure than a year 
earlier.48 
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Table 1. Black Voting Population and 1867 Tennessee  
Gubernatorial & 1868 President Electoral Results 
 
Approximate  Vote for Vote for 
Black Voting   Brownlow Grant 
Population*  1867  1868 
 
 
Middle Tennessee Counties 
Davidson     5817   5454  4519 
Giles      2300   1880  561 
Maury      2405   2817  1910 
Robertson     604   348  212 
Rutherford     2922   2939  957 
Sumner     1033   891  465 
Williamson     1757   1704  561 
Wilson      1281   1249  850 
Totals      18119   17282  10035 
 
West Tennessee Counties 
Dyer      629   316  118 
Fayette     3362   1444  821 
Haywood     2597   1655  1382 
Lauderdale     709   296  67 
Madison     1782   343  289 
Obion      304   272  85 
Totals      9383   4326  2762 
 
 
* Note: In accordance with the provisions of a March 2, 1870 law, Secretary of State Thomas H. Butler 
reported on October 7, 1871 the numbers of Tennessee male inhabitants twenty-one years of age or older. 
See Tennessee General Assembly, House Journal, 37th General Assembly, 1st sess., Appendix (1871), 
41-43; Tennessee General Assembly, Public Acts of Tennessee, 36th General Assembly, 1st sess. (1869-
70), chap. 107, 125-26; Hopkins and Lyons, Tennessee Votes, 48-49. 
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 Despite Conservative gains and Radical losses, most disfranchised Tennesseans saw their 
prospects for enfranchisement as dim.  As a new year dawned, former Confederates prayed for 
their redemption from an oppressive Radical state government.  “The New Year opens on us 
with sadness,” Hiram Fain of Rogersville recorded in his diary.  “Our prospects are gloomy, 
indeed.  Our republic destroyed, and the little left to the Southern people, will soon be swallowed 
up, by robbers . . . in this the day of our trouble.”  Fain asked for God’s redeeming power to 
bring the disfranchised comfort and salvation: “[S]ave us from our enemies.”49      
Barred from the electoral process and with no liberation from their political shackles in 
sight, Tennessee ex-Rebels watched in astonishment as several prominent Republican leaders 
suddenly took up the universal suffrage banner in early 1869.  In Congress, Radical Tennessee 
senator Joseph S. Fowler launched the first salvo against disfranchisement as congressional 
Republicans framed the Fifteenth Amendment (which would enfranchise black men throughout 
the nation).  Fowler warned his colleagues that the overwhelming majority of whites perceived 
the Republican party as an engine of class legislation.  “If a proposition is made in favor of 
suffrage in the Constitution . . . , it should be made in the name of humanity, not of a race,” 
proclaimed Fowler.  “Let it embrace all, not a part.  Let it protect the white man as well as the 
colored.”50       
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Perhaps the two most significant Republicans in Tennessee to go on record in favor of 
universal suffrage were Speaker of the House F. S. Richards and Secretary of State Andrew J. 
Fletcher.  On January 9, Richards gave a long speech in the House in which he acknowledged 
Republican factionalism: “We are suffering greatly at this moment from local dissensions, from 
social discord, from party rancor, and from widespread distrust among our citizens.  It is high 
time that all these fearful evils should be removed.  It is evident to my mind that there is only one 
safe road out of our troubles.”  Richards introduced a bill calling for a state constitutional 
convention to establish universal suffrage.  A motion to table Richard’s bill carried thirty-seven 
to twenty.  On the same day, Fletcher addressed a letter to the editor of the Nashville Daily Press 
and Times in which he stated that he had always favored “disfranchising Rebels only long 
enough to cool them off”; he regretted that disfranchisement had become “sweeping and 
perpetual” and “excessively severe.”  Convinced that the former Confederates had suffered long 
enough, Fletcher argued that ceaseless proscriptive measures offered them no incentive to 
become loyal, law-abiding citizens.  “This excessively severe policy of our party is about to 
produce its natural consequences.  It is about to explode for the want of calibre. . . .  [W]e are 
growing weaker daily, and many of our best men have become disgusted and declared openly for 
universal suffrage at once.”  In Washington, President Johnson received a newspaper clipping of 
Fletcher’s letter enclosed in a note addressed to him by his close friend R. Weakley Brown, a 
prominent Nashville Conservative lawyer and businessman.  “I think the split in the Republican 
party in this state will continue to widen,” reported Brown, “and I hope ere long a truly 
conservative restoration policy will be adopted and we shall once more have peace and good will 
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in Tennessee.”51            
 Governor Brownlow was blindsided by Richards and Fletcher.  He and his son, John Bell 
Brownlow, responded to the defection of the two high-profile Radicals in the editorial columns 
of their newspaper, the Knoxville Whig.  The Brownlows were especially angry at Fletcher, 
whose break with the administration was a great embarrassment for the governor.  Publicly, the 
Brownlows offered two explanations for this rift.  First, Fletcher had sought the party’s 
gubernatorial nomination in 1867 because he, like many other Radicals, suspected that 
Brownlow would relinquish the post on account of poor health.  However, when Brownlow 
announced his intention to run for reelection Fletcher bowed out of the race.  With his aspirations 
for the state’s highest office thwarted, Fletcher, like other politically frustrated and disillusioned 
Radicals, bolted from the Brownlow camp.  A second cause of the breach, claimed the 
Brownlows, was a quarrel over patronage.  Fletcher’s wife wanted Brownlow to appoint her 
brother attorney general for the Columbia district in Middle Tennessee.  Fletcher commissioned 
his brother-in-law; however, Brownlow revoked the commission on learning that the appointee 
had reportedly been an infamous Confederate bushwhacker.  In closing, the Brownlows accused 
Fletcher “of infidelity to party obligations, of gross faithlessness to friends . . . of reckless 
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disregard of truth, and of a false, sickly, sentimental sympathy for rebels.”52  
 If the defection of some prominent Republicans to the universal suffrage movement was 
not enough, the Radicals also had to contend with a resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan.  When 
President Johnson withdrew U.S. forces from Middle and West Tennessee after the 1868 
election, the Klan reemerged and struck with a vengeance.  The Nashville Daily Press and Times 
reported that the “Kuklux seem to be resurrecting from their ghostly slumbers.”  Anti-Radical 
newspapers initially dismissed reports of increased Klan violence against black and white 
Radicals in Middle and West Tennessee, but by the first week of January they could no longer 
ignore them.  The Daily Press and Times printed reports of Klan attacks almost daily throughout 
January.  One such report carried the headline “Civil War Imminent.”  From Livingston, in 
Overton County, a terrified young girl wrote to her father, who was away on business, that 
“There are plenty of Kuklux in town, walking the streets, with guns on their shoulders.53    
 Brownlow implored legislators to give him a free hand to strike back at the Klan.  
Radical lawmakers in both houses of the General Assembly responded by pushing through an 
amendment to the militia act repealing restrictions on the governor’s power to declare martial 
law.  A few anti-Radical legislators attempted to defeat the amendment and redirect attention 
toward the issue of enfranchisement; however, the Klan’s shocking abduction of detective 
Seymour Barmore worked against them.  Legislators previously opposed to both the militia and 
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anti-Klan laws lined up in support of the amendment.  In the Senate, William A. Garner, who 
represented the Klan-infested counties of Giles, Lawrence, and Wayne along the Tennessee-
Alabama border, declared that it was “high time that something was done to stop the outrages.”  
John Aldridge disagreed with the provision to tax loyal Unionists for the militia but understood 
that “the way to put down the Kuklux was to come right out and fight them.”  William Wisener 
countered the argument for federal troops by pointing out that they “could not swing up these 
assassins unless martial law was declared, for so long as civil law prevailed criminals and 
offenders must be tried by courts.”  On January 14, the Senate passed the amendment seventeen 
to four.  Two days later, the House brought the amendment to the floor for a vote without 
discussion and passed it fifty-five to nine.54      
 Anticipating that Brownlow would soon unleash his “dogs of war,” the anti-Radical press 
spoke out loudly.  “The calling out of this militia will break the peace,” claimed the editor of the 
Memphis Daily Appeal, “lead to a general disquiet and fear, loosen the bonds of society, injure 
the financial and industrial prospects of the State, prevent immigration and retard the general 
progress of Tennessee.”  Some suggested that the Radicals were manipulating the Barmore 
incident for political gain.  The editor of the Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, a thorn in the 
Brownlows’ side, published a fictitious conversation between “Ally Gator,” the paper’s 
Nashville correspondent, and John Brownlow, in which the latter gloated that “it takes a few Ku 
Klux outrages now and then to keep the loyal sentiment up to the mark and repress the 
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revolutionary ideas of enfranchising rebels.”55       
 Governor Brownlow wasted no time before issuing a call for enlistment in the State 
Guard.  In less than a month, he had nineteen companies with a total of nearly sixteen hundred 
white soldiers.  To alleviate anti-Radical fears of race war no black soldiers would be mustered 
to combat the Klan.  When Barmore’s body washed up on the banks of the Duck River, 
Brownlow immediately dispatched his forces to nine Middle and West Tennessee counties.  As 
Senter came into office, the Radical State Guard seemed poised for a climactic confrontation 
with the Rebel Ku Klux Klan.56          
 At this critical time, with Tennessee’s Republican party plagued by factionalism, 
reactionary violence, financial debt, and scandals, Senter had to decide whether to continue, 
modify, or abolish Brownlow’s Radical policies.  Taking note of the enormous responsibilities 
placed on Senter, the editor of the Knoxville Press and Messenger wrote that “it would be an 
easy enough thing, it is true, to mount the car of State as it now goes thundering down the 
inclined plane and ride with it to a speedy ruin already in sight. But to signal on the brakes, to 
moderate the speed and reverse the engine without a crash—this will require a steady brain and 
an iron nerve.”  How that train would fare with Senter at the controls was the question on the 
minds of Tennesseans of every political stripe as he took the oath of office in February 1869.57 
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WALKING A TIGHTROPE: FEBRUARY-APRIL 1869 
 
On February 25, 1869, Tennesseans prepared to install a new governor in office.  Shortly 
before noon, guests attending the inaugural ceremonies poured into the hall of the House of 
Representatives.  Women packed the galleries; businessmen and farmers crowded the floor.  The 
enthusiasm of the guests was palpable.  The setting itself stood in stark contrast to Brownlow’s 
inaugurations, which had been closed to all but white Radicals—even the Senate was barred in 
1865.  The Conservative press observed that the Republicans had attempted to exclude blacks 
from the inauguration: “They have no desire for a mingling of the races.”  However, several 
black Nashvillians insisted on asserting their equality by placing bets that they could gain 
admittance to the inaugural ceremonies, including the evening ball.  Not since Isham G. Harris’s 
pre-Civil War inaugural ceremonies had so many people from both political parties turned out to 
witness the swearing-in of a new governor.  The press reported the presence of a number of 
prominent Conservatives and Democrats inside the capitol.  Among the Democrats were former 
Confederate general John C. Brown and Colonel J. J. Turner, as well as former Mississippi 
governor and Confederate congressman Henry S. Foote.  Influential Conservatives included 
former Tennessee governor Neill S. Brown, New South prophet Arthur S. Colyar, and W. Matt 
Brown, who had been ousted as mayor of Nashville in October 1867 by Governor Brownlow.  
The editor of the Conservative Nashville Union and American took note:  “The occasion was 
altogether complimentary to the new governor, in as much as there were present so many of 




of a despot . . . it is perfectly natural for the sovereign people to show signs of rejoicing at a 
change, even if it is not known what that change may bring forth.”  Most Tennesseans 
anticipated change—few expected Senter to march in lockstep with Brownlow.1    
Precisely at noon, the 45th Infantry’s band struck up “Hail to the Chief” as a committee 
of three representatives appointed by House speaker Richards accompanied Senter to the 
speaker’s stand.  After briefly addressing the joint session of the legislature, Richards called 
Supreme Court judge James O. Shackelford to the stand to administer the oath of office.  
Following the oath, Governor Senter delivered his much anticipated inaugural address.  He 
began by paying homage to his native state, which he promised to restore to its pre-Civil War 
prosperity.  He pledged to exercise fiscal responsibility, to reform the common school system, 
and to preserve peace and security by strict enforcement of Tennessee’s laws.  In closing, he 
requested the “cheerful co-operation of all good citizens of all classes, sects and parties.”  For 
those who wanted Senter to explain the specific policies that he would pursue in his 
administration, the governor’s carefully worded and guarded inaugural address proved 
frustrating.  “While not so brief or so laconic in style as the latter speeches of President Grant, it 
is possessed none the less of the same non-committal quality,” observed the editor of the 
Nashville Republican Banner.  “As to what policy is indicated, depends upon what way its 
language may be construed.”  Given the state’s volatile political environment, Senter chose to 
proceed cautiously.  Nevertheless, difficult decisions awaited him.  Sooner or later he would 
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have to act decisively on divisive issues that would test his political courage and mental 
fortitude.2      
As Senter entered on his duties as governor, no issue loomed larger than martial law in 
Middle and West Tennessee.  Remarkably, his inaugural address did not discuss the recent 
deployment of the State Guard.  Two days earlier, General Joseph A. Cooper, commander of the 
Guard, had ordered Lieutenant Colonel Larken B. Gamble to establish a military district 
encompassing Giles, Lawrence, Marshall, and Maury counties in Middle Tennessee.  With five 
companies (approximately 450 men) under his command, Gamble dispersed units throughout the 
region and instructed his subordinates to suspend civil law and arrest any suspected Klansmen.  
Those purported to be included on a list of Klansmen distributed among State Guard officers fled 
south across the state line into Alabama or went into hiding.  Although the Guard managed to do 
no more than capture a few rural bandits, its activities generated sensational rumors that 
panicked many Middle Tennesseans.  Anti-Radical newspapers printed elaborate accounts of 
State Guardsmen robbing local residents of coffee, cotton, and money, and carrying out mass 
arrests of Pulaski citizens who were then tried by drumhead court.  Alarmed Maury resident 
Nimrod Porter deemed it “a terrible state of affairs.”3      
Martial law and the deployment of State Guard were the main topics of discussion on city 
streets, in businesses and workshops, and on farms.  Even as the first State Guard units began 
moving out of their barracks in Nashville, citizens began holding “Law and Order” conventions 
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in meetinghouses and courtrooms in county seats throughout Middle and West Tennessee.  These 
conventions were the outgrowth of smaller assemblies of concerned citizens who had begun 
meeting in their towns in mid-January following a resurgence of Klan violence and Governor 
Brownlow’s call for militia volunteers.  The Law and Order movement quickly spread beyond 
the counties under martial law.  The conventions drew up resolutions and appointed delegations 
to make personal appeals to Governor Senter and General Cooper.  While resolutions varied 
from county to county, each convention condemned the recent outbreak of violence, proclaimed 
that law and order had been restored, denounced secret organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan 
and the Union Leagues, promised all necessary assistance to civil authorities in the enforcement 
of the law, pledged to support all state laws including the franchise, and urged that martial law be 
rescinded and the militia disbanded.  Chronicling the surging popular movement, the Memphis 
Daily Appeal reported that “the people throughout the State are doing what they can to show to 
the powers that be their willingness to avert what is so much dreaded—martial law and the 
militia.”4     
Senter spent his first few days in office meeting with one county delegation after another.  
Prior to his inauguration, many of the same delegates had visited with Senter and their 
lawmakers in the governor-elect’s room over William T. Berry’s bookstore in Nashville for 
discussions that often dragged on into the late hours.  Then, Speaker Senter had demanded 
action, not simply words.  Now, Governor Senter assured the petitioners that their resolutions 
would be carefully considered.  Whereas Senter treated the delegations with great respect, 
General Cooper, a zealous East Tennessee Radical, was hostile and skeptical about the ex-
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Rebels’ expressions of goodwill.  When Representative Robertson Medlin of Madison County 
attempted to ease the tension during a meeting between Cooper and a delegation from his county 
by stating that he thought the local authorities and citizens could preserve the peace, the general 
launched into a tirade: “It is remarkably strange that you gentlemen have so recently discovered 
your ability to enforce the laws; strange that your civil officers are now so effective.”  While the 
Radical general made preparations for additional deployments, Senter proved sympathetic, 
promising the county delegations that he would rescind martial law and disband the militia if the 
citizens actively demonstrated their commitment to upholding the law and preserving order.5  
On February 27, Governor Senter met with a delegation of Giles County officials that 
included the sheriff, clerk, judge, and attorney general.  Sheriff David Parsons informed Senter 
that he commanded the support of all Giles County citizens and reiterated an earlier pledge to 
arrest and punish Rebel vigilantes.  In response, Senter agreed to modify General Cooper’s 
martial edict.  Following the meeting, he ordered Cooper to restore civil law by reopening all 
courts in the counties under martial law and to have his officers to provide all necessary aid to 
local law enforcement.  The governor’s modification of martial law was well received by most 
ex-Rebels.  However, some insisted that he go further, demanding that he not only rescind 
martial law and recall the State Guard but also repudiate Radicalism and purge his administration 
of every last vestige of Brownlowism.  Lawyer and former Confederate congressman Joseph 
Brown Heiskell of Memphis pressed Senter to remove Cooper from command: “I am astonished 
that a man raised in the Old Whig school of political principles and with such views as I believe 
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you to entertain of constitutional law, did not displace him at once, and cause proceedings to be 
instituted against him in the criminal courts.”  But with the exception of a few outspoken ex-
Rebels like Heiskell, Conservatives and Democrats greeted Senter’s relaxation of martial law 
with enthusiasm, if somewhat reserved enthusiasm.  Senter had demonstrated that he was his 
own man; but it was not yet clear how far the new governor intended to step outside of 
Brownlow’s shadow at the risk of alienating Radical hard-liners.6        
Numerous factors prompted Senter’s modification of martial law.  As a Republican 
leader in the General Assembly, he had compromised his moderate principles time and time 
again to tow the party line; yet with an eye toward the 1869 election and winning the 
governorship in his own right in the face of a potential Radical challenge for the nomination, he 
now sought to win over the “respectable” white vote.  Therefore, Governor Senter welcomed the 
Conservative delegations that called on him in Nashville and accepted their pledges that the 
county authorities would effectively deal with Klan violence.  In the General Assembly, 
moderate Republicans testified to a marked improvement in conditions in the counties under 
martial law.  A joint resolution passed in the House authorizing the governor to disband the 
militia failed in the Senate by only three votes.  Radical Joshua Bunyan Frierson of Klan-infested 
Maury County vehemently opposed the measure, insisting that “if the militia were disbanded 
these men who have been holding peace meetings, etc., will chuckle in their sleeves, and the 
Kuklux will rise up again and prowl around the country night by night.”  Although the resolution 
narrowly failed, the vote revealed that opposition to the State Guard was gaining strength among 
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legislators.  The governor was also inundated with petitions signed by thousands of Middle and 
West Tennesseans protesting martial law and militia occupation.  One from Wilson, a county not 
under martial law, stretched out to thirty-three feet in length when unfurled in Senter’s office.  
Nearly every high-ranking civil official from the martial-law counties visited the capitol to 
reassure Senter that they had the support of their communities to suppress the Klan.7     
Moreover, Governor Senter received numerous reports from people he trusted claiming 
that conditions in Middle and West Tennessee were not as bad as originally stated and thus did 
not warrant martial law.  The Klan violence that had swept through Middle and West Tennessee 
in January and early February subsided following the discovery of detective Barmore’s remains.  
This was due in part to growing Conservative opposition to the Klan.  It was becoming 
increasingly clear to Conservatives that Klan leaders were losing organizational control.  Some 
Conservative spokesmen alleged that unruly poor whites were infiltrating local dens, perverting 
it from its original purposes and exercising mob law.  In a January 13 letter intended for 
publication, former Tennessee governor Neill S. Brown appealed to the Klan for peace and 
criticized it for creating obstacles to enfranchisement, immigration, and economic prosperity: “I 
beg you to reflect that while I and thousands of others are struggling constantly to regain our lost 
privileges, we are thwarted at every step by continual reports of outrages upon the law, attributed 
to your organization.”  Brown and other Conservative leaders feared that continuing Klan 
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violence would take the steam out of the universal suffrage movement at a critical time when it 
was beginning to make inroads into the Tennessee Republican party.  In closing, Brown urged 
former Confederates who still harbored grudges against Unionists to abandon those sentiments 
and look to the future.  “The past is gone; let it be buried,” he declared.  “The future is ours if we 
will only cherish and cultivate it.”8    
Although Brown exercised considerable influence among Conservatives, the marked 
decline in Klan violence across Middle and West Tennessee was largely a result of the increasing 
frustration and vocal protests of the Democratic press, community leaders, and former 
Confederate officers.  As early as mid-December 1868, the Pulaski Citizen, theretofore the 
official organ of the Klan, published a letter to the editor asserting that Klan night raiding had 
gone too far, particularly raids on jails to lynch accused criminals.  In DeKalb County, R. C. 
Nesmith, a prominent lawyer and civic leader, blamed Klan activities for impeding the 
reenfranchisement of the former Rebels: “I believe that if the Kuklux would quit their outrages 
and lawlessness the chances for such men as myself or men in like political condition would 
soon get better.”  In late December 1868, General John C. Brown joined several other former 
Confederate officers to publicly condemn those operating outside the Klan’s aegis.  Perhaps the 
most significant factor in the decline in Klan activity was General Forrest’s supposed 
disbandment order.  Issued secretly on January 25, the order called on all local dens to halt their 
activities and on all members to destroy their regalia in the presence of their Grand Cyclops.  
Some headstrong members had violated the organization’s precepts, Forrest declared, and poor 
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whites had committed lawless acts in disguise for which the Klan had been blamed.  Forrest 
further instructed Klan members to assist civil officials in preserving order and upholding the 
law.  Passed around by hand, the order was disseminated among the dens, and Klan-sponsored 
violence abated in Tennessee as the organization went underground temporarily.  As Senter 
weighed his options, Klan members adopted the identity of peaceful and law-abiding 
Tennesseans.9         
Public opinion on Senter’s modification of the martial-law decree divided sharply and 
predictably along partisan lines.  Conservatives and Democrats lauded this evidence of the 
administration’s first clear break from Brownlowism; the Radicals were incensed.  “You know 
how the Rebbles hate us,” declared J. W. Bailey, a former slave from Fayette County in West 
Tennessee, in a letter to Senter.  “Still it appears to us that you take these Rebbles word for 
everything that they promise to do. . . .  They have been shooting and killing us up.”  Some 
Radicals feared that the governor’s next step would be to dismantle the State Guard.  “[T]o 
disband the militia,” claimed an alarmed Radical in Columbia in an urgent plea to General 
Cooper, “is to disband the Radical party.”10 
Having taken an important first step toward reconciliation by reopening civil courts in 
martial-law counties, Senter struggled to steer a middle course at the risk of alienating his party’s 
Radicals.  In early March, in an effort to conciliate Radicals and win his party’s nomination for 
governor, he ordered Cooper to deploy additional troops in Middle and West Tennessee.  Nearly 
                                                 
 
9 R. C. Nesmith to Wingate T. Robinson, December 14, 1868, January 19, 1869, Wingate Family Papers, 
Tennessee State Library and Archives; Nashville Republican Banner, December 29, 1868; Trelease, 
White Terror, 178-80, 470; Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 197-98, Horn, Invisible 
Empire, 356-57, 409; Sharon Loretta Wallace, “The Nashville, Pulaski, and Memphis, Tennessee Press 
Coverage and Reactions to the Ku Klux Klan, 1865-1871” (M.A. thesis, Fisk University, 1974), 75.   





six hundred State Guardsmen were sent to Livingston in Overton County and more than four 
hundred to Humboldt in Gibson County.  Conservative joy at Senter’s modification of martial 
law quickly waned as these additional Guardsmen spread throughout the countryside in a futile 
effort to capture Klansmen.11    
Most West Tennessee Radicals welcomed this reinforcement of the Guard.  Lucien Eaton 
of the Memphis Post pleaded for even more troops: “We need martial law right here.”  In early 
March, Memphis became a focus of Klan activity when the Metropolitan Police captured 
suspected Arkansas Klan leader and former Confederate major Josiah F. Earle, who had fled 
across the Mississippi River to escape Governor Powell Clayton’s crackdown on the Klan.  
Searching Earle’s pockets, a policeman discovered a disbandment order, echoing General 
Forrest’s January 1869 order, signed by the Arkansas Klan leader.  As news of Earle’s arrest 
spread, some of his friends surrounded the Shelby County courthouse demanding his release.  
After a judge postponed the decision on whether to turn Earle over to Arkansas authorities or 
release him, hundreds of Arkansas and Tennessee Klansmen descended on Memphis, holding 
public councils on street corners and in saloons and hotels and parading through the streets 
brandishing weapons.  The Eaton camp and the Memphis Post became the target of Earle’s 
supporters when the Radical organ ran stories connecting Earle to the Klan.  On the evening of 
March 3, Julius J. Dubose, editor of the Memphis Public Ledger and a former Confederate 
officer with close ties to Earle, and four armed ex-Rebel ruffians confronted Lucien and Charles 
Eaton in the Post’s editorial office.  Outside, Captain Matthew C. Galloway, an ex-Rebel officer 
and editor of the Memphis Avalanche, and nine Klansmen stood watch.  Hoping to draw the 
Eatons into an altercation, Dubose denounced Lucien as “a d—d liar & a God d—d son of a  
                                                 
 





b—h.”  But Lucien remained calm and the situation was defused.  The incident left Charles 
shaken however: “[T]he Ku Klux are too much for me in this country.”  Within a week, Earle 
was freed and Charles was bound for New England.  Charles’s departure was a significant blow 
to the Radical Eaton-Lewis camp.  Faced with a decline in subscriptions, lawsuits by Radical 
opponents, and vituperation from Conservatives and Rebels, Lucien shouldered the entire burden 
of managing his Radical propaganda and keeping it solvent.  The Earle incident proved that in 
spite of General Forrest’s disbandment order Tennessee’s Ku Klux Klan remained an active and 
formidable foe of the Radicals.12  
Even East Tennessee, the heartland of Tennessee Radicalism, was not immune from 
reactionary terrorism.  On several occasions, Klansmen struck on the Cumberland plateau and in 
the East Tennessee valley.  On the morning of Sunday, March 7, as blacks in Clinton made their 
way to Anderson County’s only freedmen’s school, which doubled as a church, they discovered 
plumes of smoke billowing from it.  After searching through the ruins, Sallie Daffin, the school’s 
black teacher, reported to a local Freedmen’s Bureau agent that bibles stored in the schoolhouse 
likely fueled the fire.  The raising of a United States flag at the school a few days earlier in 
celebration of President Ulysses S. Grant’s inauguration was the apparent motive.  Left behind 
on the school’s blackboard was a crudely scribbled message: “Three Cheers for U.S. Grant, 
President of the U. States.”13 
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Freedmen’s schoolhouses and churches were particular targets of the Klan.  These 
institutions and their agents empowered blacks in the post-emancipation world by expanding 
their political horizons and equipping them to exercise their newly attained rights of citizenship.  
Schoolhouses and churches were often used for Union League meetings.  The Union League, a 
vehicle for mass black politicization in the South during Reconstruction, was founded in the 
North during the Civil War as a patriotic Unionist club.  As the Union army penetrated the 
Confederacy, the League followed.  It spread into the upper South before the war ended, 
becoming a bastion of Radical Republicanism in Tennessee as the state’s Unionists restored civil 
government.14   
Tennessee’s Union League chapters, especially those in East Tennessee, achieved a 
remarkable degree of interracial harmony, as evidenced by the Maryville chapter, which, though 
the vast majority of its members were white, elected a number of black officers.  Moreover, the 
Maryville League helped secure victory in its black members’ bids for several local offices, 
fostering a relatively peaceful, albeit short-lived, experiment in biracial democracy.  The climax 
of this brief biracial partnership was the May 1869 election of William B. Scott, Sr., a free-born 
black, as Maryville’s mayor.  While the Maryville League’s black members continued to work 
harmoniously alongside their white colleagues, Scott and his son, William Scott, Jr., both active 
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in the League, assumed the lead within the chapter in breaking with the Radicals.  The Scotts, 
who published the Maryville Republican, the only black-owned newspaper in the state, gave 
voice to Tennessee blacks disillusioned by white Radical resistance to promoting blacks to state 
and national office.  Frustrated in his effort to advance the nomination of Thomas J. White, a 
black politician from Maury County, for Congress in the 1868 election, the elder Scott 
campaigned for Leonidas Houk, who bolted from the Brownlow camp to launch an independent 
bid for Congress.  Prior to the election, Scott and Houk plotted privately to transfer the Maryville 
Republican to the latter’s hometown of Clinton.  When the payment requested up front was not 
received, Scott abandoned the venture and sought to heal the divisions in the League.15        
Yet the divisions among Maryville’s Radicals had deeper sources.  As East Tennessee 
Radicals commenced political reconstruction, they also initiated an ecclesiastical reconstruction.  
Sharing the Northern evangelical view of Confederate defeat as God’s will and judgment for the 
crimes of human bondage and political treason, Radicals believed that a politically and 
religiously reconstructed Tennessee would safeguard the civil and religious liberties of 
Unionists.  As the head of the state and the most prominent of all religious Unionists in the 
aftermath of the war, Brownlow encouraged the persecution of Rebel preachers, who he argued 
had used the pulpit to promote rebellion in both church and state.  Heeding Brownlow’s call, the 
Maryville Union League vigorously prosecuted a religious war against Southern Methodists.  
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The Maryville League was credited with participating in three attacks on Southern Methodist 
preachers.  The most brutal occurred on March 25, 1869, when a mob of white Unionists 
including numerous League members met the Reverend Jacob Smith as he arrived at a 
schoolhouse near Maryville to perform church services.  The mob pulled Smith from his horse, 
stripped him, beat him with clubs, switches, and the butts of their guns, and left him to die.  
Members of the congregation rescued Smith, who, despite his injuries, insisted on preaching.  
Anti-Radicals condemned the Maryville “Radklux.”  The attack gave greater legitimacy to 
Conservative and ex-Rebel accusations that Union League tactics were no different from those of 
the Ku Klux Klan.  Moderate Republicans abhorred the religious vigilantism, which reinforced 
their belief that the Radicals were not yet willing to renounce the ruthless partisanship of the 
Brownlow regime.  The Scotts denounced the attack in their newspaper, calling it “injurious to 
our party interests.”  East Tennessee freedmen believed that the Radicals’ holy war hindered 
black political and educational advancement.  By late March 1869, numbers of East Tennessee 
blacks were joining the swelling chorus of disenchanted Tennessee freedmen.16  
Although black voters had contributed substantially to Republican victories in the 1867 
state election, the party’s program was never determined by its black constituents.  Republican 
leaders had granted concessions such as repealing restrictions on black court testimony, office-
holding, and jury service in return for black loyalty; however, subsequent political achievements 
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by a handful of freedmen were offset by tensions that escalated following the election.  
Tennessee’s blacks were forsaken as factional struggles set the Republican party at odds with 
itself.  Few black leaders had publicly voiced their frustration with the party’s white leadership 
prior to Brownlow’s departure.  Now, however, as Senter treaded cautiously and proved to be 
more conciliatory than his predecessor, blacks asserted themselves, in some cases launching 
independent efforts that disrupted local Republican political organizations.17   
In the first few months of Senter’s administration, the state’s newspapers printed 
numerous reports of violent altercations between black and white Republicans.  The May 13, 
1869, murder of Captain Harris, a black Union veteran, in Somerville shook the black 
community of Fayette County.  The deadly confrontation occurred when Harris, who harbored a 
grudge against a white Republican named Walter Graham, brushed up against Graham’s sister as 
they prepared to attend a traveling circus.  A few bitter words were exchanged before Harris 
walked off.  When the show was over, Harris returned and found Graham speaking to Paul 
Reeves, a close friend and kin to George W. Reeves, a prominent Radical circuit judge.  Harris 
walked up behind Graham and collared him.  Reeves then seized Harris, which enabled Graham 
to slip free of his attacker’s grasp.  Harris drew a pistol and fired; however, his shot missed its 
mark.  Eyewitness accounts differ as to what occurred next.  According to the Memphis Daily 
Appeal, Graham drew his pistol, took aim, and fired a shot through Harris’s head.  Somerville 
blacks, on the other hand, contended that Reeves fired the fatal bullet, as he shouted, “Let me 
shoot the damn nigger.”18          
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Regardless of whether Graham or Reeves shot Harris, Reeves’s connection to the murder 
stirred local blacks to a fever pitch.  In a letter to Governor Senter, J. W. Bailey, a former slave, 
expressed the community’s outrage: “[T]his was done by the niggers friend. . . .  [I]f we have to 
stand and see the Radicals as they call themselves . . . shoot down we collored people why we 
had just as well to support genrel For[res]t.”  Many Fayette County blacks had resolved not to 
vote for the incumbent circuit judge, Bailey continued, because of Reeves’s family ties.  “What 
is the use of talking about ecolity before the Law there is noone,” Bailey insisted.  “You have 
been telling us that we are allowed to hold an office.  I do not see noone of my collor in office 
and you says that we are allowed to sit on the juree bench but that is not so,” he complained.  
“When a white man kills a black man by having black men on the juree bench we then could 
defend our rights before the laws.”  Tennessee’s blacks were growing increasingly restive.  They 
wanted white Republicans to fulfill their pledge to secure black rights and to aid in the 
appointment of blacks to public office.19         
In Memphis, the Eaton-Lewis camp found itself caught between its ties with Governor 
Senter, through state patronage and various contracts, and its predominantly black rank and file, 
who were angered by the organization’s tepid support for black candidates for local, state, and 
federal office.  In February 1869, Edward Shaw, a black businessman who operated a saloon and 
gambling house, launched a bid for the Shelby County commission.  Barbour Lewis, chairman of 
the commission, and Congressman William J. Smith opposed Shaw’s candidacy in favor of a 
white Radical.  They sought a lesser post for Shaw, which according to Lewis, “would hardly 
make the trouble for us that the other arrangement will.”  To counter the perception of 
Republicans as a black man’s party, the Eaton-Lewis organization was endeavoring to develop a 
                                                 
 





“respectable” white constituency at the expense of its black constituency.  Frustrated by racial 
prejudice among white Radicals, Shaw aligned with Union veteran Hannibal C. Carter and 
William Kennedy, both prominent black leaders, and threatened to join an opposing Radical 
faction.  This tactic forced the Eaton-Lewis organization to publicly pledge to promote the 
freedmen’s political aspirations.  Shaw won and unity was, for the time being, preserved in the 
Lewis-Eaton camp.  “I think Carter and Shaw will act with us hereafter. . . .  At least they say 
they will,” wrote Lewis.  “If they would have the good sense and manliness to do so freely and 
honorably we could make a combination here that would keep our party in power for a long 
series of years.”  The alliance forged with Shaw, Carter, and Kennedy was expected to keep 
Shelby County blacks solidly in the Eaton-Lewis camp; however, racial tension persisted and the 
alliance came unglued.20    
The reluctance of Governor Senter and the General Assembly to ratify the recently 
proposed Fifteenth Amendment heightened black suspicions.  On his second day in office, Senter 
received a telegram from the state’s Radical representatives in Congress announcing that the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which prevented the nation or states from denying the right to vote based 
on race, color, or previous condition of servitude, had been passed and requesting that he keep 
the legislature in session to ratify it.  However, the governor refused to take action and the 
legislature adjourned sine die on March 1.  When pressed by some Radicals to call an 
                                                 
 
20 Barbour Lewis to John Eaton, Jr., February 6, March 1, 1869, Eaton Papers; United States Congress, 
House, Leftwich v. Smith, 41st Congress, 2nd sess., House Misc. Doc. 143, 144; McBride, “Blacks and 
the Race Issue in Tennessee Politics,” 299-300; Walter J. Fraser, Jr., “Black Reconstructionists in 
Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 34 (1975): 364-71.  When Shaw later learned that General 
Smith had secretly worked with Lewis against his election to the Shelby County commission, he asked 
Smith’s brother-in-law why the general was opposed to his candidacy.  The brother-in-law reportedly 
replied, “He like you as well as anybody else, but he don’t think a nigger should run for office.”  See 





extraordinary session to ratify the amendment, Senter pointed to the state’s financial crisis.  With 
the lengthy struggles over the militia and anti-Klan bills of the extraordinary session of 1868 still 
fresh in the minds of most, Senter declined to put the state through the expense of another 
session that might become deadlocked.  Senter considered the amendment’s primary objective to 
be to enfranchise blacks in the Northern and border states and thus solidify the Republican 
party’s national hegemony.  Given that Tennessee law already granted blacks the right to vote, 
and given the constitutional conservatism and commitment to federalism shared by most 
Tennesseans across the political spectrum, few Radicals criticized the governor’s decision not to 
act.  The McMinnville New Era, however, reminded the governor that since the beginning of the 
war Tennessee had led the South in passing sweeping political reforms.  Brownlow’s Knoxville 
Whig tread cautiously, announcing its support for an extra session yet commending Senter’s 
decision, considering the depleted condition of the state treasury.21   
By early 1869, Tennessee’s financial crisis permeated the state’s political atmosphere.  
As the Republicans expanded the scope of state government to embrace social welfare, economic 
development, and public education, anti-Radicals protested the increased taxation, public 
indebtedness, and widespread corruption that resulted.  Public outcry against the $40 million 
state debt was amplified by the revelation of the state bond and school fund scandals.  Bonds 
belonging to the Bank of Tennessee had disappeared after they had been turned over by military 
authorities, and some were reported to have been seen in the possession of East Tennessee 
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Radicals.  Anti-Radical newspapers called for an immediate investigation; however, the findings 
of an ongoing investigation into missing school funds, which implicated several Radical leaders 
including Governor Brownlow’s son, deterred Radical lawmakers from pursuing another issue 
that had the potential of hurting the party.  The Clarksville Patriot, a moderate Republican 
newspaper, decried the efforts of leading Radicals to stifle further investigation: “Whitewash as 
they may, . . . cover up as they may, they cannot get earth enough to shut out the sight of the 
festering corpse.”  For moderates seeking to win over “respectable” whites, the unscrupulous 
activities of certain leading Radicals cast a shadow on their party.  The corruption among Radical 
lawmakers and administration officials constituted yet another factor in the split within the 
Republican party.22    
In his inaugural address, Senter had pledged his commitment to financial restraint.  In the 
weeks that followed, this vow was tested as Conservatives and ex-Rebels charged that the State 
Guard deployment was bankrupting the state.  The anti-Radical press estimated that the militia 
cost taxpayers between five and six thousand dollars a day.  The Nashville Republican Banner 
asked, “Who, then, we should like to know, is to pay for the elephant?”  Several anti-Radical 
papers charged that the militia was kept in the field because the state did not have the funds to 
pay the soldiers.  When East Tennessee Radical taxpayers demanded that their lawmakers 
enforce the clause in the militia act stipulating that martial-law counties foot the bill, citizens and  
civil officials in those counties successfully resisted payment.23   
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In an effort to reduce the state’s expenses while still protecting blacks and white 
Radicals, Senter proceeded with plans to gradually withdraw State Guard units from the field.  In 
early April, he asked Quartermaster Albert S. Bayless to calculate the financial costs of the 
Guard deployment.  Bayless reported that the three-month deployment had cost the state 
$148,000, nearly half the total cost of the 1867 deployment.  Senter received further distressing 
news when Comptroller George W. Blackburn informed him that the war against the Klan was 
severely draining the state’s treasury.  Blackburn estimated that, given the current costs of the 
Guard and the public school system, the state would be bankrupt in a month.  Alarmed, Senter 
dispatched Blackburn to New York to get loans.  Working tirelessly for two months, Blackburn 
secured $50,000 from a bank in New York and $55,000 from the First National Bank of 
Nashville.  When news of the New York loan reached Tennessee, the editor of the Knoxville 
Press and Messenger cynically quipped, “So goes $50,000 of the people’s money, and not a 
criminal arrested, nor a Kuklux captured.”24   
The failure to arrest and prosecute Klansmen, as well as financial considerations, 
weighed heavily on Governor Senter as anti-Radical opposition to martial law mounted.  The 
Nashville Republican Banner suggested that “hunting missing school funds would be a much 
more profitable business to the State than [Guardsmen] hunting imaginary Kuklux in their 
dreams as they sleep away valuable time in camp at Nashville.”  Given the Klan’s success in 
evading the State Guard in 1867 by outlasting Radical taxpayers’ commitment to martial law, it 
is hardly surprising that it chose to adopt the same strategy in 1869.  A few aggressive militia 
                                                 
 
24 DeWitt C. Senter to Albert S. Bayless, April 6, 1869, Albert S. Bayless to DeWitt C. Senter, April 14, 
1869, George W. Blackburn to DeWitt C. Senter, April 23, 1869, George W. Blackburn to DeWitt C. 
Senter, June 29, 1863, Senter Papers; Knoxville Press and Messenger, May 19, 1869; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, April 22, 24, 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, May 12, 1869; Severance, 





officers led raids in pursuit of fugitive Klansmen, including one that extended beyond the limits 
of martial law into Putnam County; however, such expeditions netted few nightriders.  With 
nearly 1,600 soldiers stationed in Middle and West Tennessee and no enemy to fight, the 
misdeeds of a few officers and men of the State Guard precipitated an additional round of 
civilian protests against martial law.25 
While the State Guard generally proved to be a well-regulated instrument of force, the 
opponents of martial law seized on any incidents in which the militia infringed on the civil 
liberties of law-abiding citizens or that reflected poorly on the professionalism or morality of the 
Guardsmen themselves.  According to the anti-Radical press, the militia wreaked havoc in the 
martial-law counties, brutalizing citizens.  The editor of the Nashville Union and American 
declared that the officers “cannot entirely control the ragamuffins and desperate characters.”  
There were accounts of militiamen preying on defenseless old men, women, and children, 
threatening, and in some cases causing, bodily harm as they robbed their victims.  “Whatever 
they want they take without scruple,” reported the Nashville Republican Banner.  Guardsmen 
stationed in cities and towns, particularly Nashville, were frequently accused of immoral 
activities.  The capital’s notorious eight-square-block nest of saloons and brothels known as 
“Smokey Row” benefited from the large numbers of militiamen seeking recreation.  Militiamen 
were accused of drunkenly roaming the streets, brandishing guns, picking fights, and committing 
theft.  The anti-Radical press also told of militiamen seen visiting houses of prostitution, where 
many contracted venereal disease.  Such reports contributed to Senter’s eventual decision (in 
                                                 
 
25 Nashville Republican Banner, March 4, April 23, 1869; Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, April 24, 





early May) that no additional State Guard units should be mustered out at Nashville; rather, they 
were to muster out in the counties in which they were organized (primarily in East Tennessee).26   
The idle white State Guardsmen even began to target the freedmen they were called to 
protect.  There were several reports of militiamen attacking and robbing blacks.  Perhaps the 
most egregious incident of this sort during the 1869 deployment occurred on February 26.  That 
evening, a Private Adams of Company C, 1st Tennessee State Guards, left his camp on the 
outskirts of Pulaski after stealing an overcoat, two revolvers, and two blankets from a tentmate.  
Adams then visited former Confederate general John C. Brown’s farm; but finding Brown absent 
he stole a mule on which he rode away into the night.  About two and half miles from Pulaski, 
Adams stopped at the cabin of Pete Howell, a freedman who had a wife and a twelve-year-old 
daughter.  Adams told the family that he had orders to take Howell and his daughter to give 
testimony on Klan activity in Giles County.  Howell informed Adams that he would go willingly 
but that his daughter knew nothing, and that given the cold temperature he preferred she remain 
home with her mother.  Adams agreed and instructed Howell to take the mule and go over the 
hill, where his captain and approximately sixty soldiers were waiting.  As soon as Howell was 
out of sight, Adams drew his pistol and forced the girl to go with him into the woods, where he 
raped her.  Failing to find any militia force waiting for him beyond the hill, Howell returned 
home and discovered that his daughter had been abducted.  In the meantime, the girl managed to 
make it to the cabin of Henry Aymett, a family friend, who carried her back home.  On learning 
what had happened, Howell and Aymett hastily summoned a few of their friends and went in 
                                                 
 
26 Nashville Union and American, March 3, 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, March 17, 18, April 7, 9, 
13, May 8, 1869; Severance, Tennessee’s Radical Army, 156, 213-220, 243.  For an examination of the 
visibility of urban prostitution that triggered contentious public debates over its legalization in Civil War 
Nashville, see D. Jeannine Cole, “‘Upon the Stage of Disorder’: Legalized Prostitution in Memphis and 





pursuit of Adams.  When they found him they shot him twice in the arm and beat him with the 
butts of their muskets, fracturing his skull.  Partially covering him with leaves and bark, they left 
him in a pool of his own blood.27 
The next morning, Private Adams dragged himself to the home of a Mrs. Williams, who 
attempted to care for him.  State Guard captain Edwin E. Winters conducted an investigation and 
decided that if Adams survived his injuries he should suffer the extreme penalty of the law.  As 
Adams recovered at the Williams home, a group of local freedmen went there, intent on 
vengeance.  They found Adams lying in bed surrounded by several other Guardsmen.  The 
freedmen convinced the militiamen that they had been sent by Captain Winters to bring Adams 
to town.  A few moments after they left with Adams, gunshots were heard.  Adams’s dead body 
was discovered a few hundred yards from the house, riddled with bullets.28           
The rape incensed Pulaski’s blacks, who joined their white neighbors in calling for the 
State Guard’s removal from Giles County.  At a formal protest a week after the incident attended 
by thousands of citizens of both races, Captain Winters warned the blacks that the county’s white 
leaders were a “G—d d—d set of rebels” and that if the militia, their “friends and protectors,”  
left Giles, then “the Ku Klux would be as numerous as ever.”  Colonel Larken Gamble vowed to 
reinforce discipline among his men.  He prohibited the consumption of liquor in the camps and  
barred militiamen from entering Pulaski.29   
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Despite Gamble’s efforts to impose discipline, violent altercations between the State 
Guard and Giles County blacks continued.  In early April, three Guardsmen broke into the house 
of freedman Wash Black demanding money.  Black recognized one of the militiamen, who then 
panicked and emptied his revolver into Black’s chest, killing him.  Two days later, a fight 
erupted in Pulaski’s public square as two militiamen attempted to rob a freedman of some 
tobacco he was carrying.  When he refused to give up the tobacco, the militiamen pelted him 
with rocks.  Forced to retreat about fifty yards, the freedman picked up a huge stone and rushed 
toward his assailants.  At this juncture, the soldiers’ commanding officer and the town constable 
intervened.  The officer promptly arrested his men.  However, the constable demanded that the 
soldiers be turned over to him and arraigned in the civil court, to which the officer replied, “by 
G—d, none of my men can be tried by the civil courts of this county!”30 
The misbehavior of State Guardsmen in Giles, the birthplace of the Ku Klux Klan and 
home to four Klan dens, produced an unlikely alliance between the disfranchised whites and 
discontented blacks.  Working side by side, they prepared a petition to Governor Senter, stating 
that “friendly relations have existed at all times between the white and colored people of Giles” 
and that the county’s black citizens “do not desire the presence of militia.”  The black signers 
protested that “their families and those of the white people among whom they live are constantly 
exposed to the danger of pillage and outrage by the vicious men who thus seek to elude 
responsibility for their crimes.”  While praising the majority of the militia officers and men, who 
seemed disposed to do their duty, the petitioners suggested that the Guard might better serve in a 
region in which Klan crimes were actually occurring.  If the county’s civil officers should prove 
unable to secure peace, they added, perhaps federal troops could be provided.  Thus did the 
                                                 
 





criminal actions of a few lawless militiamen add to the mounting pressure on Governor Senter to 
disband the Guard.31      
For many white Tennesseans, the great panacea for the economic ills of the state was 
immigration.  Bristling at black independence, Conservative and Democratic spokesmen 
promoted schemes to replace black laborers with Northern immigrants or imported foreigners.  
Some suggested that white immigrants could not only solve the labor problem but also help 
redeem the state from Radical rule.  The Nashville Daily Press and Times proclaimed, “Let’s 
welcome the immigrant and populate and develop, and place the grand old Volunteer State along 
side her enterprising sisters of the great Northwest, in the line of progress on the road to freedom, 
prosperity and happiness. . . .  [T]reasures of wealth are within easy reach.”  The Radicals agreed 
on this last point.  Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig chided the legislature for its failure to act, which 
cost the state “millions of dollars which she needs and for want of which she is staggering under 
a heavy burden of debt and difficulty.”  Despite legislative inactivity, the state’s railroads 
supported immigration by offering reduced rates to those who would settle in Tennessee.  As in 
other Southern states, an immigration bureau was established in Tennessee and agents were 
dispatched to the North and Europe to recruit immigrants.  Few came, however.  Republicans 
claimed that Klan violence kept them away.  Conservatives and Democrats countered that 
Brownlow’s declaration of martial law and the calling out of the State Guard were to blame.  
Whatever the case, many potential immigrants did indeed have doubts about settling in 
Tennessee.  “We hear a great deal about disturbances between whites & blacks in your State,” 
wrote one Northerner.  Another told a Dickson County real estate agent, “All that is wanted, is to 
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let us, up here in Ohio know that we can live in Tennessee in peace & safety, and such a stream 
of wealth will pour in which will be hard to stop.”  Governor Senter agreed that immigration 
would be a boon to the state and concluded that disbanding the Guard would encourage it.32            
Constitutional issues were also on Governor Senter’s mind as he considered what to do 
about Brownlow’s proclamation of martial law and the calling out of the Guard.  Ex-Confederate 
and Memphis lawyer Joseph Heiskell denounced martial law as unconstitutional and urged 
Senter to revoke it: “I do hope my dear sir that you have not forgotten the ideas you once had of 
free government & of the sacredness of constitutional rights and that you will decline to emulate 
the bad eminence of your predecessor in regard to outrages on the constitution.”  On the day 
Senter succeeded to the governorship, the Nashville Daily Press and Times took note of Radical 
judge J. F. Lauck’s return from Gainsboro, the county seat of Jackson County, one of the nine 
included in Brownlow’s martial-law edict, where he had presided over a two-week session of the 
chancery court.  During that time Lauck met with men from all parties and from every portion of 
the county and was favorably impressed by the peaceful conditions and general sentiment of law 
and order.  The newspaper commented that “it is not to be presumed that his impressions were 
                                                 
 
32 Nashville Daily Press and Times, January 18, 22, April 8, 9, May 7, 10, 1869; Knoxville Whig, March 
3, 1869; Memphis Daily Appeal, January 17, 1869; Nashville Union and American, January 29, 1869; 
James H. Owings to Henry Clements Collier, May 17, 1869, J. C. Ford to Henry Clements Collier, March 
10, 1869, E. Higham to Henry Clements Collier, April 3, 1869, Collier Family Papers, Tennessee State 
Library and Archives; Nashville Republican Banner, June 8, 1869.  Anti-Radicals also pointed to the 
state’s franchise and registration laws as a formidable barrier to immigration.  See Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, July 21, 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, June 20, 1869.  One of the more bizarre foreign 
immigration schemes, led by former governor Isham G. Harris and Confederate general Gideon J. Pillow, 
was to import Chinese laborers to work in the cotton fields.  A convention was called in Memphis in July 
1869 to discuss Chinese immigration; however, the plan was derailed in the fall of 1869 when the 
legislature passed a law prohibiting the importation of Chinese into Tennessee.  See Lennie Austin 
Cribbs, “The Memphis Chinese Labor Convention, 1869,” West Tennessee Historical Papers 37 (1983); 
74-81; Lucy M. Cohen, Chinese in the Post-Civil War South: A People Without a History (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 65-66; Columbia Herald, July 30, 1869; Nashville Republican 
Banner, July 1, 1869, November 24, 26, 1869. 




made by any prejudice in favor of the ex-Confederates.”  Such evidence was flaunted by 
Conservative and Democratic newspapers as they editorialized against the “spiteful infliction” of 
martial law and militia tyranny.33 
Judge James Shackelford of the Tennessee Supreme Court probably influenced Governor 
Senter’s decision to relax martial law.  Shortly after Senter’s inauguration, Shackelford met 
privately with the governor and General Cooper and offered his opinion “that in times of peace 
no power existed to declare martial law, and if men were tried, they . . . and the officers engaged, 
would ultimately be held amenable.”  Shackelford added that the other two justices on the court 
concurred.  Given the court’s apparently waning support of Radical legislation, and the editorials 
of Conservative and Democratic papers urging the friends of any Tennesseans arrested by the 
State Guard to apply immediately to Judge Connelly F. Trigg of the United States Circuit Court 
for East Tennessee for a writ of habeas corpus, the question of the constitutionality of martial 
law weighed heavily on the mind of Governor Senter as he considered disbanding the militia.34  
As he contemplated these political, economic, and constitutional issues stemming from 
martial law, the governor left Nashville bound for East Tennessee and a couple of relaxing weeks 
at home with his wife in Grainger County.  Reporting that the governor was considering an 
extensive reduction of militia forces and noting that he had relaxed martial law prior to his 
previous visit to East Tennessee, the Nashville Republican Banner quipped, “Hurrah for Mrs. 
Senter.”  When the governor’s train arrived in Knoxville on April 1, he was met by a large crowd 
clamoring for a speech.  He gave them one, taking the opportunity to assert that the counties 
placed under martial law had proven to be among the most peaceful in the state.  He applauded 
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Middle and West Tennesseans’ Law and Order conventions, which denounced Klan violence and 
pledged the public’s cooperation with civil authorities in the enforcement of the law.  “Under this 
beneficent state of affairs,” announced Senter, “the militia might soon be disbanded and sent 
home to plow.”  He cautioned, however, that if vigilantes continued to persecute loyal citizens 
and the State Guard had to be called out again, “then wo[e] be unto those upon whom the hand of 
stern justice should fall!”35    
The much anticipated large-scale disbandment of the militia had in fact commenced days 
before Senter’s departure from Nashville.  By mid-April, only five companies, consisting of 
approximately five hundred militiamen, remained on duty, stationed in the three militia districts 
of Pulaski (Giles County), Humboldt (Gibson County), and Livingston (Overton County).  
Senter believed that these forces, strategically placed across Middle and West Tennessee, were 
sufficient to deter Rebel lawlessness.  With judicial and state elections looming on the horizon, 
and still anxious to maintain Radical support for his gubernatorial bid, Senter declined to disband 
the Guard completely.36   
 Middle and West Tennessee Radicals were shocked and incensed at Senter’s refusal to 
continue Brownlow’s policies.  From mid-April through May, his office was inundated with 
letters and petitions reporting renewed Rebel lawlessness and appealing for militia protection.  
Writing on behalf of their frightened constituents, Congressman David A. Nunn and other 
leaders in Haywood County warned that, for the time being, it would not be safe to withdraw the 
militia.  William A. Peffer of Clarksville informed Senter that “The spirit of the democracy in 
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this city and county today is as violent as it could have been in 1860-1.”  “No Colored man can 
have justice done him,” proclaimed William Stilwell of Humboldt.  The Klan, he said, had 
resumed its midnight rides in Gibson and surrounding counties, preying on the black community.  
When the militia made arrests, Stilwell noted, friendly judges and juries acquitted the accused 
and billed the state for the costs incurred.  He and other Radicals therefore insisted that without 
martial law behind it, the Guard was impotent.  Stilwell was certain that “if the militia could be 
permitted to work upon the rebels here one month” it could flush out the Klan and bring the 
Rebels to heel.  He informed General John Eaton, Jr., that “Only yesterday a Conservative friend 
told me that so soon as the Guards are withdrawn, the Radicals will be punished for bringing 
them here!”  In a candid letter to Senter, Major Judge K. Clingan of the State Guard bluntly 
warned of the political cost of failing to defend the Klan’s victims: “These people want 
protection and will support the man who they think will do it.”37   
As the Radicals protested Senter’s policy on martial law and the State Guard, Senator 
William Brownlow came to his successor’s defense.  Brownlow remained a respected figure 
among Tennessee Radicals in spite of General William B. Stokes’s campaign to assume 
leadership of the party’s Radicals.  The senator and his son, John, continued to publish the 
influential Knoxville Whig.  Decrying Republican attacks on Senter as unjust, the Brownlows 
pointed out that he had inherited a militia law enacted by a decided majority of the legislature 
and a State Guard activated by Governor Brownlow: 
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To have precipitately disbanded—even if Ku Klux outrages had not been imminently 
threatening, would have enabled the rebel sheets to have proclaimed throughout the land, 
that the Governor did not sustain his party, and in a measure to have imposed upon the 
country as a truth their constant false assertion, “that all was peace,” when there was no 
peace. Moreover, such a course would have tended to sow the seeds of mistrust and want 
of confidence in his party. . . .  Gov. Senter has shown, we think, all due regard to 
economy in this particular, by disbanding the State Guards as rapidly as public safety and 
the personal security of loyal citizens were assured.38     
While Senter moved away from Brownlow’s policies, his efforts did not wholly appease 
Conservatives.  They demanded that he go further.  The anticipation of change that Senter’s 
inauguration had generated among Conservatives gave way by mid-April to disillusionment.  
The Nashville Union and American lamented that “Governor Senter is content to run the 
machine in the old rut.  With the exception of fewer proclamations one would not know that 
there was a change of rulers.  We have simply swapped the devil for a witch.”  West Tennessee 
Conservative businessmen protested the criminal actions of the militiamen quartered in 
Humboldt.  M. G. Senter begged Governor Senter to “relieve us from this State of Thieves” that 
have desecrated “our little town.”  Certainly the Conservatives were pleased by Senter’s 
relaxation of martial law and subsequent reduction of the militia; however, they continued their 
protests in the hope of inducing the administration to completely disband the militia.  The 
Conservatives’ reaction was an indication that Senter, heading into the gubernatorial election, 
had failed to win over the “respectable” white voters he so desperately sought.39        
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The remaining units of the State Guard did not formally muster out of service until July 
1869; however, once the administration commenced the extensive reduction of the Guard, after 
nearly two months of active service, Tennessee’s Radical army ceased to be a reliable, well-
regulated enforcement arm of the state’s Republican party.  Although the Guard generally 
behaved professionally as it sought to defend Radicals and protect the freedmen’s rights, the 
actions of a few lawless militiamen undermined its efforts.  The Guard’s brief deployment in 
1869 was a short-term success, for it stifled Klan violence and restored order in Middle and West 
Tennessee for the time being.  It was a failure in the long term, however, for the Klan adopted 
the same strategy of evasion that had proved effective during the 1867 deployment.  When the 
governor withdrew the militia, the Klan and kindred organizations emerged from their hiding 
places and resumed their reign of terror.  The editor of the Radical Nashville Daily Press and 
Times lamented on March 12 that “While the assassins lurk in the State, unpunished and 
undiscovered, the law remains unvindicated and the people can feel no security.”  State Guard 
historian Benjamin H. Severance concludes that “the Rebels’ paramilitary defiance outlasted the 
Radicals’ commitment to armed suppression.”  That persisting defiance would prove disastrous 
for Tennessee’s Radicals, particularly the freedmen.40     
Governor Senter inherited a precarious position.  Thereafter he walked the political 
tightrope cautiously in the hope of forging an alliance between moderate Republicans and 
Conservatives without altogether alienating Radicals.  But Tennessee’s Republican party was 
under pressure from a variety of sources.  The deployment of the State Guard generated tensions 
within the party, angering many whom it was intended to help—white Radicals and the 
                                                 
 





freedmen.  Battered by financial crisis, scandals, militia lawlessness, and doubts about the 
constitutionality of martial law in peacetime, Tennessee’s Republican party was torn asunder.  
As the election season approached, it remained to be seen whether Senter could unite the 
Republican party while appealing successfully to Conservative voters.  The involvement of 
President Andrew Johnson in the canvass and the Radicals’ efforts to mobilize the freedmen for 























TENNESSEE REPUBLICANS’ HOUSE DIVIDED: MARCH-MAY 1869 
 
They began arriving early, shortly after daybreak on Saturday, March 20.  Some traveled 
by train from nearby cities and towns; others rode on horseback or in buggies from the 
countryside and outskirts of town.  But many more came on foot to welcome home their adopted 
son, Andrew Johnson.  A brass band entertained the large crowd that gathered around the depot 
in Greeneville.  The depot’s platform, cars, and practically everything else to which a flag could 
be affixed were decorated with the national colors.  Local dignitaries occupied a covered 
archway on the platform and were joined by young women dressed in white and crowned with 
wreaths of flowers.  The platform and benches were filled by ladies and businessmen, while the 
railroad tracks were flanked by East Tennessee’s yeomanry.  The drizzle that had been falling 
since daylight soon ceased and the clouds parted to permit the sun to shine brightly over the 
festivities.  Abruptly, the shrill whistle of a train engine in the distance denoting the coming of 
Johnson and his family created a sensation among the well-wishers.  As the former president’s 
special train adorned with national flags and bunting came to a stop, it was immediately 
encircled by a throng of supporters, the men cheering, the women waving handkerchiefs.  When 
Johnson and his party emerged from the train, a tumultuous roar of applause broke forth.  
Johnson reveled in the outpouring and spent several minutes speaking with old friends before 
being taken away in a carriage.  The procession then rode down Main Street to the courthouse.  
Along the way, Johnson’s party passed the very spot in which he had in June 1861 last spoken 




across the street by Confederate supporters reading, “Andrew Johnson, Traitor,” and bearing a 
crude sketch of then-Senator Johnson hanging by his neck.  Eight years later, ex-President 
Johnson now passed under quite a different banner strung across the street; it read, “Welcome 
Home, Andrew Johnson, Patriot.”1 
At the courthouse, James Britton, Jr., the attorney general of the circuit court and 
longtime Johnson acquaintance, delivered an address that highlighted the former president’s 
political career and his devotion to the Constitution.  Following Britton’s speech, Thomas Amos 
Rogers Nelson, an influential Tennessee Conservative, introduced the man of the hour.  Johnson 
then addressed the crowd, which had by now swelled to nearly a thousand well-wishers 
vigorously waving American flags.  He reminisced about the town that had welcomed him as a 
young tailor and subsequently nurtured his political career.  He defended his tenure as president 
and challenged his critics to prove him wrong.  He proclaimed March 4, his last day in office, to 
be his personal emancipation day and announced that he was now home again and his public 
career was over.  Concluding his brief remarks, Johnson stepped back into the carriage and the 
procession continued down Main Street to his home, where he was greeted warmly by his 
daughter Mary and his grandchildren.  As the former president thanked the crowd, the band 
struck up “Home, Sweet Home.”  “Andrew Johnson’s presence was felt in Tennessee so soon as 
his foot pressed its soil,” declared the editor of the Nashville Republican Banner.  “The country 
is not done with A. Johnson yet.  Tennessee is not done with him.”2  
                                                 
 
1 Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, March 21, 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, March 23, 1869; 
Knoxville Whig, March 24, 1869; Robert Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebeian and Patriot (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1928), 488-89; James S. Jones, Life of Andrew Johnson (Greeneville, 
Tennessee: East Tennessee Publishing Company, 1901), 335-36. 
2 Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, March 21, 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, April 10, 1869; 




Few took Johnson’s pledge of retirement seriously.  Augustus Ricks, an East Tennessee 
correspondent for the Cincinnati Commercial, failed to find a single Greeneville resident who 
believed that the former president would remain quiet for long.  One said that “private life will 
be to him what dry land is to a fish.”  Another, who had known Johnson since he moved to the 
mountain community in 1826, expected him to reenter the political fray because “Greeneville is 
too small a place to contain so large a man.”  Indeed, Johnson himself agreed.  “Greeneville is a 
dull place and seems likely to continue so,” he admitted in a letter to his youngest son, Andrew 
Johnson, Jr.  Politics and power were the passions of Johnson’s life, and not even the nation’s 
highest office could wholly satisfy his desire for them.  George Townsend, a Washington 
reporter, observed that “Mr. Johnson will hardly consent to relapse quietly into private life, after 
enjoying the sweets of office for so many eventful years, and holding the reins of power until a 
desire for authority has become a second nature.”  Johnson remained tightlipped about his 
political future, but reports of his plans soon leaked into the press.  The Bolivar Bulletin claimed 
even before his return that he was planning a speaking tour across Tennessee.  A person who 
traveled with Johnson from Washington to Greeneville claimed to have overheard him on the 
train remarking that “There is a good deal of life in me yet.  If the people of Tennessee should 
require my services, I would not feel justified in refusing them in behalf of the public good.”3   
Johnson spent his first few days in Greeneville receiving visitors from all parts of the 
state.  Passersby often caught a glimpse of him sitting in his yard engaged in vigorous political 
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talks.  Johnson was willing to discuss with his callers the situation in Tennessee, but he became 
much more animated when the conversation turned to national politics.  He was anxious to 
defend his administration.  Acquittal in his Senate impeachment trial was not enough; he sought 
full vindication.  Still, he refused to reveal his immediate plans to any except a few members of 
his inner circle.4        
The pending statewide elections offered an opportunity for vindication.  Johnson had his 
eye on the U.S. Senate seat soon to be vacated by Joseph Fowler.  The elections would obviously 
garner national interest if Johnson entered the canvass.  “If Johnson should take the stump,” 
wrote an anonymous Nashville correspondent to a Cincinnati newspaper, “he would make a 
tremendous stir.”  Tennessee’s Conservatives agreed.  Shortly after the November 1868 
presidential election, Conservatives began writing Johnson to see if he could be induced to run 
for governor.  Edward Golladay, a Lebanon lawyer and former Confederate officer, predicted 
that once Johnson had “redeemed the state” he would be rewarded with a U.S. Senate seat.  As 
his last day in office neared, President Johnson was deluged with messages from Tennesseans 
assuring him that with the Republicans mired in a factional struggle he could easily win the 
governorship and usher in a Conservative revolution.  Longtime friend Robert Weakley Brown 
told him “that you may be the Providential instrument to redeem Tennessee from Radical—
bondage and misrule.”  It remained unclear to most Tennessee Conservatives whether Johnson 
intended to lead them to their promised land.  But those in Johnson’s inner circle knew that his 
quest for vindication was driving him to plunge into Tennessee’s roiling political waters.5        
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From Greeneville, Johnson announced an ambitious speaking tour throughout Tennessee.  
He was careful, however, not to declare his intention to seek office, depicting himself instead as 
just a public citizen.  “I will indulge in no set speeches,” he claimed, “but I will have a few 
simple conversations with the people here and there.”  He was eager to get started, to test the 
public pulse.  And no one could deny that he was one of the ablest campaign stumpers that the 
American political system had ever produced.  However, the revolutionary events of the past 
eight years had profoundly altered the political landscape.  On the one hand, Johnson was hated 
by ex-Rebels for his wartime Unionism and his fierce suppression of secessionism as military 
governor.  On the other hand, he was despised by Radicals for his abandonment of the Union 
party and his lenient Reconstruction policies as president.  “I shall not be surprised, therefore, if 
he is not as successful as in former years,” Gideon Welles, Johnson’s secretary of the navy, 
recorded in his diary. “[U]nder the sweeping proscription by which Brownlow and his [Radical] 
faction have aimed to disfranchise all who are opposed to them, the ex-President may find it 
more difficult than he apprehends to serve the State.”  The Conservatives’ only hope lay in the 
complete breakdown of Republican unity.6    
The Republicans had, of course, been gradually splitting since Brownlow’s reelection as 
governor and subsequent election to the U.S. Senate in 1867.  Johnson, fully aware of the rupture 
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in the Republican party, saw in it an opportunity, and thus took to the hustings to appeal to 
Conservatives and moderate Republicans.  From Greeneville he journeyed to Knoxville, 
Chattanooga, Nashville, and Memphis.  At each stop he advocated the removal of all political 
disabilities, attacked President Grant, and reminded his listeners that their constitutional liberties 
were threatened by a usurping Congress.  Bidding for the support of moderate Republicans, he 
reminded them of his unwavering fealty to the Union throughout the war and claimed credit for 
preserving republican government.  His tone changed depending on the venue.  In East 
Tennessee he emphasized his wartime Unionism, but in Middle and West Tennessee he 
emphasized his antebellum accomplishments as a stalwart Democrat and his postwar clashes 
with congressional Republicans bent on thwarting his plan to swiftly restore the former 
Confederate states to the Union.  The Knoxville Daily Press and Herald predicted that the ex-
president’s decision to enter the fray would likely alter the election: “Andy is only shelling the 
woods now.  When he develops the enemy’s position and strength, he will order up and train his 
artillery.  We guess most of the people of Tennessee will be within hearing of the battle before 
it’s over.”  Johnson’s canvass across the state had indeed kicked off the state election campaign.7   
One of the more curious features of Johnson’s 1869 campaign was that he sought black 
votes.  By the fall of 1868 most Democrats had rejected further appeals to black voters; but 
Johnson, sensing that Tennessee’s blacks were becoming increasingly discontented with the 
Republican leadership, made a bid for their support.  Like most other Conservatives, who were 
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gradually accommodating to the new political order in the South, he acknowledged the reality of 
black suffrage and officeholding.  He hoped to siphon off the votes of restless Tennessee blacks 
and moderate Republicans by defusing a critical Reconstruction issue that helped unify the 
national Republican party.  Johnson reminded his audiences that he had freed the slaves in 
Tennessee and had advocated the extension (albeit limited) of the franchise to blacks in the 
provisional Southern state governments that preceded congressional Reconstruction.  Speaking 
directly to blacks in the audience, Johnson told them that they were slaves to the Union Leagues 
and, by association, the Republican party, which relied on the votes of its “second-class partners” 
to remain in power.  The Union Leagues had failed to raise the status of blacks beyond freedom, 
a freedom that he—not Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation or the Thirteenth Amendment—
had bestowed on them.  “Where is the forty acres and the mule they promised you?,” Johnson 
asked.  The Union League, he argued, had done nothing but give blacks a new master.  Harking 
back to his October 1864 “Moses” speech delivered from the steps of the state capitol, Johnson 
proclaimed, “Your Moses has come to free you again.”  He also urged blacks to support 
universal male suffrage, not just their own voting rights.  Reenfranchising the ex-Confederates 
would, he claimed, bring an end to the violence that plagued Tennessee.8       
Many black Tennesseans were skeptical of Johnson’s professed friendship.  Some asked 
that he elaborate on his views of black equality.  The Reverend Daniel Wadkins, Sr., of Nashville 
sought answers to two questions: Did Johnson support black civil and political equality with 
whites?   Did he regard Tennessee’s government as the representative of the black man as well as 
the white man?  Wadkins sent a letter with these questions to the editor of the Nashville 
                                                 
 
8 Speech at Memphis, April 15, 1869, in Graf, Haskins, and Bergeron, eds., Papers of Andrew Johnson, 
15: 611; Nashville Union and American, February 17, April 11, 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 




Republican Banner, hoping to induce Johnson to respond publicly.  The editor alluded to the 
letter in a column on the Banner’s back page but refused to publish it.  Instead, he suggested that 
Wadkins meet with Johnson while he was in Nashville.  A couple of days later the editor of the 
Radical Nashville Daily Press and Times published Wadkins’s letter in full.  Tennessee’s Moses 
chose not to respond.  Rather, he continued to deliver the same stump speech highlighting his 
policies as military governor of Tennessee and professing to be the freedmen’s best friend.9  
Johnson’s bid for black support created a stir among Tennesseans of all political stripes.  
Some Democrats acknowledged that he might succeed where others had failed due to his support 
of emancipation as military governor but most thought it more effective to coerce blacks with 
economic pressure or violence.  An editorial in the Memphis Daily Appeal cast doubt on the 
efficacy of Johnson’s strategy in these words: “We have no faith in the negro and prefer that we 
should owe our manumission to the efforts of our own race.”  Moderate Republicans looking to 
Senter as their candidate in the upcoming state election were worried.  Judge Leonidas C. Houk, 
a close confidant of Senter, received word from a friend in Nashville that “Andy Johnson . . . is 
making a marked impression upon the negroes.”  Moderates had two concerns: on the one hand, 
Johnson’s campaign could pay dividends for Conservatives by attracting disgruntled black voters 
whom the moderates were relying on to counter the Radicals; on the other hand, the ex-
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president’s rhetoric might re-radicalize the Republican party.  The Radicals agreed on the last 
point.  The Nashville Daily Press and Times boasted, “The Republicans are not half as sick of 
the Johnsonian lectures as the Democrats are.  We can stand it a good deal better than they can, 
for while they disgust not a few Democrats, they unite and consolidate the Republicans.”10 
With his sights set on Fowler’s soon-to-be vacant Senate seat, Johnson addressed the 
political situation in Tennessee, if only in closing.  In East Tennessee, he astutely kept his 
remarks brief, speaking of Tennessee and the Southern states in general.  In Nashville, however, 
he attacked Brownlow, and by association Senter.  Claiming that he had left the state in a 
flourishing economic condition in early 1865, Johnson pointed out that now bonds belonging to 
the state bank were missing, the school fund had been plundered, and long-promised internal 
improvement projects remained unfinished.  He accused Brownlow’s administration of 
mishandling state funds and driving the state into debt.  His most bitter criticism of the 
administration was aimed at the declaration of martial law and the deployment of the militia.  
Although Senter’s administration had, by this time, commenced a large-scale reduction of the 
State Guard, Johnson drew on popular discontent to whip his audiences into a frenzy.  
Maintaining a standing army was, he claimed, unconstitutional and a subversion of civil 
government.  “You may call them ‘guards,’ ‘militia,’ or just what you please,” he said, but “they 
are just as offensive, and it smells just as bad as it would [by] any other name.”11        
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With the Republican state convention not scheduled to meet until late May, Johnson’s 
speaking tour garnered a lot of attention in early April as it moved westward across the state.  
Most Conservative papers lauded him as a powerful speaker and welcomed him into the ranks of 
those fighting to wrest control of the state away from the Radicals.  Some, such as the Columbia 
Herald, acknowledged having disagreed with him in the past: “[T]he people can both help and 
forgive him,” if he would “prove his sorrow by destroying Radicalism in the State.”  But not all 
Conservatives, nor most former Confederate leaders, greeted Johnson’s speaking tour so 
favorably.  Rather, they expressed concern that his canvass might derail the movement among 
moderate Republicans in favor of universal suffrage.  According to John DeWitt Clinton Atkins, 
a former Confederate congressman and editor of the Paris Intelligencer, “The only possible 
effect it can have will be to unite the different factions of the Radical party into a compact mass.”  
The Pulaski Citizen warned its readers against short-sightedness: “[W]e confess an utter aversion 
for the man, and feel an apprehension that his canvass of the State, while it may elevate our 
hopes and spirits for a season, will eventuate in confusion and more oppressive laws against the 
disfranchised.”  Such contempt for Johnson among ex-Rebels was not uncommon.  The Memphis 
Public Ledger reminded its readers that “We should not forget what we are now and what we 
should have been but for Andrew Johnson.”  Prominent leaders, such as former Mississippi 
governor and Tennessee Confederate congressman Henry S. Foote and secessionist governor 
Isham G. Harris, spared no effort to defeat Johnson.  Foote debated Johnson supporters before 
large crowds in Nashville while Harris penned an anonymous letter to the Public Ledger in 
which he charged that Johnson, as military governor, had initiated “a policy of hate,” resulting in 
the disfranchisement of three-fourths of the state’s citizens.  Furthermore, Harris argued, Johnson 




correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial explained that the Rebels’ hatred for Andrew 
Johnson was unabated: “They can’t let ‘by-gones be by-gones’ sufficiently to take by the hand a 
man who was such a bitter enemy of their darling project, a Southern Confederacy.”  A former 
Rebel soldier expressed the sentiment shared by many disfranchised Confederates: “If [Johnson] 
has not changed, I have no use for him: if he is changed, I can not trust him.”12   
Congressman William Stokes, who sought the Republican nomination for governor, set 
his sights on Johnson as he prematurely launched his campaign in a bid to seize the Radical base.  
In a lengthy speech delivered to a large crowd of blacks on the steps of the Nashville courthouse, 
Stokes gave a scathing review of the former president’s career.  He accused Johnson of insanity, 
profanity, and drunkenness and charged him with cowardice for shunning the battlefield and 
barricading himself inside the fortified, hilltop state capitol during the war.  In closing, Stokes 
ardently appealed for black support and admonished the disfranchised to abide by the law if they 
wanted to regain access to the ballot box.13  
Meanwhile, Governor Senter and his moderate Republican supporters kept a close watch 
as Johnson and Stokes canvassed the state.  Few Senter Republicans revealed any concerns 
regarding their candidate’s decision to remain on the sidelines.  While they conceded the hard-
line Radical constituency, Senter Republicans regarded Stokes as too timid, too cowardly to meet 
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Johnson on the stump.  They also believed Johnson’s diatribes would unite Tennessee 
Republicans and they still hoped to forge an alliance with Conservatives.  In a letter to President 
Grant, who would closely monitor the Tennessee state elections from the White House, John 
Eaton, Jr., expressed an opinion shared by most moderates: “Some of us do not believe it 
expedient to put a Republican after [Johnson], hoping to close him out by ex-Rebel influence, in 
which we have quite a show of success.”14   
Tennessee Republicans did not have to wait long before Johnson’s speaking tour 
imploded.  It had begun smoothly; however, things took a turn for the worse as Johnson arrived 
in Memphis.  It was apparent to those who had caught a glimpse of the former president 
emerging from his train that he was ill, for he uncharacteristically spoke in a low tone and 
offered but a few remarks before retiring to his hotel.  Although he managed to recover to an 
extent and delivered his standard stump speech the following day, those in his camp suspected 
that he had pushed on too soon after a serious bout of bilious fever, which had disabled him for 
nearly two weeks after he returned to Greeneville.  He was so ill on that occasion that rumors 
spread throughout the nation that he had died.  Though unwell, Johnson went on with his tour, 
unwilling to halt his search for vindication.  But then tragedy struck.  While at a brief stop in 
Athens, Alabama, prior to another round of speeches in Middle Tennessee, Johnson was 
informed by telegram of the death of his thirty-five-year-old troubled son, Robert, who, having 
long suffered from alcoholism and depression, had committed suicide.  Johnson then stepped off 
his train and addressed the cheering crowd that had gathered, explaining that he would have to 
return immediately to Greeneville to attend his son’s funeral.  For the time being, Johnson’s  
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speaking tour was on hold.15     
Yet neither illness nor bereavement could deter Johnson from his quest for vindication.  
As he attended to matters in Greeneville, he instructed his advisor John Williams to confer 
confidentially with Secretary of State Andrew J. Fletcher in the hope of enlisting him to run 
against Stokes.  Johnson had met with Fletcher during his speaking tour to discuss Tennessee’s 
political situation and had offered to canvass the state on his behalf, with the possibility of a 
Senate seat as his reward.  Fletcher’s break with the Radicals over disfranchisement made him a 
much more attractive candidate to the Conservatives than Senter, who maintained a moderate 
position on the franchise issue while adopting both Conservative and Radical positions on 
various other issues as he sought to control the center of the political spectrum.  As the 
Republican state convention neared, Williams reported to Johnson that Stokes would win the 
party’s nomination. “We must do something to defeat him if possible,” he said.  “I will write to 
Fletcher to-night, & see if he is in the same state of mind that he was when we last saw him.  
Senter has been so completely set aside, that I think he will be mad; & probably Fletcher can 
manage him.  If so, Stokes can be defeated.”  Though Fletcher would not seek the gubernatorial 
nomination, Johnson continued to position himself for election to the U.S. Senate in the fall by 
what he hoped would be a more conservative state legislature.16   
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While Johnson’s speaking tour served as the inaugural event of the 1869 state election, 
his departure from the stump, if only temporarily, set the stage for the Conservatives and 
Democrats to adopt an electoral strategy designed to undermine Tennessee Radicals by seizing 
the political center and ultimately the state legislature.  The excitement generated by Johnson’s 
tour led some newspapers to call on Conservatives (Johnson included) to enter the gubernatorial 
and legislative races.  But the Rebels’ inability to forgive Johnson prevented a serious 
Conservative gubernatorial challenge to the Republicans.  To ensure its continued viability, 
Tennessee’s Conservative party changed tack.  Eschewing confrontation, including political 
terrorism, they decided to defeat the Radicals through the normal competition of party politics.  
Party leaders advocated what ex-Rebel newspaper commentators coined a policy of “masterly 
inactivity.”  They advised against fielding a gubernatorial candidate or candidates for local or 
legislative offices in races in which a bolting Republican faction emerged.  In these cases, they 
said, Conservatives and Democrats should back the more “conservative” Republican candidate.  
Conservative candidates should run only in local or state races in which a single Republican was 
on the ballot.  In advocating “masterly inactivity,” the editor of the Cleveland Banner advised, 
“We think that the Democrats should pursue this style of warfare . . . by fighting Radicalism with 
Radicals.”  In a widely published letter to the editor of the Winchester Home Journal, Colonel 
Peter Turney urged all former Confederates to become “apolitical noncombatant[s]” in the 
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coming gubernatorial canvass: “Now let us be hands off and abide our time; let us be patient, the 
day of our deliverance is bound to come, and the sooner by our present political silence.”  The 
May judicial election would prove to be the testing ground, the first occasion in which the 
Conservatives and Democrats implemented this new electoral strategy of embracing disaffected 
Republicans as a means to their great end—the restoration of voting rights to former 
Confederates.17      
If Johnson’s speaking tour was the opening act of the election, then the Republican 
judicial nominating convention and the election that followed constituted a dramatic turning 
point with a surprise plot twist.  Radical Reconstruction rested ultimately on a favorable judicial 
interpretation of its constitutionality.  Governor Brownlow had been well aware of this, and thus 
in early 1865 he suspended judicial elections—a violation of the state’s code—and began 
appointing judges and district attorneys when vacancies occurred.  Throughout Tennessee’s 
Reconstruction, Radical judges intervened in every major political issue with an eye toward 
safeguarding Unionists and freedmen.  Eschewing judicial standards such as a reverence for legal 
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precedents, the strongly politicized Tennessee judiciary viewed its role as remaking the state’s 
law, politics, economics, and society along Radical lines.18 
By early 1869, however, Republican dissension had taken a heavy toll on the party.  That 
discord permeated every aspect of Republicanism, including jurisprudence.  When Secretary of 
State Andrew J. Fletcher’s quarrel with Governor Brownlow over the franchise issue became 
public in January, it was suggested that a disagreement over a judicial appointment had 
precipitated their feud.  Fletcher charged Brownlow with infringing on the constitutional rights 
of Tennesseans by not permitting judicial elections.  By early February, public outcry against the 
appointment of judges and district attorneys reached a fever pitch.  Meetings were held across 
the state in which Tennesseans of all political stripes condemned Brownlow’s judicial 
appointments.  The Knoxville Daily Press and Herald pointed to such meetings attended by 
prominent Radicals as evidence that “the absolutism of Brownlowism is not much longer to be 
quietly tolerated by the people.”  In response to the strong tide of public opinion, the legislature 
passed a law by a wide margin two days prior to Senter’s inauguration mandating a judicial 
election.19  
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Rebel disfranchisement notwithstanding, a statewide judicial contest without Republican 
control of the election machinery could result in sweeping Conservative victories in Middle and 
West Tennessee.  The Republicans were understandably concerned.  Bitterly divided among 
themselves, they realized that desertions from their ranks since war’s end had bolstered the 
Conservative electorate.  By early March, Radical newspapers were reporting that Democratic 
leaders intended to field a full slate of Conservative judges for the Supreme Court.  Many feared 
that if a Conservative supreme bench were elected it would hold a special session and rule the 
franchise acts unconstitutional, thereby paving the way for Rebel gubernatorial and legislative 
electoral victories and ultimately the dismantling of the Radical state.  The Radical press called 
on all Republicans to support a united judicial ticket, warning readers that the gubernatorial 
contest hung in the balance.  The Nashville Daily Press and Times described the judicial election 
as “the preliminary and, at the same time, deciding battle of 1869 in this State.”20    
Governor Senter fully appreciated the gravity of the situation.  Shortly after taking office, 
he began exercising his patronage powers to build support among Conservatives and moderate 
Republicans.  In addition to relaxing martial law, he appointed pro-universal-suffrage men, both 
Conservatives and moderate Republicans, to vacant judicial seats throughout Middle and West 
Tennessee.  Prominent Conservatives whom he appointed to key judicial posts included William 
McFarland to the Second Circuit Court and William H. Wisener, Jr., as attorney general of 
Bedford County.  These actions were applauded by Conservatives.  However, in several 
instances, Senter resorted to the same controversial procedures employed by Brownlow to curry 
favor with the Radicals.  By the first of May, he had declared null and void all voter registrations 
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in Giles, Madison, Maury, and Shelby counties on the grounds of fraud and voting irregularities.  
In addition, he removed commissioners of registration in Conservative strongholds who had 
displayed antipathy to the franchise law.21   
The Conservatives and Democrats predictably condemned these latter actions.  The 
exasperated outburst of the editor of the Memphis Daily Appeal on April 29 exemplified the anti-
Radical viewpoint: “We did have hopes that Senter would be advised to his own and the State’s 
benefit, but seeing that he still continues the militia, has ordered a re-registration of voters in 
counties enjoying the most profound peace, and where there was no shadow of excuse for so 
arbitrary and Brownlow-like a proceeding, we have given him up as sealed in wickedness and 
utterly given over to the devil whose successor he is in the gubernatorial chair.”  Despite Senter’s 
hope of attracting the support of Conservatives, many of them concluded that he could not be 
trusted.22  
Meanwhile, Senter also found himself under attack from Radical hardliners.  Although he 
had reaffirmed his Republican credentials by removing unfriendly county registrars and calling 
for the re-registration of voters in Conservative counties, ultra-Radicals were not willing to 
accept him as the party’s gubernatorial nominee.  They were displeased with his disbandment of 
the State Guard and his appointment of Conservatives and universal-suffrage Republicans to 
judicial posts, and they were incensed by his ties to the Brownlows.  Curiously, the Brownlows 
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found themselves defending Senter on these issues of the Guard and judicial appointments.  
Unable to win over the ultra-Radicals, Senter was endorsed by few Radical newspapers.  Indeed, 
as the Republican state convention loomed on the horizon, he received more endorsements from 
Conservative than Radical papers.23      
By late April, William Stokes had emerged as the Republican gubernatorial frontrunner 
by appealing to the anti-Brownlow Radicals and by securing the support of black leaders in 
Memphis and Nashville.  With the exception of calling for a constitutional amendment to end 
suffrage restrictions, he had avoided taking a definite position on the thorny issue of universal 
suffrage and had made it clear that he would not discriminate against Northern-born Republicans 
in the disbursement of state patronage.  Pledging to adhere to Radical Republicanism, he 
garnered the endorsements of nearly every Radical newspaper in the state.  In hoisting his name 
alongside its masthead, the Nashville Daily Press and Times referred to Stokes as the “Atlas of 
the Republican party, supporting its principles and defending its policy and acts, everywhere and 
on all occasions.”  On the eve of the judicial and state nominating conventions, Stokes and his 
supporters stood poised to wrest control of the party from Governor Senter and the Brownlow 
Radicals.24 
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But Stokes made a significant misstep, perhaps his most serious in the 1869 canvass, by 
forging an alliance with Alfred M. Cate, the chairman of the Republican state executive 
committee.  Cate first gained notoriety during the war for organizing Unionist guerrilla strikes on 
bridges over the Tennessee River in lower East Tennessee intended to sever the Confederacy’s 
communication and supply lines ahead of a planned Union invasion of the region.  Evading 
capture by the Confederate authorities, he went to Kentucky and enrolled in a Union regiment, 
later becoming a captain.  Following the restoration of civil government in Tennessee, he was 
twice elected to a state Senate seat and became an influential Republican party leader.  However, 
his opposition to the militia and anti-Klan bills in the summer 1868 special legislative session 
tarnished his reputation among Brownlow and Stokes Radicals.  In an October 5, 1868, meeting 
in Chattanooga, Stokes offered Cate redemption.  According to a Radical party leader in 
attendance, Stokes suggested that Cate propose a resolution to expel Senter from the Senate on 
the ground of his ineligibility under the Fourteenth Amendment for having served in the Rebel 
state legislature and taken an oath to support the Confederacy.  When Cate introduced this 
resolution, a dead silence ensued on the Senate floor, moderate and Radical Republicans staring 
at one another in astonishment.  The resolution was shelved indefinitely; and, soon after, 
Congress responded favorably to an appeal from Tennessee Republicans to remove Senter’s 
political disabilities.  Stokes’s involvement in this plot to oust his political rival from office 
remained largely secret until it was revealed in April 1869 with the publication of letters 
exchanged between two Stokes Radicals in attendance at the October meeting.  The Conservative 
press suggested that a mutual ambition for higher political office motivated Cate and Stokes: 
Stokes wanted the governorship to attain a United States Senate seat and Cate sought Stokes’s 




simply read and explained the Fourteenth Amendment to Cate, nothing more.  And yet despite 
the disgust at Cate’s tactics expressed by a majority of Republicans, Stokes chose not to cut ties 
with him.  By virtue of his party office, Cate constituted a formidable obstacle to Senter’s quest 
to become the Republican gubernatorial nominee.25  
The “Senter-Cate feud,” as it was referred to in the press, continued with increasing 
bitterness as the judicial election neared.  When Cate scheduled a Republican state executive 
committee meeting shortly after Senter issued a proclamation setting the judicial election for 
May 27, Senter Republicans charged that the meeting was intended as a convention to secure 
Stokes’s gubernatorial nomination and to select ultra-Radical judicial candidates.  They also 
contended that Cate scheduled the meeting for an early date (March 25) to prevent Senter from 
taking full advantage of his patronage power to build support for himself.  The intraparty dispute 
spilled into the pages of Republican newspapers.  Senter’s supporters sought to delay the 
nomination of judicial candidates until the May 20 state convention, arguing that it was fiscally 
irresponsible to hold a separate meeting given the state’s financial crisis.  Interestingly, the 
Knoxville Whig joined Cate in support of a judicial convention held in advance of the state 
convention to give sufficient time to properly nominate candidates for the bench.  After a fierce 
debate among Senter Republicans and Stokes Radicals at the March 25 committee meeting, the 
two factions agreed to meet in convention at Nashville on April 20 to determine the party’s 
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judicial ticket.  “The evidences of an ‘agreeableness’ in the Radical household are not very 
abundant in this region just now,” the editor of the Knoxville Daily Press and Herald reported 
gleefully.  “There are signs of inharmoniousness in all directions.”  Tennessee Republicans 
recognized that the repeated elections were tearing their party apart.  Memphis judge Barbour 
Lewis predicted that “Our present system of an election every two or three months will kill off 
the Radical Party in our State in a year or two if we continue it.”26    
Tennessee’s Republicans hoped the April 20 judicial convention would inaugurate a new 
era of reconciliation for the party.  But on the eve of the convention, a powerful spring 
thunderstorm brought tornadoes and torrential rains that wreaked havoc across the state and 
further divided the party.  Nearly all the roads leading to Nashville were flooded out or blocked 
by fallen trees and debris.  Sixty-four West Tennessee delegates en route from Memphis failed to 
arrive because their train derailed.  In all, ninety-four of the convention’s 326 delegates were 
unable to reach the capitol.  Losing candidates subsequently cried foul, claiming that the 
convention was not properly representative.27  
Although there were rival candidates for numerous judgeships and other judicial 
positions, most attention at the convention was focused on the three Supreme Court seats.  The 
balloting for these nominations began with the selection of a candidate to represent East 
Tennessee; incumbent George Andrews, a Brownlow appointee, was unanimously approved.  
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The two other incumbents, both Brownlow appointees, were Henry G. Smith of West Tennessee 
and James O. Shackelford of Middle Tennessee.  Smith lost the nomination to Alvin Hawkins by 
a single vote on the first ballot.  The fiercest contest of the three pitted Shackelford against four 
Radical rivals.  Shackelford secured a sizable lead over the others on the first ballot, but with 
each successive ballot Judge Andrew McClain of the sixth circuit gained momentum.  McClain 
won on the fourth ballot with 157 votes to Shackelford’s seventy-five.28   
Then, in an astonishing turn of events, Shackelford announced that he would not be 
bound by the results of the convention.  He charged that it had been called at the instigation of 
Radical Republican leaders in Washington because he and Smith had expressed support for 
universal suffrage and, in a recent case, had struck down a school tax that lined the pockets of the 
state’s Radical party leaders.  He pointed also to the flooding that had prevented a majority of the 
state’s western delegates from attending the convention, insisting that those men had been 
instructed by their county conventions to vote for him and that both he and Smith would have 
won nomination on the first ballot if those delegates had been present.  Whereas Smith accepted 
his defeat without protest, Shackelford bolted the Republican party and ran as an independent 
candidate.29    
Radical reaction to Shackelford’s move was swift and derisive.  “We have no respect for 
bolters,” the editor of the McMinnville Enterprise howled. “No party can succeed or survive such 
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a policy if it becomes general.”  The Radicals rejected Shackelford’s claim that the absent 
delegates were pledged to him.  Moreover, they said, with the attendees so divided among 
themselves over the candidates on the first ballot, the missing delegates would have had to vote 
nearly unanimously for Shackelford to ensure his nomination; as the field dwindled, the Radicals 
coalesced behind McClain as a viable alternative to Shackelford.  Conservatives observed that 
though Shackelford had once marched in lockstep with Brownlow and the Radical Republicans, 
he now diverged from them on several issues, particularly the extension of the franchise to 
former Confederates and the imposition of martial law in peacetime; his apostasy had proven 
fatal to his aspirations, as Radical leaders decided to cast him aside.30        
The outcome of the judicial convention and the subsequent nomination of a Radical slate 
of judges were welcome and reassuring to Tennessee’s Conservatives and Democrats.  Although 
the Radicals’ stringent franchise laws, bolstered by Senter’s rejection of voter registrations in 
selected Conservative strongholds, remained in effect, the Conservatives and Democrats 
intended to use the judicial election to test the efficacy of “masterly inactivity” with an eye 
toward the subsequent gubernatorial and legislative elections.  They agreed to back Shackelford, 
the more conservative candidate, for the middle division seat and commenced soliciting 
Conservatives to challenge Andrews in the east and Hawkins in the west.  No viable candidate 
emerged to compete against Hawkins, but Thomas A. R. Nelson of Knoxville stepped forward to 
take on Andrews.  Shackelford, convinced that he could garner many Radical white and black 
votes in and around Nashville, agreed to campaign for Nelson in Middle and West Tennessee in  
                                                 
 





return for Nelson’s support in East Tennessee.31 
There were many Democrats, however, who had doubts about the strategy of supporting 
moderate Republican candidates running against Radicals.  “It is evident that if the Radical party 
is left to itself, it will tumble to pieces,” declared the editor of the Murfreesboro Monitor.  “Let 
them rend each other.”  The Paris Intelligencer agreed: “With extreme Radicals in office we will 
be more likely to reach the end of this day’s damning work than with mild conservatives, who 
sympathize ever so much, but who have not the nerves to take the bull by the horns and declare 
for our freedom and equality at every hazard.”  Some former Confederates implied that neither 
Conservatives nor moderate Republicans could be trusted.  The Democratic press assailed Judge 
Shackelford, who, having renounced the Radicals, now courted Conservative voters.  “What 
canting hypocrisy is this!,” exclaimed the Monitor.  “After becoming the instrument by which 
the Radicals have perpetrated their power, . . . [Shackelford] now turns to the people he has 
outraged, and begs their support, telling them he desires to see everybody enfranchised.  It won’t 
do.”32          
 But a few prominent Confederate leaders and Democratic newspapers counseled 
otherwise.  “The Radicals are divided and at enmity, their rank and file are demoralized, they are 
without compass, rudder or pilot,” said the editor of the Memphis Daily Appeal.  “Our time is 
close at hand.  Harmony and unselfishness among the Democracy will hasten it.”  The 
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Democratic press reprinted numerous letters and editorials from frustrated Radicals revealing 
that Tennessee’s Republican party was a house divided.  These arguments eventually prevailed.  
Powerless to participate in the political process, and reassured by their former officers and party 
leaders, most ex-Rebels grudgingly accepted the necessity of embracing the lesser of the two 
evils.33 
Meanwhile, Governor Senter’s campaign nearly came to a dead end in the wake of the 
judicial convention.  The Brownlows were not entirely satisfied with Senter, disapproving in 
particular his relaxation of martial law and disbandment of State Guard units.  But Stokes was an 
avowed enemy and the pugnacious Parson and his son refused to let bygones be bygones.  
Seeking to avoid a party split, Senator Brownlow publicly professed his support for Senter—
although he did not publish any official endorsement in the Knoxville Whig.  At the same time, 
however, he privately tried to induce Radical congressman Horace Maynard to enter the 
gubernatorial race as a compromise candidate.  But Maynard had his sights set on Joseph 
Fowler’s United States Senate seat and did not want to make any new enemies in the party.  The 
Brownlows therefore returned to Senter’s camp.  On April 24, the Whig finally endorsed Senter.  
It was a rather tepid endorsement, however, much of it aimed at damning Stokes rather than 
praising Senter.34   
The Brownlows’ lack of enthusiasm for Senter’s candidacy was shared by many other 
nominal supporters of Senter.  The Conservatives who intended to vote for him saw him, as did 
the Brownlow Radicals, not as the candidate who embodied their cause but as a means by which 
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they might advance their cause, a bitter pill that was worth swallowing because it might 
ultimately bring a cure.35 
In the weeks leading up to the Republican state convention, the Conservatives and 
Democrats, in particular, pressed both Senter and Stokes to clarify their stand on the franchise 
question, the central issue on which the election would pivot.  Neither seemed willing to go on 
the record first.  When the editor of the Hartsville Vidette falsely reported that Senter had 
declared in favor of universal suffrage during a speech in Gallatin, the governor’s supporters 
denied that he would undo a law he had voted to enact and had upheld by suspending voter 
registrations.  Sensing an opening, Stokes charged that Senter’s rigid enforcement of the 
franchise law indicated that he was indeed a harsh proscriptionist, cut from the same cloth as 
Brownlow.  Though reluctant to speak at length on the issue, Stokes reiterated his willingness to 
support an amendment to relax suffrage restrictions provided that the Klan would disband and 
the ex-Rebels would obey the law.  Senter Republicans countered by questioning Stokes’s 
commitment to the franchise law and accused him of favoring immediate enfranchisement of ex-
Confederates.  The pro-Stokes Nashville Daily Press and Times denied such claims, insisting 
that Stokes supported gradual enfranchisement by the state’s cumbersome constitutional 
amendment process, which required approval by two consecutive legislatures before being put 
on the ballot for a public referendum.  The heated exchange of charges and counter-charges 
placed both camps on the defensive as the county conventions met to elect delegates to the state  
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convention.36     
The turmoil and division in the Republican ranks evident in the judicial convention 
reappeared in the county nominating conventions in May.  Senter Republicans knew they were at 
a disadvantage going into the county conventions because Stokes could count on the support of 
most of the party’s Radicals, a majority of Republican voters.  In the rural counties, the 
conventions instructed their delegates, with little debate, to vote for either Stokes or Senter.  
Predictably, a majority of these counties overwhelmingly elected Stokes delegates.  In the more 
urban county conventions, however, the warring factions clashed, with neither side willing to 
compromise.  In some of these cases, the conventions adjourned with the Senter Republicans 
forcing the election of a slate of uncommitted delegates.  In some instances where Stokes 
supporters predominated, as in Chattanooga, Senter Republicans walked out and convened 
separately to nominate their own delegates.  As rumors circulated that Senter Republicans 
intended to send rival delegations to Nashville to disrupt the state convention and foil Stokes’s 
nomination, the Nashville Daily Press and Times declared that in all such cases both delegations 
should be excluded.  The paper’s editor knew full well that once all rival delegations were 
excluded, Stokes would emerge as the party’s gubernatorial nominee.37   
The scene that unfolded inside the Davidson County courthouse during that county’s 
nominating convention seemed to foreshadow what might occur at the state convention unless 
                                                 
 
36 William Stokes to D. G. Thornburg, F. S. Singletary, and John Welsh, January 31, 1869, as quoted in 
Nashville Republican Banner, February 5, 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, April 23, May 3, 6, 14, 
17, 19, 21, 1869; McBride, “Blacks and the Race Issue in Tennessee Politics,” 301-302; Alexander, 
Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 216; William H. Combs, “An Unamended State Constitution: The 
Tennessee State Constitution of 1870,” American Political Science Review 32 (1938): 518. 
37 Nashville Republican Banner, May 20, 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, May 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 1869; Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, May 14, 1869; James C. Parker, 
“Tennessee Gubernatorial Elections: 1869—The Victory of the Conservatives,” Tennessee Historical 





Republican leaders could repair the breach in their party.  From the start, each nomination was 
contested.  The Senter Republicans, who had packed the assembly, managed to nominate Major 
Enos Hopkins as chairman.  But James H. Sumner, a Stokes partisan and the only black captain 
to serve in the State Guard, defiantly nominated Abram Smith, a former slave who had served as 
a porter in the state capitol prior to the war.  Captain S. F. Allen, the chairman of the Davidson 
County central committee, ignored Sumner and called for a vote, in which Hopkins was elected.  
Several black delegates protested and called for another vote with Smith on the ballot.  Randall 
Brown, Nashville’s most prominent black leader, rose from his seat and demanded in his 
stentorian voice that black Republicans be given a fair chance to vote for their chosen candidate.  
Allen ruled Brown out of order, and announced Hopkins as chairman.  As Hopkins approached 
the rostrum, the black Stokes Radicals boiled over with rage and cursed him.  The Senter 
Republicans attempted to shout down Brown and his supporters; however, the determined black 
leader made himself heard: “You are not the chairman of this convention,” he exclaimed to 
Hopkins, “and you know it!”  Pandemonium ensued as a black and a white delegate traded 
punches.  Shouts echoed through the courthouse; one black delegate was heard to say, “G-d d—n 
we are going to have justice or have blood!”  The police were called and one unruly delegate was 
removed.  As the police monitored the proceedings, Senter and Stokes partisans pleaded with one 
another to settle their differences peacefully and unite behind a single candidate.  “We are all 
Republicans,” proclaimed Captain A. S. McTeer, a black Stokes supporter.  Congressman 
Roderick R. Butler admonished the delegates to bury the hatchet: “The Democracy [are] 
watching for a rent in the party in order to put in a splitting wedge. . . .  We can’t afford to divide 




harmony, however, neither faction would give in.  Instead, each elected its own delegates to the 
state convention.38 
The county conventions portended trouble for Tennessee’s Republican party.  Not only 
did they result in the election of rival delegations from numerous counties, they also further 
strained race relations in the party.  Despite their substantial numbers, blacks were routinely 
criticized by white Republicans for attempting to vote independently and demanding an active 
role in the conventions.  An example occurred at the Knox County convention, in which black 
attendees, including a contingent of Maryville Union League members, were treated rather 
shabbily.  Following the incident, the Conservative Knoxville Press and Messenger proclaimed 
that whenever blacks sought to elect their own candidates they could expect to be snubbed by 
white Radicals.  William Scott, Sr., who had accompanied his fellow League members to 
Knoxville, responded in the Maryville Republican, acknowledging that “We are sorry to say that 
such is the disposition of a great number of professed Radicals.”  Wracked by factional rivalries 
and racial conflict, Tennessee Republicans limped into the state convention with no prospect of 
harmony.39    
On the morning of May 20, delegates to the state convention met at the capitol to elect 
their party’s standard bearer for the August gubernatorial election.  Many Republicans 
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considered this convention the last chance to repair the breaches in the party.  The audience filled 
the public gallery of the House and overflowed onto the floor.  In addition to the Republican 
faithful, several Conservative and Democratic partisans were among the spectators.  Rival 
delegations joined the throng on the floor, pushing their way through reporters, spectators, and 
unchallenged delegates.  The Senter Republicans among the challenged delegates intended to 
disrupt the convention and impede Stokes’s nomination.  Few admitted this publicly, although 
one prominent Senter Republican announced openly in Knoxville while en route to Nashville 
that he and his fellows “intended to nominate Senter or bust up the convention.”40   
At the appointed hour, Alfred M. Cate, the chairman of the Republican state executive 
committee and staunch Stokes supporter, called the convention to order.  The first item of 
business was to elect a temporary chairman.  The chairman’s power to appoint committees—
including the committee on credentials, which would determine the legitimacy of rival county 
delegations—made each faction desirous of this position; Senter Republicans were bent on 
capturing it at all costs.  Almost immediately after the secretary had finished reading the roll call, 
Judge Leonidas Houk moved that Thomas H. Pearne, a Northern Methodist minister who had 
recently bought Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig, be appointed temporary chairman.  Determined to 
use his power to control the proceedings in favor of Stokes, Cate refused to accept Houk’s 
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motion on the parliamentary ground that he had not called for nominations.  Cate then proceeded 
to harangue the Senter Republicans who objected to his decision, asserting that there was a 
“preconcerted effort to choke him down.”  When he concluded his remarks, a Stokes Radicals 
inquired whether the convention was organized.  In a stunning move, Cate announced that the 
convention was indeed organized and that motions were now in order.  This precipitated 
confusion and disorder.  Cries of “Mr. Chairman” came from all parts of the hall.41   
During a lull in the wrangling, Cate recognized a Stokes delegate from Chattanooga who 
nominated Congressman Roderick R. Butler as temporary chairman.  Abruptly, Judge Houk 
mounted the stenographer’s stand and demanded to be heard.  Treading on the fingers of a 
stenographer, he put the question of Pearne’s nomination and declared him elected.  Senter 
Republicans cheered and called loudly for adjournment while Stokes Radicals cried foul.  Cate 
frantically wielded his gavel as he admonished the delegates to take their seats and “act like 
white men in a civilized country.”  This remark aroused the wrath of black Senter Republicans.  
One declared that black men had rights: “This [is] no white man’s party; it [is] a party of the 
country!”  A combination of Memphis and Nashville black Stokes Radicals then began to shout 
down their counterparts, demanding that the bogus black Senter delegates be removed from the 
capitol.  The Senter Republicans responded by echoing Ulysses S. Grant’s famous dictum of 
1864: “No, we’ll fight it out on this line.”  A brief altercation occurred between a white and 
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black delegate in which the latter threw off his coat and defied the former to shoot him, 
exclaiming that he was a freeman and entitled to his rights.42   
As the morning turned to afternoon, the arguments grew more heated, the language more 
vituperative, the altercations more violent.  Amid the confusion, a few delegates made 
impassioned pleas for party unity.  “In the name of God and the Republican party,” said B. F. 
Cook, “let us have peace.  Let us act like men, and not a pack of dogs.”  Knoxville physician 
Lynville M. Mynatt declared that the ungentlemanly behavior he was witnessing was an 
embarrassment to the party and provided the Rebels with fodder for the coming state election: 
“We are making a rich treat for the Democratic party.”  Several delegates then began singing 
songs, including “On Jordan’s Stormy Banks I Stand,” “Hail, Columbia,” and “Rally ’Round the 
Flag.”  In a rare show of unity, several Senter and Stokes delegates agreed to adjourn for an hour; 
the truce was quickly undone, however, by a couple of drunken delegates who shouted “Go to 
h—l!” and “The convention is a disgrace.  Let’s throw it away.”  Bedlam ensued again, with 
delegates shouting for either Butler or Pearne to occupy the chairman’s stand.  When both of 
those men mounted the stand, there was a struggle to seize the gavel.  Finally, General Joseph A. 
Cooper managed to restore order by convincing Cate, Butler, and Pearne to agree to a cooling-
off period.  Cooper instructed the delegates to leave the hall but assured them that “There is no 
trick in this.  Go, and drink less bad whiskey and you will be more capable of doing business.”  
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When the hall cleared, Cooper ordered the doors to be locked and had policemen stationed at the 
doors with orders to admit hereafter only delegates with credentials.43              
The afternoon session began promisingly as Senter Republicans and Stokes Radicals 
patiently listened to each other’s claim to the chairmanship.  However, the proceedings soon 
degenerated into anarchy, with the feuding factions trading jabs and hurling expletives at one 
another after Pearne refused to accept Congressman Butler’s proposition that they both withdraw 
their claim to the position.  Fed up with the partisan bickering and political posturing, State 
Guard captain William L. Hathaway, a Stokes partisan, unleashed a torrent of profanity and 
threatened to nominate the notorious Rebel Nathan Bedford Forrest for governor.  As the 
evening wore on, a full-scale riot was narrowly averted by the Metropolitan Police’s rapid 
response to a potential duel between Colonel David M. Nelson of the State Guard and 
Congressman Butler.  The quarrel began after Nelson mounted a desk and made a fiery speech 
declaring that no avowed enemy of Governor Senter should be appointed speaker.  Nelson 
charged that the same men who now sought control of the chair to engineer Stokes’s nomination 
had held midnight conclaves to depose Senter.  “We will never submit to be ruled by such men,” 
he shouted, “never, by G-d!”  The crowd grew turbulent and there was a general rush toward the 
speaker’s stand.  The police pushed their way past the crowd and found both Nelson and Butler 
brandishing pistols.  A scuffle ensued as the police and delegates attempted to disarm the two.  
Both were taken into custody and marched off to the police station.  In the midst of the scramble, 
the secretary’s desk was overturned, its handsome marble slab broken into fragments and 
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scattered over the floor.  Cate still held the chair and declared an adjournment until the next 
morning.  He then slyly slid the gavel into his pocket and left the convention.  Several delegates 
continued in vain to nominate their candidate; however, the disturbance had effectively broken 
up the meeting.  The antagonism between the factions had become seemingly irreconcilable.44   
 As darkness fell, there was great excitement throughout the city.  The two factions held 
rallies at opposite ends of the capitol to boost morale and reinvigorate support for their 
candidate’s nomination.  The Stokes Radicals met in the Senate chamber, the Senter Republicans 
in the House chamber.  The Stokes Radicals blamed Senter partisans for conspiring to divide the 
party to block Stokes’s nomination.  Captain Williams of White County warned that if the Senter 
Republicans succeeded in dividing Tennessee’s Republican party, then Andrew Johnson, 
supported by a unified Conservative voting bloc, would sweep into power and crush both 
factions.  Meanwhile, the Senter Republicans celebrated the fact that they had prevented the 
Stokes delegates from controlling the proceedings.  “We’ve got these fellows by the gills,” 
declared Judge Houk, who claimed he had paid three weeks’ room and board and was prepared 
to remain and fight until the election was over.  Eventually Governor Senter addressed the 
crowd.  He reaffirmed his Republican credentials, pledged to abide by the convention’s decision 
on the nominee, and chastised the Stokes Radicals for scheming to divide the party.  When 
pressed to state his views on extending the franchise to the former Confederates, he replied that 
“the time might arrive when the rebels could come up to the ballot-box, but that day [is] a long 
way off.”  It was reported that Stokes, eager to avoid a brokered convention, had sent a 
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delegation of Radical legislators to Senter to propose that they now enter the convention arm in 
arm to restore party harmony.  Senter’s friends denied that there had been any such meeting, 
while the Stokes Radicals insisted it had been held but that the governor rejected their plan.45              
With the exception of threatened bloodshed, the embarrassing scenes of the first day of 
the convention were repeated on the second day.  Scores of delegates, reporters, and curious 
spectators filled the porticos, terraces, and hallways of the capitol that morning, waiting to gain 
entry to the House chamber.  When the doors were unlocked, Alfred Cate rushed toward the 
speaker’s stand but stopped suddenly when he caught a glimpse of Dr. Pearne calmly sitting in 
the chair wielding a gavel of his own.  Earlier in the day, Senter’s supporters had slipped Pearne 
into the room with the assistance of Frank Hyberger, the sergeant-at-arms of the House and 
recently-appointed adjutant general and private secretary to the governor.  Undaunted, Cate 
strode to the speaker’s stand, positioned himself next to Pearne, took out the gavel he had 
removed from the hall, and called the convention to order.  Pearne responded with a more 
emphatic gaveling and likewise called the meeting to order.  Both attempted to speak over one 
another as the other delegates shouted for their respective candidate.  The noise compelled some 
members to put their thumbs in their ears.  Several unproductive hours passed before the 
delegates unanimously agreed to adjourn sine die.  As they streamed out of the hall, a reporter 
for the Nashville Republican Banner wrote, “We are glad, for decency’s sake, and the reputation 
of the State, to draw the curtain upon these unsightly orgies.”46  
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During the evening, the rival camps held meetings in which they nominated their 
candidates—each of whom accepted his “party’s nomination.”  The Stokes Radicals met in the 
Senate chamber, where their standard bearer vowed to stand on the national Republican 
platform.  Stokes announced his support for the Fifteenth Amendment and reassured his 
followers that, for now, he did not favor lifting suffrage restrictions on the former Confederates.  
But he also repeated an earlier response in answer to Andrew Johnson, promising the 
Conservatives that if the Rebels remained quiet, accepted the situation, and halted the killing of 
Unionists, he would eventually enfranchise them.  In closing, Stokes remarked that he was 
certain of the support of forty thousand black voters and thirty thousand white Union soldiers.  In 
the House chamber, Senter thanked his followers and, like Stokes, pledged to adhere to the 
national party’s platform.  But he also took the opportunity to vent his anger at Stokes and those 
who had plotted in midnight caucuses to remove him from office, asserting that these men were 
devoid of honor and that he himself would carry out the gubernatorial canvass honorably.  After 
he finished, his supporters, with an eye to winning over black voters, passed a resolution 
reaffirming the party’s pledge of racial equality.  In addition, a group of black Senter 
Republicans led by Dr. Edward Shaw successfully moved that the convention appoint one black 
delegate from each congressional district to a state executive committee with the power to 
appoint a subcommittee in each county to conduct the canvass.47     
Thus ended the tumultuous Republican state convention, which failed to restore harmony 
and unify the party behind a single candidate.  Rather, the chaotic proceedings drove a deeper 
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wedge between the two factions.  Given the results of the county conventions preceding the state 
convention, Senter had little hope of winning the Republican nomination.  His supporters scored 
a major victory by deliberately disrupting the convention.  With the party divided and each 
faction nominating its own candidate, Senter could claim that he was as much the Republican 
nominee as Stokes.48   
The editor of the Memphis Avalanche correctly argued that “though partially veiled by 
the violence of the late Radical State Convention, [universal suffrage] was the rock on which the 
assemblage split.”  The split had been widening since Brownlow called the summer 1868 special 
session of the legislature.  Despite the split, both Senter and Stokes had each made utterances in 
favor of gradual universal suffrage as bids for the Conservative vote.  The election would hinge 
on the candidate who chose to take up the banner of immediate universal suffrage first; yet 
neither candidate seemed poised to act first and restore the franchise to the former 
Confederates.49   
On May 27, a week after the convention, Tennesseans cast their ballots in the judicial 
election.  Despite the effort of Republican newspapers to encourage the party faithful to vote, 
many Republicans abstained, perhaps out of disgust with the convention proceedings.  
Consequently, Conservative voters were emboldened to take an active part in the judicial contest.  
Although the former Confederates and many Conservatives were unable to vote due to the 
franchise law and Governor Senter’s annulment of voter certificates, Conservative Thomas A. R. 
Nelson and independent James Shackelford managed to outpoll the Radical judicial ticket in 
several Middle and West Tennessee counties.  In the state at large, however, the Radical slate of 
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judges defeated its opponents by a nearly two-to-one margin.  Shackelford confided to Nelson 
that the newly elected “Supreme Bench would tend to perpetuate the extreme views of 
Radicalism.”50   
The May judicial election thus secured the state Supreme Court for the Radicals, but this 
proved a hollow victory.  Even as the Radicals celebrated, Brownlow’s lame-duck Supreme 
Court prepared to announce its decisions in two momentous franchise cases that would abruptly 
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CONSERVATIVE TRIUMPH: MAY-AUGUST 1869 
 
 In the year and a half since Governor Brownlow appointed Robert E. Bogle 
commissioner of registration for Gibson County, the Radicals had exercised complete control 
over the local election machinery.  Vested with the authority to determine the qualifications of 
voters and protected by a company of State Guardsmen during the 1867 deployment, Bogle 
upheld the Radicals’ policy of wholesale Rebel disfranchisement.  He also added the names of 
350 newly-enfranchised blacks to the county’s registration rolls.  But the trouble for local 
Radicals began after the 1867 state election, when the State Guard disbanded.1   
No sooner had the Guard departed than the Klan resumed its terrorism across Middle and 
West Tennessee.  It preyed on Radicals—black and white—and intimidated Brownlow’s 
registrars.  The Radicals responded by enacting in the legislature a stringent loyalty oath that 
extended to the Conservatives, who viewed it as simply an underhanded method of 
disfranchising them.  In Gibson County, the Conservatives aligned with a majority of Democrats 
to stand between the militant ex-Rebels and the Radicals.  Rather than resorting to threats, the 
Conservatives and Democrats curried favor with Bogle by plying him with liquor.2   
By January 1868, hundreds of disfranchised Conservatives and ex-Rebels had procured 
voting certificates.  Gibson County Radicals fumed.  “We are on the eve of a great & perilous 
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crisis,” Dr. William H. Stilwell declared.  With the county elections scheduled for March 7, the 
Radicals petitioned Brownlow to remove Bogle and set aside his registrations.  On February 25, 
Brownlow invalidated the county’s voter registrations and appointed a new registrar to oversee 
the election.  The Radical ticket subsequently won a landslide victory in the county as the new 
registrar barred nearly four thousand Conservatives and ex-Rebels from the polls.3   
Following the election, Gibson County Radicals discovered that William Staton, a 
Confederate-sympathizing farmer, had, in defiance of Brownlow’s proclamation, cast a ballot.  
The sheriff arrested Staton and a grand jury subsequently indicted him for voting without a valid 
certificate.  Staton’s counsel filed a demurrer on the ground that the statute authorizing the 
governor to set aside voter registrations was unconstitutional, in that it deprived citizens of an 
inalienable right—the right of suffrage.  Conservative judge John A. Rogers of the Sixteenth 
Circuit Court agreed and sustained the demurrer.  The attorney general prosecuting the case 
against Staton appealed this ruling to the state Supreme Court, thereby setting the stage for a 
series of legal decisions that reshaped the political battlefield and, in time, helped end 
Tennessee’s Reconstruction.4  
Staton’s case was argued before the Tennessee Supreme Court against the backdrop of 
Republican intraparty conflict.  The factional bickering and fistfights that marked the Republican 
state convention spilled out into the streets of Nashville and beyond.  In Memphis, black Senter 
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and Stokes partisans viciously attacked one another.  “Radicalism is killing itself,” the editor of 
the Hartsville Vidette reported.5   
Senator Brownlow had made no attempt to repair the breach during the convention.  
Now, hard-pressed by Senter Republicans to come out strongly in favor of their candidate, he 
broke his silence.  In a public statement, he lamented the convention’s failure to unify behind a 
standard-bearer, but acknowledged that he “had anticipated the unhappy result.”  He regarded 
both candidates as devoted Republicans.  He thanked Stokes for defending him and his 
administration during the 1867 gubernatorial campaign.  But in concluding, he expressed his 
“unshaken confidence in [Senter’s] honest devotion and steadfast constancy to the great 
principles of the Union [Radical] Republican party.”  It was evident to Brownlow that Senter had 
greater claims on him than any other Republican.  Senter had not only advocated his election on 
every stump throughout his senatorial district, but also defended Brownlow’s administration on 
the floor of the Senate while being assailed by Stokes’s supporters.  Moreover, while Stokes had 
sought to undermine Brownlow’s U.S. Senate bid, Senter had faithfully stood by him.6 
Responding to Brownlow’s statement, the editor of the Knoxville Daily Press and Herald 
remarked, “The Senator never forgives a friend nor forgets an enemy.”  The Nashville 
Republican Banner wrote that Brownlow “snivels as meekly and sadly as if he was entirely 
innocent of the causes of the late ‘split,’ when it is well known that the whole anti-Stokes 
movement had its inspiration in his own heart and by his own dictation.”  Rather than heal the 
rupture within the party, Brownlow’s pronouncement exacerbated it.7  
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With so much attention diverted to Republican internecine rivalries and the pending 
gubernatorial canvass, the Republican press largely ignored the legal ramifications of the 
franchise cases being considered in both the Tennessee and United States Supreme Courts.  Anti-
Radicals, however, closely monitored the courts, anxiously awaiting the decisions that could 
overthrow Tennessee Radicalism.  Besides the Staton case, there was Ridley v. Sherbrook, on 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which involved the validity of the 1866 (second) franchise 
law and the succeeding franchise laws.  Bromfield L. Ridley, a former Confederate pardoned by 
President Andrew Johnson, had appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court in December 1866 
after his county registrar refused him a certificate to vote based on his Rebel past.  That court 
ruled that the right to vote was a political right that was not inalienable; therefore, it could be 
conferred or denied by the state; the court cited the 1834 constitution, which empowered the 
General Assembly to prohibit criminals from voting.  Ridley then appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but its decision was delayed due to the justices’ ill health.  Tennessee’s Conservatives and 
Democrats grew impatient and suspicious at the delay.  The Nashville Union and American 
questioned the U.S. court’s motive: “Was this done for the benefit of the Radicals?”  The 
Conservatives and Democrats knew full well the political implications of inaction: Tennessee 
would soon be holding judicial, legislative, and gubernatorial elections while nearly 100,000 
potential Democratic voters remained barred from the polls.8     
Meanwhile, the Tennessee Supreme Court took up the Staton case.  Though scheduled to 
convene for its spring term in Brownsville on April 27, the court did not meet until the following 
day, when Judge Shackelford, who was busy organizing his independent bid for the judicial 
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statewide election, finally arrived.  The court had a crowded docket but the justices moved 
expeditiously.  Staton’s case came up on May 18.9  
As Tennesseans awaited the court’s ruling, some read the tea leaves of Judge 
Shackelford’s April 26 circular announcing his candidacy to determine how he might rule in the 
case.  According to Shackelford, he had opposed stringent franchise measures during the January 
1865 constitutional convention.  A point of great contention during the convention, the franchise 
issue was compromised by delegating to the General Assembly the power to designate who was 
qualified to vote.  Shackelford referred to a number of cases questioning the constitutionality of 
the franchise laws that subsequently came before the court.  “As a judge, with its policy I had 
nothing to do,” he maintained.  “Believing the people, in their sovereign capacity, had the right 
to determine the elective franchise—I so held.”  But as a citizen, having resigned from the court 
in 1867, Shackelford had publicly professed his support for universal suffrage.  Along with 
several prominent residents of Davidson County, he had appeared before the legislature bearing a 
petition with over four thousand signatures calling for the immediate restoration of the franchise 
to all former Confederates.  Nevertheless, Governor Brownlow had reappointed Shackelford to 
the bench in September 1868.  “Believing, as I conscientiously do, that [extending the elective 
franchise to all men] alone can bring peace to our State, and advance its material interests,” said 
Shackelford, “I now hold, and I honestly believe that nine-tenths of the people are in favor of 
equal rights to all.”  “But,” he added, referring to the Stokes Radicals who had cast him aside 
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because of his moderation on the suffrage question, “political intriguers, for their own private 
ends, seek to keep the people thus enthralled.”10   
These remarks gave some Conservatives hope that Shackelford might be on their side.  
Recent statements in favor of universal suffrage by Shackelford’s colleague, Henry G. Smith, 
likewise encouraged Conservatives.  But few expected George Andrews of East Tennessee, the 
only sitting judge renominated by the Radical-dominated judicial convention, to be 
sympathetic.11 
The hearing lasted three days, during which time Staton’s lawyers, one of whom had 
been a Confederate congressman and the other an officer under Nathan Bedford Forrest, sharply 
challenged the denial of voter registration to citizens without due process of law.  The attorney 
general made a brief but forceful defense of the franchise laws.  As the justices retired to 
deliberate, the Republican state convention was meeting.  With that party on the verge of 
disintegrating and the judicial election looming, Conservatives prayed that the ruling would 
come quickly.12   
On May 27, the court rendered its decision in State v. Staten.  Smith wrote the court’s 
opinion; however, Shackelford and Andrews filed concurring opinions.  The unanimous decision 
ruled unconstitutional Governor Brownlow’s practice of setting aside voter registrations.  Smith 
declared that the elective franchise was a vested property right and that according to the state’s 
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bill of rights neither the legislature nor the governor could deprive Staton of his right to vote 
without due process of law.  Regarding the commissioners of registration, the court concluded 
that their functions under the franchise laws were judicial.  The office of registrar was in effect a 
tribunal, “awarding, declaring, evidencing and establishing the right [to vote].”  Thus, chief 
executive Brownlow had no right to set aside registrations.  Under the March 1867 franchise law, 
Smith held, “The Governor is, practically, made the ultimate arbiter and judge of the right of all 
and of every citizen to the franchise. . . .  [F]rom his action the registered and qualified voter has 
no appeal or redress.”  This was plainly a violation of the separation of powers embedded in the 
state constitution.  Therefore, the law violated a franchise holder’s constitutional right to due 
process.13   
In his concurring opinion, Andrews declared that suffrage was both a property right and a 
trust.  The courts, he said, had held that the 1865 amendments conferred on the General 
Assembly the power to determine the qualification of voters and restrict the elective franchise.  
Therefore, he reasoned, the subsequent franchise laws were not contrary to the principles of 
republican government.  Andrews’s objection to the laws was not so much that they were 
judicial, but that they were arbitrary: “The power of the Legislature is, to regulate the exercise of 
the right, and not to destroy the right itself.”  Shackelford, in his concurrence, felt the need to 
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defend his previous ruling (Ridley v. Sherbrook) on the franchise.  Consequently, he deviated 
from his colleague’s views, arguing that the franchise was “a political right or privilege, and not 
a natural or inherent right.”  He noted numerous precedents for this assertion, including the 
history of voting rights for Tennessee’s free blacks, which the 1796 constitution had granted but 
the 1834 constitution had revoked.  Shackelford declared that the state could restrict or revoke 
the franchise at any time “without the violation of any vested right.”  But he agreed that the state 
must comply with the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause.  He held that the sovereign people 
of Tennessee, acting in a constitutional convention, could divest a citizen of the franchise, but 
neither the legislature nor the governor could do so.  Moreover, he said, the act empowering the 
governor to invalidate a commissioner’s voter registration violated the separation of powers by 
permitting the governor to overrule the judiciary.14 
Although the ruling was not filed until May 29, news of the court’s decision began 
circulating earlier, even before the judicial election polls had closed.  While some initially 
misinterpreted Staten as a repudiation of Rebel disfranchisement, the Nashville Republican 
Banner was quick to grasp its correct meaning thanks to Shackelford, who, on leaving 
Brownsville, leaked specific details of the case.  The Banner heralded the decision as a turning 
point, but not a revolution: “It is the entering wedge to the general and final enfranchisement of 
the 80,000 Tennesseans who have heretofore been deprived of the ballot.”  The editor urged all 
county commissioners to preserve their poll books and all Conservatives to dig out their voting 
certificates: “We imagine there will be a general resurrection of old documents and ransacking in 
old cabinets, and the pockets and pantaloons that had been dismissed from service.”  “Let every 
Conservative use all honorable means to increase our vote,” proclaimed the editor of the 
                                                 
 





Clarksville Chronicle, “and the day is not far distant when we will see our State redeemed and 
disenthralled.”  Tennessee’s Conservatives—twenty to thirty thousand of whom were now 
reenfranchised by the Staten decision—potentially held the balance of power and stood poised to 
become a formidable force in the 1869 state election.15  
Often misinterpreted by historians as the landmark decision that doomed Radicalism, 
State v. Staten was, as the Banner said, only the “entering wedge” in the demolition of the 
Radical edifice.  The foundation of the edifice—the proscriptive franchise laws—remained 
firmly in place notwithstanding the decision.  Republican political domination could continue so 
long as the party could control the county commissioners of registration.  Charged with 
determining the eligibility of voters, the registrars were the key to Tennessee’s political future.16    
  Since entering office, Senter had received numerous requests to remove Brownlow’s 
registrars; but in the wake of Staten, there came a deluge of letters, petitions, and newspaper 
editorials from Conservatives and Democrats urging him to purge the state of all Radical 
registrars.  While many accused the registrars of dereliction of duty—not opening their offices 
for voter registration as prescribed by law—most claimed that the registrars were Stokes 
Radicals who refused to issue certificates not only to eligible Conservatives but also to Senter 
Republicans.  Although Senter exercised complete control over the registrars, he initially proved 
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reluctant to take action against them, removing only four in his first hundred days in office (two 
additional positions were vacated by resignation).17  
One of Senter’s correspondents was Abner A. Steele, a staunch Unionist and one of the 
first legislators to publicly break with Brownlow over the franchise law, resigning his seat in 
protest in February 1866.  Identifying himself now as a Conservative Unionist, he informed 
Senter that Marshall County Conservatives were inclined to vote for him rather than Stokes; 
however, they were waiting for Senter to declare himself for immediate universal suffrage.  
Steele urged the governor to remove Marshall County’s Radical registrar as a sign of good faith 
and appoint in his place a Conservative, who would ensure that those reenfranchised by the 
Staten decision received their voter certificates.  “You are master of the situation and I think you 
might use it to your advantage & the people[s’],” Steele wrote, “but you can only do so, by 
giving the people a fair chance to register, and by a full open avowal in favor of the white people 
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voting in Tennessee, regardless of the part they took in the ‘late unpleasantness.’ Do this before 
Stokes does & you will win a good majority & Middle & West Tennessee will be yours.”18   
Senter carefully considered his options.  He had walked a tightrope during the first few 
months of his administration.  Now, he was faced with a critical decision.  He could refuse to 
contest the universal suffrage issue with Stokes and thus move toward the Radical wing of the 
party, or he could take up the banner of immediate universal suffrage and thus broaden the base 
of moderate Republicanism by attracting the support of the newly reinforced Conservative 
voters.  The time to act was fast approaching.  
Meanwhile, Stokes received the same advice as Senter.  John Bowen, who along with 
Steele and other Conservatives had resigned his seat in the General Assembly in February 1866, 
offered Stokes a proposition: if he would declare for universal suffrage, Bowen pledged, no 
Conservative candidate would enter the gubernatorial race.  Senter’s waffling on the issue, 
explained Bowen, presented Stokes with an opportunity to win the votes of Conservatives.  “This 
opportunity was [Senter’s] once,” but “It is no longer.”  Bowen implored Stokes to “Take the 
position that the past shall be bloted [sic] out” and thereby bring peace to “the storm-lashed 
social and political waters” of Tennessee.19 
 Hence, in the brief interim between the Staten decision and the June 5 opening of the 
gubernatorial joint canvass, there was uncertainty over universal suffrage—the central issue of 
the election.  Tennesseans wondered if Senter or Stokes would seize the banner of universal 
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suffrage.  But neither candidate seemed willing to do so.  Previously, Stokes had advocated 
relaxation of the franchise restrictions by way of Tennessee’s cumbersome constitutional 
amendment procedures; but on the eve of the canvass he announced in favor of a two-thirds vote 
in each house to remove political disabilities on a case by case basis—either of which processes 
would take several years to complete.  Meanwhile, Senter, despite his moderate tone, had 
strategically shifted away from the center on the eve of the state convention in a bid to secure 
Radical support by retaining the militia in parts of Middle and West Tennessee and strictly 
enforcing the franchise law during the judicial election.20   
Complicating matters was the return of Andrew Johnson.  Only a few weeks had passed 
since the death of his son, but Johnson showed no signs of grief as he resumed his speaking tour.  
Thousands came to hear him speak in Middle Tennessee in the days preceding the opening of the 
gubernatorial canvass.  He delivered essentially the same stump speech as before, railing more 
about the Radicals in Washington than those in Tennessee. Although he was no longer 
considered a viable gubernatorial candidate, since it was generally understood that he had his 
sights on the vacant U.S. Senate seat, Johnson cast a giant shadow over the election.  “I think the 
state can be redeemed if there is a reasonable effort made in the approaching elections,” he wrote 
to George W. Jones, an old Jacksonian-Democratic friend.  He condemned disfranchisement and 
urged Conservatives to press both candidates to come out in favor of immediate universal male 
suffrage.  It was by no accident that he made an appearance in Nashville on the eve of the 
candidates’ opening speeches.  He even came close to purchasing a controlling interest in both a 
Memphis and a Nashville newspaper in the hope of influencing the gubernatorial election and 
positioning himself for appointment to the U.S. Senate.  In light of the court’s ruling in Staten 
                                                 
 




and Johnson’s much heralded return to the stump, the Conservatives had reason to be optimistic. 
The Murfreesboro Monitor predicted “rapid and repeated somersaults in the arena of politics.  
The most intolerant oppressors of the people will suddenly discover that they have always 
believed in and advocated universal suffrage.”21 
Many people were wondering which candidate, if either, would blink first on the issue of 
universal suffrage as the gubernatorial joint canvass opened in Nashville on June 5.  The hall of 
the House was full to capacity, with white Radical and moderate Republicans, Conservatives, 
and Democrats crowding the main floor while blacks thronged the galleries.  Stokes spoke first.  
There was something badly wrong in Tennessee, he declared, and Senter and Brownlow were to 
blame.  The state’s finances were a mess and corruption was rampant.  He portrayed himself as 
an outsider.  He had served in Washington since fighting to preserve the Union, devoting himself 
there to Lincoln’s task of binding up the nation’s wounds.  He had now returned to Tennessee 
determined to put the state into the same healthy condition as the federal government.  He 
pledged to wage war on the thieves who had plundered the school fund and the unscrupulous 
railroad schemers and corrupt politicians.  He denied any involvement in a conspiracy to unseat 
Senter and refuted the charge, intended to reduce his black support, that he had been the last man 
in Tennessee to bring a slave to Nashville in chains to be sold.  Finally, he briefly addressed what 
he referred to as “the issue of the time”—the franchise.  He maintained that he had neither 
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equivocated nor modified his position on the issue.  He clung to gradual, rather than immediate, 
enfranchisement.  In taking this stand, he was acting as a true Republican who adhered to the 
national party platform on the issue.  When the killing of loyal Unionists—white and black—
ceased, the hellish Ku Klux Klan disbanded, and law and order was restored across the state, 
then, and only then, would he be willing to extend the franchise to the former Confederates.  
“The idea of amending the constitution so as to place the ballot in the hands of these outlaws at 
one clear sweep, and at the present time, would be cruel to the Union men,” he proclaimed.22        
 When Stokes concluded, Senter advanced to the speaker’s stand.  However, his opening 
remarks were drowned out by noise from the galleries as many blacks rose to leave.  Senter 
pleaded with them to stay and listen to what he had to say.  While some left, others remained.  
When the governor resumed, he addressed the matter of the forty thousand black votes that 
Stokes boasted of having at his beck and call.  He declared that he would win the support of half 
of those voters before the race was over.  He then pressed forward with more attacks, branding 
Stokes as a slave trader and a “do-nothing” U.S. congressman.  He challenged his opponent to 
point to a single piece of significant legislation that he had introduced that increased the 
prosperity and happiness of the people of Tennessee.  He even questioned Stokes’s loyalty, 
holding up a copy of the infamous “Duncan letter.”  In this document, which had plagued Stokes 
ever since he wrote it (to John Duncan of McMinnville) in May 1861, Stokes expressed his 
heartfelt opposition to secession; however, he echoed Tennessee’s secessionist governor Isham 
Harris by proclaiming a state’s right of revolution and the duty to resist the oppression of the 
federal government since Lincoln’s call for troops to put down the rebellion.  Although Stokes 
had soon changed his mind and joined the Union army, the letter was an embarrassment to him.  
                                                 
 





Moreover, Senter found fault with his opponent’s military career: “My friend Stokes would make 
it appear that he was a warrior bold, yet in the thickest of the fight he was generally found falling 
back to hunt up stragglers.”23   
Only after a long and vigorous assault on Stokes’s record did Senter address the critical 
issues facing Tennesseans.  First, he discussed the state’s financial woes.  True to his old 
Whiggish principles, he called for state-assisted internal improvements.  He wanted to see 
Tennessee’s grand divisions united by bands of iron and wanted to hear the busy hum of industry 
throughout the hills and valleys of Tennessee.  Nothing, he proclaimed, would help direct the 
tide of immigration toward Tennessee more than building railroads and factories.24 
Next the governor turned to the election’s key issue.  He challenged anyone in the 
audience who claimed to actually comprehend his opponent’s stance on the franchise question to 
explain it.  The challenge was not immediately accepted.  After a moment’s pause, Senter 
repeated it.  Someone in the crowd shouted that Stokes was “trying to ride both sides of the 
question.”  A chorus of protest then erupted among the blacks in the galleries.  Several minutes 
passed before the hullabaloo subsided and Senter was able to resume.25   
The moment was now at hand for the governor.  For weeks, his supporters had adamantly 
denied rumors that he intended to endorse universal suffrage.  His closest associates had 
undertaken a campaign in the press and on the stump to portray Stokes as an advocate of 
universal suffrage in the hope of discrediting him among Radicals.  Thus, those listening to 
Senter must have been stunned by the words he now uttered: “We cannot hold out in longer 
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opposition to the enfranchisement of the people—ought not to make any such effort.”  If elected, 
he continued, he would recommend to the next legislature the calling of a constitutional 
convention to extend the franchise to all adult males.  “There is no equivocation—no two sides 
to the mill pond,” he said.  “It is best to deal plainly with honest men—let all know where you 
stand, and what you are for.”26 
What caused Senter’s abrupt conversion to universal suffrage?  Historian Thomas B. 
Alexander proposed long ago a few possible motivating factors.  First, he said, Senter may have 
been reacting to Stokes’s bid for Conservative support.  But this is unlikely, for although 
Conservatives and Democrats praised Stokes’s gradual enfranchisement policy as a step in the 
right direction, they made it clear that only the candidate who declared for immediate 
enfranchisement would receive their support.  Second, suggested Alexander, Senter may have 
feared defeat at the hands of a largely Radical electorate.  The recent Republican conventions 
had served as a wake-up call.  Dissension in the Republican ranks had proved too great for 
Senter to overcome in his first hundred days in office; only the strong-arm tactics of the 
governor’s supporters during the conventions had preserved his candidacy.  Rather than try any 
longer to win the Radicals to his side, Senter decided to try to enlist the support of 
Conservatives, hoping that their votes along with those of the moderate Republicans would give 
him a majority.  This is a more convincing argument than the first.  Finally, Alexander argued 
that the persistence of Whiggery in a time of shifting party alignments and its influence on 
Senter, a former Whig, could not be dismissed.  Whereas most Tennessee Republicans had 
belonged to the Whig party prior to the war, a number of old-line Whigs were conspicuous in the 
Conservative ranks.  After Appomattox, the former Confederates turned to those leaders, who 







had initially cautioned against secession.  These conservative men retained Whiggish notions 
regarding economic development and postwar recovery.  Senter and leading Conservatives thus 
shared a Whig tradition.  This argument, too, is largely convincing.27 
It is apparent that Senter astutely perceived that Radicalism was dying, and not just in 
Tennessee.  Following Grant’s election, the national party gradually retreated from its Southern 
Reconstruction program.  Various factors crippled Reconstruction: administrative inefficiency, 
constitutional conservatism, and racism.  But above all, it was the erosion of support in the North 
that doomed Reconstruction.  Northerners were eager to settle the “Southern question.”  They 
wanted to put Reconstruction behind them and get on with matters more relevant to their lives.  
Grant’s campaign slogan, “Let us have peace,” expressed the desire of many Americans.  It 
promised an end to a long, bitter conflict.  It suggested that violence would not be tolerated.  
With peace came the offer of reconciliation and enfranchisement to white Southerners willing to 
acknowledge defeat and work toward reunion.  Finally, Grant’s phrase held out the promise of 
prosperity sustained by a system of free labor, which put an emphasis on education and 
enterprise.  According to Republican ideology, equality of rights and opportunities for all men to 
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bargain freely for labor and services fostered liberty and prosperity.  Senter touted free labor not 
only as a safeguard of American republican government but also as a means for white and black 
Southerners to achieve prosperity, thus ushering in a New South.  Senter and many other 
Southern Republicans sought to reconstitute their party along moderate-conservative lines by 
recruiting “respectable” whites and shifting away from sectional questions and black “class 
legislation” toward pressing issues of economic development.28     
From the vantage point of nearly one hundred and fifty years, the failure of Southern 
Republicans to establish a biracial party and the subsequent collapse of their party seem 
preordained.  But many party moderates believed they could achieve a political realignment that 
would give them legitimacy and competiveness in a vibrant two-party system and move the 
region in a new direction, toward a New South of free labor, equal rights, and economic 
development.  To achieve this, they needed to win over a large segment of the white Southern 
electorate, which meant abandoning disfranchisement.  With the Staten decision opening the 
ballot up to approximately twenty to thirty thousand anti-Radical voters, Senter decided it was 
the right moment to act.  He came out in support of universal male suffrage, but only after 
carefully calculating his chance for success.  In doing so, however, he found himself 
championing the interests of influential Conservatives and Democrats at the expense of black  
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Republicans, whom he—and Stokes, too—took for granted.29   
In an instant, Senter had altered the course of the campaign.  “You have struck the key-
note & will beat William to death as sure as his head is bald,” predicted former Confederate 
captain James C. Fleming.  The Nashville Republican Banner agreed: “If [Senter] uttered no 
other [statement] from now till August [his call for universal enfranchisement] would be 
sufficient to elect him overwhelmingly over any other candidate whose avowed principles fell 
short of [his pledge] by a hair’s breadth.”  Many Conservatives and Democrats celebrated 
Senter’s announcement and vowed to cooperate with him to restore harmony to Tennessee.  “The 
road, then, to peace lies through universal enfranchisement,” the Jackson Tribune proclaimed.  
“We are ready to forget and forgive the past, and to meet our Republican opponents half way.”  
Some, on the other hand, remained skeptical.  They questioned Senter’s “sudden conversion,” 
suspecting that it was motivated not by principle but by politics.  The editor of the Lincoln 
County News cautioned his readers not to trust the governor, for “he seeks our aid to conquer an 
opponent, and suffrage is the price he offers.”30       
Senter Republicans generally accepted their leaders’ decision, at least publicly.  
Legislative candidates who supported the governor promptly took to the stump to campaign for 
enfranchisement themselves.  Judge Houk reported on June 16 that Senter’s announcement was 
being well received on the Cumberland Plateau in East Tennessee: “I did not believe it, but I 
have learned to talk eloquently of the justice of restoring ‘the tax-payers of the state’ to ‘their 
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rights.’”  Privately, however, many expressed concern that the governor had now placed them at 
the mercy of their enemies.  Others shrugged off their disappointment by reminding themselves 
that Rebel enfranchisement was inevitable.  “Seeing the Supreme Court has decided the question 
for us, willy nilly, & that universal suffrage must speadily [sic] be adopted, I am still for Senter,” 
wrote a despondent former Brownlow Radical.  “Most of our Northern friends . . . have urged it 
upon us in a spirit of dictation, & almost menace, & surprisingly in utter ignorance or 
indifference to the result of such universal suffrage in our State.  We did intend, all the time, to 
enfranchise the rebels in the end; but we could not tell them in advance, when we would do it, 
lest they should wrest this concession to bad ends.”31 
Perhaps even more shocking than Senter’s declaration in favor of universal male suffrage 
was an announcement from Senator Brownlow that he too accepted the new doctrine, a position 
in which he joined his archenemies Andrew Johnson and ex-Rebel governor Isham Harris.  
Writing from his summer retreat at Montvale Springs in the Great Smoky Mountains of East 
Tennessee, Brownlow defended the franchise laws as necessary to prevent the state from being 
thrown into anarchy and to protect Unionists from proscription, violence, murder, and exile 
following the war.  If he had the power, he said, he would disfranchise the leaders of the 
Confederacy for life.  But the state’s Republicans had voted for Grant on the platform of 
universal suffrage, Brownlow admitted.  “Should the Republicans of Tennessee obstinately stand 
out any longer against the great Republican party of the nation and its entire press, and also 
against the President and both houses of Congress,” he said, “they would simply render 
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themselves ridiculous in the estimation of all besides themselves.”  Even those Brownlow 
Radicals most reluctant to endorse Senter now fell in line behind their leader.  Stokes Radicals 
were shocked to learn of Brownlow’s about-face.  They claimed he had forged an alliance with 
Johnson and Rebel leaders.  But the “Fighting Parson” soon released an indignant letter in which 
he expressed his hatred for the Democratic party and scoffed at the idea that he was capable of 
“forming any alliance, offensive or defensive, with Andrew Johnson.”32 
A closer look at Brownlow’s public declaration in favor of universal suffrage is 
revealing.  Although he lamented the recent decision of the Supreme Court—a court of his own 
choosing—he maintained that the Republicans held a secure grip over the entire judiciary for the 
next eight years as a result of their sweeping victories in the judicial elections.  Moreover, he 
neither addressed Senter by name nor did he specifically endorse the governor’s position.  He 
contended that it would require at least two years to lift restrictions on the disfranchised should 
the governor urge the legislature call a constitutional convention.  He further alleviated the fears 
of Republicans by observing that the Fourteenth Amendment still barred most former Rebel 
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leaders from holding state office.  Brownlow essentially endorsed long-term, gradual, rather than 
immediate, universal suffrage.  In doing so, he agreed basically with Stokes.33   
Yet the Brownlows remained in Senter’s camp.  While his father wrote letters and 
solicited prominent Republicans to support Senter, John Bell Brownlow took to the stump.  The 
Brownlows had, behind the scenes, championed Horace Maynard for governor; however, having 
failed to entice Maynard to announce his candidacy at the state convention, they settled on 
Senter.  Privately J. B. Brownlow thought neither Senter nor Stokes “worthy of the nomination, 
because both showed a willingness to subordinate the party to their interests.”  But publicly, he, 
like his father, justified the endorsement of Senter based on his long service to the legislature, his 
support of the Brownlow administration and its Radical policies, and his eight months spent in 
various Confederate prisons.  Stokes, on the other hand, had twice been elected to Congress, was 
certain to be reelected, and, worst of all, had challenged Parson Brownlow for the U.S. Senate 
seat.  The unwillingness to forgive a political enemy drove the Brownlows’ campaign to beat 
Stokes at any cost.34     
In 1869, as in past elections, the black vote was a potentially formidable force in 
Tennessee.  Both candidates wanted black votes, yet neither actively pursued black voters.  As 
the election unfolded, Stokes spoke less and less to the freedmen in the crowds.  He assumed he 
had secured their support for his candidacy and therefore took it for granted.  Senter, however, 
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walked a narrow line.  On the one hand, to curry favor with the Conservatives and Democrats he 
attempted to portray Stokes as the black man’s candidate.  On the other hand, he promoted 
education, free labor, economic development, and equal rights (although not Radical class 
legislation) as the keys to black social, economic, and political advancement.  Brownlow 
addressed an open letter to Tennessee blacks on behalf of Senter in which he warned them to be 
weary of “political demagogues,” such as Stokes, who sought black votes for their own political 
gain.  The former governor urged the ex-slaves not to “forsake your political friends, . . . those 
who have heretofore stood by you and who have ever maintained your rights.”35   
Brownlow’s plea may have won a few converts, but Senter was aided more by William 
Scott, Sr., who shared his moderate vision of black advancement and the promise of peaceful and 
prosperous relations between the races.  Scott and his son, William Scott, Jr., the newly-
appointed editor-in-chief of the Maryville Republican, had long since abandoned the Maryville 
Union League and broken with East Tennessee Radicals after becoming disillusioned by white 
Radical resistance to promoting blacks to state and national office.  In July, the senior Scott 
published an impassioned editorial urging blacks to abandon Radicalism and support Senter’s 
moderate course.  For those fearful that the former Confederates might exact revenge against 
their Radical enemies, Scott noted that the national Republican party and the Reconstruction 
Amendments were still there to afford protection.  He reminded the freed people that they had 
received social, civil, and political rights at the state and national level, and these rights were 
settled beyond question.  The state’s white voters, not blacks, would decide the current suffrage 
issue at the ballot box.  “This is not your fight,” said Scott.  “[I]t is a fight between the whites, 
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and to bring you into it is both unwise and dangerous.”  The South was now trending toward 
support of universal suffrage, and it was in blacks’ best interest to accept it.  If they desired 
peaceful and friendly relations with their Rebel neighbors, Scott insisted, they must eschew 
political proscription.  Moreover, they should no longer demand class legislation in their behalf 
and should support laissez-faire government.  In closing, Scott warned the freed people “not to 
be led as slaves by designing white men, who inflame your worst passions” solely for their own 
political gain.  Like Senter, Scott envisioned a new Republican party anchored at the center of 
the South’s political spectrum.  However, he also foresaw the possibility of blacks and white 
moderates within both parties becoming full partners in shaping a New South.  Although Scott’s 
message did not appeal to all Tennessee blacks, he exhibited considerable courage in the face of 
boisterous and sometimes dangerous crowds of Radicals—white and black—incensed at his call 
to appease their enemies.36     
Anti-Radical candidates and newspapers made a half-hearted effort to court black voters.  
They predicted the Radicals’ defeat and informed blacks that it was in their interest to ally with 
the Conservatives: “If [the black man] wants the white people to remain his friends,” explained 
the editor of the Columbia Herald, “he has only to vote for the universal suffrage candidates.”  
They warned blacks that aligning with the Radicals might lead to dire consequences.  The white 
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Southern employer, on whom blacks’ livelihood depended, might feel compelled to “turn them 
over to the tender mercies of their friends across the Ohio, and try John Chinaman awhile.”37    
From the outset of the gubernatorial canvass, Senter’s supporters joined Conservatives 
and Democrats in urging him to use the Radical election machinery to replace Brownlow’s 
registrars and thus help ensure victory.  “Turn out all the registers,” advised an anonymous 
correspondent from Memphis.  “Put in your friends who will see that full and fair registration 
shall be made.  Act boldly like Gov. Brownlow did and you will win.”  But Senter moved slowly 
at first.  He put Brownlow’s registrars on notice that removal from office was the penalty for 
refusing to certify eligible voters.  By mid-June, Senter had removed three registrars as 
examples.  Stumping across the state, he claimed that these actions were in strict compliance 
with the law.  As proof, he pointed out that while he had removed two of those registrars for 
refusing to enroll Conservatives, he had removed the other for refusing to enroll a Stokes 
Radical.38   
A few Radical registrars resigned rather than issue certificates to Conservatives, but most 
stayed on and simply ignored Senter’s edict.  Some challenged Senter’s authority to remove 
registrars based on the court’s ruling denying the governor arbitrary power over voter 
registration.  Others suggested that Senter planned a wholesale removal of Brownlow’s registrars 
to pave the way for the appointment of his own registrars to accomplish an extralegal extension 
of the franchise.  Thomas Harris, the former registrar of Maury County, emerged as one of 
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Senter’s sharpest critics.  He charged the governor with colluding with the Rebel Democracy for 
his own political gain: “As a Union Republican Whig, and from a sense of justice and duty, I will 
ever oppose such demagogue principles.”  Harris warned Senter that he was prepared to 
challenge his removals in court.39 
The Radicals quickly grasped the precarious position that Senter had put them in by his 
endorsement of universal suffrage and his threat to remove registrars who refused to comply with 
the law.  “Governor Senter has entered into a most villainous conspiracy to secure his own 
election,” charged the editor of the West Tennessean.  “His registrars, appointed for the purpose 
of disregarding the law, are his willing tools.”  Determined to prevent his further use of the 
election machinery, Stokes Radicals sought to outmaneuver the governor by proposing an 
agreement in which they promised to refrain from pushing forward a bill to repeal Senter’s 
pardon in return for the governor’s pledge not to remove any additional Radical registrars.  
Senter, however, rejected the agreement.  Several registrars responded by entering the legislative 
races without resigning their post.  Senter, whose resolve stiffened as his enemies grew more 
defiant, removed those registrars from office.40   
It was clear that the outcome of the gubernatorial and legislative elections would pivot on 
control of the registrars.  “It is important . . . to have the right sort of Registers throughout the 
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state during the next forty days,” advised William Moore of Memphis in a letter to Senter.  
During the three weeks following his rejection of the Radicals’ proposed agreement, the 
governor removed thirty registrars without any explanation.  In their place he appointed not only 
moderate Republicans but also Conservatives—a move to improve his standing among both 
Conservatives and Democrats.  To those Stokes supporters who clearly grasped the legal 
implications of Staten, Senter’s appointment of Conservative registrars portended trouble.  They 
feared that former Confederates might acquire certificates from sympathetic registrars seeking to 
enlist their aid in developing a formidable Conservative party to challenge the badly divided 
Republican party.  Several letters were dispatched to Tennessee’s best legal minds inquiring 
about the legality of a certificate in the hands of a disfranchised Rebel.  Writing to a group of 
concerned Greene County Radicals, Thomas Coldwell, the state attorney general, concluded that 
“the legal presumption is that persons holding certificates of registration are legal voters.  There 
can be no question that a newly appointed Registrar can grant valid certificates, and persons 
voting upon such certificates cannot be indicted for ‘illegal voting.’”41    
As Senter’s Conservative registrars assumed control of their counties’ registration books 
and certificates, they extended the franchise to many men who had supported the Confederacy.  
Although there is no extant evidence to prove that Senter instructed his newly appointed 
registrars to issue voter certificates to ex-Rebels, he certainly did nothing to stop it.  His 
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correspondence suggests that he must have been aware that thousands of disfranchised Rebels 
were receiving certificates.  Ferdinand S. Singletary, a Republican member of the lower house, 
warned Senter that “Designing men who care nothing for your election are doing their utmost . . . 
to procure certificates for illegal voters.”  In a little more than a month, nearly eighty thousand 
former Confederates were registered.42 
With his stand on universal suffrage, Senter was sure to win the votes of these Rebel 
certificate holders, as well as the Conservative votes, including those of the twenty to thirty 
thousand men reenfranchised as a consequence of Staten.  He was also fairly certain of carrying 
nearly half of the Republican vote.  Most Senter Republicans and Conservatives, embracing the 
spirit of reconciliation as embodied in the national Republican party’s platform, welcomed Rebel 
voters.  But some Senter Republicans expressed grave doubts.  They grudgingly accepted the 
situation so long as the Rebels pledged to support Senter.  Yet they cautioned Senter against 
making promises to the former Confederates in return for their votes.  “You may answer that 
they are pledged to you,” wrote an anonymous Republican, but “Don’t trust them too far.”  Some 
feared that once the Confederates obtained their certificates, the Conservatives would field their 
own legislative candidates in an attempt to wrest control of the state from the Republicans.43    
Several letters from Brownlow’s registrars suggest that even if the governor did not 
personally order his appointees to register Rebels, some of his closest supporters may have done 
so.  “I cannot, in the discharge of my duty as I understand it, increase the registered vote of this 
county as is demanded by many seeking your election,” wrote Montgomery County registrar H. 
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W. Bunker.  Cocke County registrar William Cureton reported that he had been informed that he 
would be removed from office if he refused to issue certificates to disfranchised Rebels.  Some 
Radical registrars chose to resign rather than violate the franchise law.  Others dug in for a 
fight.44  
A little after two on Saturday afternoon, the third of July, Knox County registrar Charles 
Morrow went to pick up his mail at the post office.  When he unlocked his box, he found an 
envelope marked “Executive Department,” which he hastily opened.  His face turned pale as he 
read its contents.  Then he became red with rage.  Friends and curious onlookers gathered around 
him.  Brandishing the letter, he announced that Senter had removed him and appointed George 
Weaver, “an arrant conservative,” in his stead.  “It’s all a dirty piece of rebel work,” he 
exclaimed.45   
News of Morrow’s removal spread rapidly.  Quickly he and some of Knoxville’s other 
leading Stokes Radicals gathered to discuss the matter.  They then sent a letter to the governor 
requesting an explanation.  As they waited for Senter’s response, former Confederates lined up 
outside the newly-appointed registrar’s office in the hope of receiving voter certificates.  A close 
confidant of Andrew Johnson reported that Weaver issued a staggering total of 1,200 
certificates—many of them to ex-Rebels—on his third day in office.  Rumors circulated that 
Weaver was closeted with the Brownlows at the office of the Knoxville Whig, where its press 
reportedly printed certificates at the rate of a hundred an hour.  On July 5, Frank Hyberger in the 
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governor’s office responded to Morrow’s inquiry, saying that Senter had ordered Morrow’s 
removal without explanation.  Hyberger repeated Senter’s stated policy that if any registrar failed 
to abide by the Supreme Court’s Staten decision he would be replaced.  Hyberger’s response did 
not sit well with Knox’s Stokes Radicals, who joined others across the state to protest Senter’s 
removals.  They feared that if Senter was not stopped, his new registrars might register ex-Rebels 
en masse, he would win the governorship in a landslide, and Radicals would lose control of the 
legislature.  The stage was now set for high drama as Brownlow’s deposed registrars, the last line 
of defense for Tennessee’s Radical Republicans, prepared to take court action.46   
Radicals rushed to court seeking restraining orders to bar Senter from removing 
registrars.  They found some like-minded Radical chancellors, particularly William M. Smith in 
Memphis and Oliver P. Temple in Knoxville, who gave them what they wanted.  Conservatives 
and Democrats derided this Radical “injunction business.”  “Go on with your petty attempts to 
stop the leviathan of universal suffrage,” said the Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, “and you 
will be trampled under his enormous hoofs.”  The Radicals’ tactic to stem the tide of Confederate 
registration worked, but only temporarily, for the issue soon wound up in the hands of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court and the result proved to be the Radicals’ undoing.47 
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That the injunction case of Williams v. Boughner would doom Tennessee’s Radical 
Reconstruction was not yet apparent when it was rushed to the Supreme Court.  But that it 
originated in Memphis, where the Republican split had spawned a violent tempest, came as no 
surprise.  It began simply enough.  Shelby County registrar J. E. Williams, an ardent Stokes 
Radical, had refused to issue certificates to those entitled to them by the Staten decision.  Senter 
therefore removed Williams and replaced him with John Boughner, who had a reputation as a 
good Union man of unimpeachable character.  Senter expected his supporters to receive this 
news enthusiastically, but they did not.  Boughner’s appointment stirred up discontent among 
both Stokes and Senter supporters.  Notwithstanding the bitter intraparty conflict in the county, 
Shelby Republicans found common ground with regard to their newly-appointed registrar, for 
they were suspicious of Boughner’s political ties to the Democratic party and his loose 
construction of the franchise law, not to mention his possible financial motive in accepting the 
post.48   
The Senter Republicans of Shelby flooded Senter’s office with letters and petitions 
calling on him to reconsider Boughner’s appointment.  Reverend W. H. Pearne, superintendent 
of the Metropolitan Police, insisted that Boughner was not a Republican but rather a Democrat 
who sympathized with the “bitter class of rebels, who hate niggers & carpetbaggers, and will 
rather be pleased to gratify” his Rebel friends.  On hearing of Boughner’s appointment, Judge 
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Barbour Lewis, Memphis’s most influential and outspoken Senter Republican, became alarmed 
and wrote two letters to the governor urging him not to make any changes in Shelby or 
surrounding counties without first consulting his supporters in the region.  Lewis warned Senter 
that he risked the defection of moderate Republicans if he kept Boughner in office.  Doing so 
could prove “fatal to the Republican party in this County,” and even the state as a whole.  Lewis 
was convinced that Senter was being misled and manipulated in this matter by the Ku Klux 
Democrats, who had concealed their true intentions.  They “will go for you if they don’t cheat 
us,” Lewis contended.  “They are slippery dogs and it wont do to trust them far.  They like you 
better than Stokes, or rather they hate you a little less, but they mean to squeeze a tight hard 
bargain out of you”—universal suffrage—in return for their votes.49 
 But Senter would not be deterred.  Even as the campaign grew increasingly bitter and 
Stokes Radicals successfully sought injunctions in an attempt to derail his election, Senter, for 
the first time publicly, moved boldly toward removing all remaining political disabilities.  In 
early July, he made it pointedly clear where he stood on the franchise issue.  In a speech at 
McMinnville, he declared that anyone who had received a voter certificate or could make an 
affidavit that he would have voted in the elections designated in the franchise act if it had been 
convenient to do so was now entitled to vote.  He further broadened the definition of those he 
thought entitled to vote to include all young men who had reached the legal voting age of 
twenty-one since the war and who had not borne arms against the Union.  Moreover, in a move 
that shocked even those Senter Republicans unfazed by his previous statements, the governor 
declared that all who had been forced against their will into Confederate military service by 
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conscription or other means were also entitled to be registered.  In closing, he announced that he 
relished a showdown with Brownlow’s Radical registrars in the courts and threatened to marshal 
the state’s legal and financial resources to strike down the injunctions.  Shortly thereafter, at 
Tullahoma, he announced that Tennessee’s Republican party “must liberalize its policy” on the 
franchise to be in accord with the national party.  Privately, he issued written instructions to his 
registrars to petition the Tennessee Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to supersede the orders 
of Radical chancellors.  By now, Senter had turned a complete political somersault.  He had 
reversed his previous position that the “day [is] a long way off” that the Rebels would be granted 
the ballot, which he had proclaimed at the capitol during the state convention.50 
As numerous injunction cases navigated the state’s legal channels, Boughner’s was 
rushed to the Shelby chancery court, whereupon Judge William M. Smith cleared his docket to 
hear the case.  After a marathon court session, Smith rendered a decision in favor of Williams, 
declaring that his removal was unconstitutional.  The Conservative and Democratic reaction to 
Smith’s ruling was swift and dismissive.  “It is remarkable how Radical Judges have twisted the 
laws to suit the exigencies of the Radical party,” remarked the editor of the Nashville Union and 
American.  But some Democrats counseled patience as Boughner heeded Senter’s instructions 
and appealed to the Supreme Court to overrule Smith.  They looked to an increasingly 
independent Brownlow-appointed Supreme Court for salvation.51 
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The Supreme Court extended its term a few days to hear Boughner’s appeal.  Senter’s 
embattled registrar hired Joseph Heiskell, the former Confederate congressman who had 
successfully argued Staton’s case before the court.  Heiskell presented essentially the same case 
that Boughner’s attorneys had made in Chancellor Smith’s court, arguing that the power of 
appointment necessarily (although only implicitly) involved the power of removal.  He cited 
multiple precedents in the U.S. Supreme Court and various state courts to conclude that the law 
was silent with respect to the removal of officers when the tenure was not fixed, except for 
crimes and misdemeanors.52   
Judge James Pierce, Williams’s counsel, argued that Staten curtailed Senter’s removal 
powers.  In that decision, the court denied the governor power to set aside voter registrations, a 
key provision of the February 1868 franchise act.  The General Assembly had enacted the law to 
protect Radicalism amid an outbreak of renewed KuKluxism.  But now, as Governor Senter 
employed the Radical election machinery for his own ends, Pierce took the position that many 
Radicals had adopted in the wake of Staten.  He insisted that the court’s denial of the governor’s 
power to set aside voter registration extended to the 1868 law’s remaining provisions, namely 
section two, which authorized the governor to remove registrars for dereliction of duty, fraud, or 
other malfeasance.53      
The court soon rendered its decision.  Shackelford, writing for a unanimous court, 
characterized the question of the governor’s removal powers as “one of grave importance.”  The 
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court sustained Senter’s removals on the basis that no tenure of office had been fixed by the 
legislature and that the governor’s power of appointment and removal was confirmed in the 
franchise act of 1868, which, with the exception of the power to set aside voter registrations, had 
not been nullified by Staten.  In closing, Shackelford referenced Joseph Story’s magisterial 
Commentaries on the Constitution to conclude that registrars held office at the pleasure of the 
governor.  Thus, Senter’s removals were constitutional.54  
The Memphis Daily Appeal hailed the ruling: “Shelby [County] is saved.  Indeed the 
whole state is saved.”  While Senter Republicans, Conservatives, and Democrats celebrated, the 
Radicals condemned the lame-duck court for exacting revenge on the party that had repudiated 
two of its members.  They realized the gravity of the court’s decision.  “We are not foolish 
enough to deny that when the Democracy get the ballot the days of the Republican party in 
Tennessee are numbered,” remarked the editor of the Daily Tennessee State Journal.  
“[P]roscription of Republicans from office will follow as rigid, wholesale and sweeping as it has 
been of the Democracy under the reigns of Brownlow and Senter.”  The resolve of some 
Radicals subsequently wavered, but others remained defiant.55   
Excitement ran high as hundreds packed into Chancellor Temple’s courtroom to hear the 
injunction case against Knox County’s newly-appointed registrar.  Five days had passed since 
the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Williams v. Boughner and many East Tennessee Radicals 
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looked anxiously to Temple to stand firm against the court’s decision.  But few Senter 
Republicans, Conservatives, and Democrats expected Temple, who had enjoined George Weaver 
from performing his duties as registrar only hours before the news that the Supreme Court had 
upheld Senter’s removal power reached Knoxville, to do anything more than immediately 
dismiss the case.  On taking his seat on the bench, Temple remarked that the duty of the courts 
was to interpret the law.  In light of the Williams v. Boughner decision, he said, he could not 
restrain the appointees of Governor Senter.  To do so implied power in the chancery court to 
determine political questions, which exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction.  Therefore, Temple 
dismissed the case against Weaver.  He might have stopped there, but a sense of public duty 
obligated him to add a few words.  An attempt had been made to intimidate his court, Temple 
declared, as well as other courts in the state.  The culprit was Governor Senter, who, while on the 
campaign trail, had threatened to deploy the State Guard to enforce universal suffrage.  Senter 
seems to assume, Temple went on to say, “that he is the State and that he has the power, by his 
will, to overthrow the courts of the country whenever they may interfere with his plans.”56  
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Williams v. Boughner was a key turning point on Tennessee’s journey toward 
redemption, the defining moment in which the balance of power in Tennessee politics passed 
from the Radicals.  Henceforth there would be no more Radical victories, only defeats.  Many 
Rebels and Conservatives sensed the profound change in their fortunes.  “Political matters seem 
to be assuming quite a different aspect to the downtrodden and oppressed,” wrote Eliza Rhea 
Anderson Fain on August 2.57 
In the campaign’s final four weeks, Senter removed an additional twenty-four registrars.  
Seeing the handwriting on the wall, twelve other Brownlow registrars resigned.  As the 
gubernatorial canvass came to a close, Stokes repeatedly charged that Senter had “gone over and 
joined the Rebel-Democracy” thus “sell[ing] out the boys in blue, lock, stock and barrel.”  With 
thousands of certificates being issued to disfranchised Rebels, the franchise law was, according 
to Stokes, “absolutely a dead letter.”  The Radicals accused Senter of disingenuousness, looking 
the other way while his registrars openly violated the law.58   
In Nashville, Senter’s private secretary Frank Hyberger felt compelled to respond to such 
criticism.  When presented with yet another account of Knox County registrar George Weaver’s 
misconduct in issuing certificates in violation of the franchise law, Hyberger fired back, 
erroneously stating that it was the first such charge made against that particular Senter appointee.  
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If Weaver had, in fact, abused the powers of his office as Knox County Radicals claimed, said 
Hyberger, Senter had nothing to do with it and knew nothing about it: “Gov. Senter is not forced 
to the necessity of instructing Commissioners of Registration how to perform their duties.”  He 
insisted moreover that if Senter was presented with clear evidence of a registrar’s misconduct, he 
would remove him as soon as he could find a replacement who would faithfully administer the 
law.  In closing, Hyberger observed that Senter “could have been easily elected as the 
registration stood under Gov. Brownlow’s administration but being an honorable man and 
knowing that the different Counties was [sic] not fairly registered he has endeavored to have said 
registration law executed to the letter.  [I]f such has not been done it is no fault of Governor 
Senter.”59              
In firm control of the state’s election machinery, Senter was now free to reconstitute his 
party’s organization and agenda along moderately conservative lines by expanding its base 
through the recruitment of “respectable” non-Republican whites and shifting away from 
sectional questions and black “class legislation” and toward issues of economic development.  
Yet it remained to be seen whether Senter could really bridge Tennessee’s partisan divide and 
establish such a centrist party.60 
 So far everything was proceeding according to Senter’s wishes.  The Conservatives had 
managed to keep ambitious office-seekers and the former Confederates in line, in accordance 
with their strategy of “masterly inactivity.”  “Let there be no divisions,” proclaimed the editor of 
the Franklin Review.  “Let every one go to work in a spirit of conciliation and Tennessee will be 
once more redeemed, regenerated and disenthralled.”  Except for a few assaults on blacks, even 
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the Klan remained quiet during most of the campaign.  The governor’s closest advisors were 
convinced that the Conservatives would keep their word.  “I have no fears of the opposition party 
running candidates,” Frank Hyberger remarked in a private letter.  “They are pledged not to do 
so and when they can get Republicans to run on the Universal Suffrage platform it will be to 
their advantage for this reason.”  As the election neared, Senter Republicans were confident that 
the governor had “played a skillful game.”  He had not only outwitted the Stokes Radicals but 
also seemed on the verge of doing the unthinkable—bringing about the peaceful realignment of 
the party system to take control of the center of Tennessee’s political spectrum.61    
However, following the Williams v. Boughner ruling the Conservatives decided that their 
opportunity had arrived.  One East Tennessee Conservative remarked, “The suffrage revolution 
is crushing every thing in its path way.  May it continue, until the last vestige of Radicalism in 
Ten. is wiped out.”  With the ballot open to virtually all, it was time to shift strategy.  The 
Conservatives appreciated the extralegal manipulation of the ballot that Senter had allowed; yet 
they coveted the next General Assembly, for that body could sweep the statute books clean and 
enact the new legislation needed to formally remove the Rebels’ disabilities.  Casting “masterly 
inactivity” aside, the Conservatives now hastily arranged conventions across the state to 
nominate legislative candidates.  In contrast to the Republican conventions, which had been 
mired in intraparty strife, the Conservative conventions quickly reached a consensus on 
candidates.  The Conservative platform called simply for the election of Senter and all other 
candidates running on the universal suffrage ticket.  The editor of the Nashville Republican 
Banner, who had been the most vocal proponent of Conservatives’ remaining on the sidelines, 
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reflected on the sea-change in Tennessee politics that had occurred over a few weeks: “The 
opinion was almost unanimous that the best we could hope for was the election of a General 
Assembly composed primarily of moderate Republicans . . . and the platform on which we all 
stood was—the ballot first, and the rest will naturally follow.”  But with Senter apparently 
willing to win at any cost, acquiescing in his registrars’ violation of the franchise law by 
permitting Rebels to vote, the Conservatives asked themselves, “Why then, . . . wherever the 
ballot-box has been rendered accessible to such as are entitled to the rights of freemen, shall we 
not make assurance doubly sure by sending men of our own choice to the General Assembly?”  
Thus there were now three distinct groups represented on the ballot: Stokes Radicals, Senter 
Republicans, and Conservatives.62  
Although their situation was dire, Stokes Radicals refused to concede defeat.  They 
threatened legal action against commissioners who accepted Rebel registrants and against Rebels 
who cast ballots.  Stokes told Tennesseans that if Senter won, Congress would intervene and 
place the state under military occupation.  To secure President Grant’s support, a Radical 
delegation was dispatched to Washington.  While Grant never issued a public endorsement of 
Stokes, two members of his cabinet—George Boutwell (secretary of the treasury) and John 
Creswell (postmaster general)—did so.  In a letter addressed to Stokes, clearly written for public 
consumption, Boutwell suggested that the enemies of the Republican party were supporting 
Senter.  He also appealed to black Tennesseans to rally behind Stokes.  But neither the threats 
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nor the cabinet endorsements deterred the Conservatives and Democrats or united Republicans in 
opposition to Senter’s candidacy.63   
 The fears of a few of Senter’s staunchest Republican supporters were realized in the 
waning days of the campaign.  They accused him of violating the franchise law and making a 
pact with the Conservatives and Democrats in return for their votes.  “Senter has sold us out and 
destroyed every hope for all of us,” lamented Lucien Eaton.  Dr. William Stilwell, a Brownlow 
Radical from West Tennessee, reported that “the rebels are jubilant, insolent, & overbearing. . . .  
The elections in this end of the State will all be carried by force & fraud for Senter, & the rebel 
Democratic candidates for the Legislature! What is to become of us?”64   
 As the gubernatorial race entered the final stretch, it was no longer a question of whether 
Senter would win, but rather by how much.  On election day, tens of thousands of previously 
disfranchised Rebels turned out to cast their first ballots in many years.  There was tension in the 
air as ex-Confederates, Conservative Unionists, freedmen, moderate Republicans, and Radicals 
trooped to the polls, but with a few exceptions the election passed off quietly.  Senter carried 
each of the state’s three grand divisions, even the Radical stronghold of East Tennessee, 
receiving a statewide total of 120,303 votes to Stokes’s 55,066.  Of the eighty-one counties for 
which returns are available, sixty-six cast majorities for Senter.  Stokes received 19,372 fewer 
votes than Brownlow had received in the 1867 election.  This suggests that nearly a fourth of 
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Republican voters supported Senter.  Although Senter managed to siphon off some of Stokes’s 
black support, he fell far short of his campaign pledge to win half of the state’s 40,000 black 
votes.  Black voters overwhelmingly continued to support the Radical party, constituting the bulk 
of its constituency in this election.65    
 The keys to Senter’s decisive victory were the nearly thirty thousand white Tennesseans 
reenfranchised by the Staten decision and the additional tens of thousands illegally enfranchised 
by his own registrars in the wake of Williams v. Boughner.  But more important than Senter’s 
triumph was the fact that control of both houses of the General Assembly passed into the hands 
of the Conservatives.  The legislative races were originally contests between Senter Republicans 
and Stokes Radicals.  However, after Senter’s registrars began a wholesale registration of ex-
Rebel voters, Conservative candidates came forth, transforming most two-way races in Middle 
and West Tennessee into three-way contests.  In the Radical stronghold of East Tennessee, 
Senter Republicans and Conservatives united to defeat the Stokes Radical candidates.  In nearly 
every contest, the Conservatives achieved a clear majority or capitalized on the division between 
Republicans to win the seat.  In the Senate, Conservatives won twenty-two of the twenty-five 
available seats; Senter Republicans claimed the other three seats, while Radicals got none.  In the 
House, Conservatives won sixty-three seats, Senter Republicans and Stokes Radicals ten each.66 
The Conservatives’ triumph was the result of a series of serendipitous events and political 
calculations and miscalculations.  Brownlow’s election to the Senate had fostered Republican 
intraparty strife, which spawned shifting political alignments.  Meanwhile, the Conservatives 
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skillfully maneuvered Governor Senter, who sought to reconstitute the Republican party, into an 
alliance and patiently waited for their opportunity.  Seemingly assured of victory once the 
Supreme Court issued its rulings in two momentous franchise cases, Senter outsmarted himself 
by appointing Conservative registrars to solidify his standing among Conservatives and 
Democrats and then failed to rein in those registrars when they extended the franchise to the 
former Confederates by extra-legal methods.  Senter’s acquiescence paved the way for the 
Radicals’ downfall.  The Conservatives promptly jettisoned their strategy of “masterly 
inactivity” and, working hand-in-hand with the ex-Rebels, seized control of the legislature.  With 
the election over, they had no further use for Senter or the Republican party.  Now the 
Conservatives set about completing their plan to overthrow Tennessee’s Republican regime by 
demolishing the foundation on which Radical Reconstruction stood.   
After casting his first ballot since before the Civil War, Nimrod Porter, a Maury County 
ex-Rebel, reflected on the recent turn of events: “Fare well to all Radicals,” he recorded with 









                                                 
 






CLEANING THE AUGEAN STABLES: AUGUST 1869-MARCH 1870 
 
Tennesseans anxiously anticipated the convening of the Thirty-sixth General Assembly.  
For Conservatives and Rebels, the August 1869 election results were the welcome death-knell of 
Radicalism.  For Radicals, the Conservatives’ decisive victory in the legislative races was 
ominous.  Senter Republicans, still reeling from the surprise entry of Conservative candidates 
into the legislative races, sought to forestall a reactionary takeover of the legislature. They 
persisted in their efforts to forge a new Republican party, demanding that Republicans shift their 
priorities and bring moderate Conservatives into the fold.  Still unclear was the course to be 
pursued by the Conservative-dominated legislature.  Certainly it would endeavor to fulfill the 
Conservative campaign promises to restore voting rights to disfranchised whites and revise the 
state constitution, but there were other volatile issues also on the legislative docket: selecting a 
United States senator, considering the Fifteenth Amendment, reassessing the free school system, 
and dealing with the resurgent Ku Klux Klan.  What the legislature would do and, just as 
importantly, how the Republicans in Washington would respond became matters of great interest 
to Tennesseans of all parties and races. 
Hardly was the August ballot-counting finished before a delegation of disgruntled Stokes 
Radicals, led by Stokes himself, descended on the nation’s capital in the hope of persuading 
sympathetic congressional Republicans and President Grant to investigate the legality of the 
election.  They were determined to make good on their threat that if Senter and his registrars 




who reportedly held numerous meetings behind closed doors with influential men in 
Washington.  When asked to comment on the election, he remarked, “The Republican party in 
Tennessee has gone to hell.”  He wanted the president to call Congress into special session to 
consider the situation in Tennessee.  Initially, Stokes and his fellows pledged to remain in 
Washington until Grant and key members of his cabinet and Congress returned from their 
summer holidays.  But time was of the essence, for the Tennessee legislature would convene in 
the first week of October.  The delegation therefore headed to New York City, where Grant and 
his family were residing.1 
To the Radicals’ consternation, Senter and a party of his friends, who had followed 
Stokes to Washington, beat them to New York City.  Although Senter publicly insisted that he 
was there to discuss the subject of railroads with Grant, his real purpose was to put the 
president’s mind at ease over the Conservatives’ victory and dissuade him from either calling 
Congress into session or sending U.S. troops to Tennessee.  It was Senter’s good fortune that, in 
New York, Grant was surrounded by intimate friends rather than congressional and cabinet 
Radicals.  According to a reporter traveling with Senter, the governor found the president at the 
Fifth Avenue Hotel, where they spoke only briefly before Senter rose to bid Grant farewell.  At 
that point the president asked Senter to sit back down and talk to him about the recent election.  
When Grant inquired if Stokes had received any Rebel votes, Senter replied emphatically that he 
had not.  “Then the rebels all voted for you?,” asked Grant.  “No, sir; I did not get any rebel 
votes,” replied Senter.  “We have no rebels in Tennessee now.”  The ex-Confederates were, he 
explained, thoroughly reconstructed and his victory was due to a combination of Republicans, 
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old-line Whigs, Conservatives, and moderate leaders of the old Democratic party, all of whom 
favored peace and order.  Satisfied, Grant recognized Senter as a legitimate Republican in lock 
step with the party platform until he proved otherwise.2 
Stokes met with the president the following day.  Though Grant proved sympathetic to 
the Tennessee Radicals’ plight, he refused to become involved.  Likewise, congressional 
Republicans balked at conducting an investigation.  Had East Tennessee remained loyal to the 
Radical party, the prospects of federal intervention might have been greater, but Senter’s victory 
there, and in particular Stokes’s defeat in his own county and congressional district, were 
decidedly discouraging to those in Washington who might have been inclined to intervene.3  
 Although Senter had for the time being forestalled the possibility of federal intervention, 
he did not rest easy.  He and his supporters were still coming to grips with the Conservatives’ 
eleventh-hour decision to exploit the divisions in the Republican party by fielding legislative 
candidates.  Senter was angry about this treachery—as he saw it—but he still hoped to cooperate 
with the Conservatives to reconstitute the Republican party along moderate lines and focus on 
pressing issues of economic development.  The task was daunting.  Even his staunchest 
supporters wondered whether he could harness and control the diverse factions that had elected 
him.  The editor of the Knoxville Whig observed that “It is sometimes more difficult to control an 
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army after victory than before.  Here will be the Governor’s trouble, in part—how to keep upon 
good terms with the promiscuous soldiery who helped him to fight his battles.”4     
Senter’s coalition, which had begun to unravel when Conservative candidates entered the 
legislative races en masse, came apart in the days after the election.  Some Conservatives, 
spurred on by Democrats, broke with their erstwhile allies over the meaning of their victory.  
These Conservatives and their Democratic friends saw the election as a repudiation of four years 
of Radicalism and looked to the incoming legislature as their vehicle of redemption.  The 
Democratic press went beyond simply calling for the restoration of white voting rights and a 
state constitutional convention, demanding that the legislature reject the Fifteenth Amendment 
and repeal every law passed during Radical Republican rule.  The Democrats and Democratic-
leaning Conservatives sought, moreover, to fully clean the “Augean Stables” by purging every 
Radical who held state office.  One such officeholder, Gibson County school superintendent 
William H. Stilwell, made a gloomy prediction: “After the rebel Legislature meets I judge we 
shall all walk out of office.”5   
Many Conservatives, however, made an honest attempt to maintain unity with the Senter 
Republicans.  The executive committees of several counties issued congratulatory messages to 
the people on their triumph at the polls, and pleaded for moderation and good will between the 
anti-Radical factions.  Davidson County’s committee, for example, called on its constituents to 
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maintain a united front in order to fully redeem Tennessee from Radical oppression, and hailed 
Governor Senter as “the great instrument of our emancipation.”6   
Speaking in Nashville following his landslide victory, Senter called for “a new 
departure.”  He asked Tennesseans to let bygones be bygones as he sought to build a centrist 
party on old Whiggish principles.  But Senter’s hope of bringing together, and leading, such a 
party was unattainable.  As historian Thomas B. Alexander argued many years ago, the plan 
presumed that ex-Whig Conservatives would reject any real alliance with Democrats, their 
traditional political enemies.  In fact, however, the Conservatives and ex-Confederates had 
gravitated toward one another under Radical Republican rule and had found common ground.  
The Conservatives recognized Rebel voters during the waning weeks of the election and 
welcomed them.  Conservative leaders wanted to put together a centrist party, but it was not what 
Senter envisioned, and they certainly did not want Senter to lead it.  Their party would stand 
between the Radical Republican proscriptionists on the one hand and the “Bourbon” Democratic 
states’ rights extremists on the other, but would embrace the majority of Democrats.  Moreover, 
despite their gratitude to Senter for helping break the stranglehold of the Radicals in Tennessee, 
Conservatives simply did not trust him.  They remained skeptical of his sudden conversion to 
universal suffrage, a decision they attributed to politics, not principle.  Senter’s own words 
confirmed their suspicions about his loyalty.  He continued to proclaim himself a true 
Republican and pledged to fight to the bitter end if a reactionary legislature took extreme 
measures.  Furthermore, the Brownlows continued to publicly back Senter, despite their 
reservations about his removal of Radical registrars, which had brought about extralegal Rebel 
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enfranchisement.  Consequently, the Conservatives were eager to cut ties with Senter at the 
earliest possible moment.7 
Political turmoil reigned as the coalition that elected Senter and a Conservative 
legislature unraveled.  Issues thought to have been resolved by Senter’s victory, such as the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and the calling of a constitutional convention, became 
topics for debate among Senter Republicans, Conservatives, and Democrats as they contested the 
meaning of their victory over the Radicals.  In the process, it became apparent to Senter that the 
Conservatives had rejected his vision of a centrist party.  Furthermore, a breach opened between 
some Conservatives and the Democrats, despite their common interests, especially over the 
extent of constitutional changes needed to redeem Tennessee. 
The post-election split between the Senter Republicans and their erstwhile allies was first 
manifested in debates over the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.  Most Democrats and 
Conservatives had chosen not to address the amendment during the election campaign, but rather 
focused their efforts on extending the vote to the disfranchised.  But with the contest over, the 
editor of the Nashville Union and American, who had previously thought it inexpedient to 
oppose the amendment, declared war on it: 
We oppose [the Fifteenth Amendment] both on principle and expediency.  We deny that 
“it is the only road to peace.”  We insist that it is the surest and swiftest road to ruin.  We 
deny that the “refusal to pass it will open the floodgate of another eternal controversy.”  
We insist that its rejection will put a final quiet to its agitation, rid the country forever of 
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one of the most dangerous innovations upon the fundamental doctrines of our republic 
that was ever proposed, and give the people an opportunity of considering and disposing 
of other dangerous heresies which threaten the life of the Constitution.   
The amendment subsequently became the target of an onslaught of Democratic and Conservative 
vituperation.  Another editor denounced it as “the meanest of all Radical cunning and villainy.”8     
 Republicans fired back.  The Nashville Daily Press and Times warned that “[W]hen 
radical Democracy attempts to ignore and set aside the . . . victory of free suffrage for all men 
won, it will fire a mine whose explosion will convulse the State and destroy itself.”  The 
moderately Conservative Nashville Republican Banner agreed as it struggled mightily to 
preserve the peace.  Reminding its readers of the threat of federal intervention, its editor argued 
that the people, by electing Senter, had endorsed the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.  
The Memphis Daily Appeal countered by declaring that the Conservatives who helped elect 
Senter did so solely for the cause of white enfranchisement; their votes should not be construed 
as a pledge of support for the Fifteenth Amendment: “Does not the Banner know that the 
Conservatives took Senter as the choice of evils, when it was too uncertain whether they could 
succeed to risk a candidate of their own?”9           
While the press waged a war of words, many political leaders kept quiet on this issue.  
Former president Andrew Johnson was not, however, among them.  As he toured the state to 
bolster his U.S. Senate bid, Johnson held forth on the amendment, which he referred to as the 
greatest outrage ever contemplated against the Constitution and republican institutions.  “[I]f this 
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amendment is adopted,” he declared in Knoxville, “Congress takes the power away from the 
State, that body [Congress] becomes sovereign, and the country is swinging towards empire.”10     
 In the meantime, the Radicals launched a last-ditch effort to secure the amendment’s 
adoption.  Knowing that the incoming Conservative-dominated legislature would likely oppose 
the amendment, the Radicals held a secret meeting in Nashville at which they decided to urge 
Senter to convene the lame-duck legislature in an extraordinary session to ratify it.  To present 
Senter with this proposal, the Radicals selected Congressman Horace Maynard, who, having left 
the state for a tour of the West during the election after declining the Brownlows’ offer to run for 
governor, was presumably on friendly terms with the governor.  When news of the Radicals’ 
secret conclave got out, Senter was barraged with letters from across the nation encouraging him 
to call the retiring legislature into session.  Ohio Republican governor Rutherford B. Hayes, for 
one, whose state had soundly rejected the amendment earlier in the year, pressed Senter to 
convene that “loyal and solid body.”  For the time being, however, Senter refused to commit 
himself on the issue.11        
 Indeed, Senter found himself in a rather precarious political situation.  He had spoken in 
favor of the amendment on nearly every stump in the state.  Furthermore, congressional 
Republicans and President Grant were anxious for its ratification.  On the other hand, if he 
yielded to the Stokes Radicals and convened the outgoing legislature over the protests of the 
Democrats and Conservatives, he risked his political future.  After much deliberation, he decided 
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not to take action.  In doing so, he reiterated his earlier response to Stokes and his supporters—it 
was simply too costly, considering the state’s financial crisis, to call a special session.  He 
dismissed Radical claims that the incoming Conservative legislators, working hand in hand with 
the ex-Rebels, intended to disfranchise black voters: “[The legislature] will not even touch upon 
that subject.  It will do nothing that the Republican party can call revolutionary; nor will it do 
aught that will injure vital interests of the State as they at present exist.”  Senter was under the 
false impression that he was popular among all Conservatives and could persuade them to ratify 
the amendment.  Moreover, he retained his faith in his ability to work with Conservatives and 
moderate Democrats across the state to forge a Republican centrist party.12   
 Another question of equal concern was calling a constitutional convention.  Some 
Radicals thought it inevitable once the new legislature convened.  The Chattanooga Republican, 
a staunch Stokes organ, declared that “The Democracy, like a fat sow over a slop bucket, 
caflumixed both sides, [and] is now ready to guzzle up the slop.”  Many Senter Republicans, on 
the other hand, hoped to convince Conservatives that there was no need for a convention because 
the franchise had now been extended to all who desired it.  The Knoxville Whig argued that the 
Rebels’ objective had been attained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, as a result of the state 
Supreme Court.  Senter’s mouthpiece, the Nashville Daily Press and Times, took a different tack, 
warning Democrats and Conservatives that Uncle Sam might have something to say if they acted  
rashly, thus raising the specter of federal intervention to overturn the Conservative victory.13              
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Most Conservatives heeded the warning.  With an eye toward the congressional 
Republicans, they took a measured position on constitutional reforms.  An editorial in the 
Lebanon Herald and Register exemplified this stance:   
A convention of the people of Tennessee will probably be called. . . .  This will be by far 
the most important assemblage ever convened in Tennessee.  It will possess unlimited 
power, and can either change, amend or abolish the entire constitution and form a new 
one. . . .  The convention should be composed of men of profound intellect, liberal ideas, 
combined with sound judgment and wise discretion.  It is no place for hot-headed 
impracticable men, or men of extreme and illiberal views on any question.14 
Most Democrats agreed with the Conservatives, but a few Democratic papers called for a 
thorough repudiation of Radicalism, urging prospective delegates to the convention to, as the 
Memphis Daily Appeal put it, “Rub out and begin anew.”  Such rhetoric provoked further words 
of caution from Conservatives.  However desirable it may be to purge the state of Radicalism, 
the Nashville Republican Banner editorialized, “[I]t is risking too much in our present situation, 
with a despotic military power at Washington, backed by the Radical party of the North.”  In 
response, most of the fiery Democratic papers toned down their rhetoric.  Even the Appeal 
accepted, albeit grudgingly, the Conservatives’ advice: “We are willing . . . to ‘make haste 
slowly.’”15  
Complicating matters further, the Ku Klux Klan reappeared with a vengeance in Middle 
and West Tennessee during the waning days of the campaign and continued its mayhem into the 
fall, ignoring the Conservatives’ call for unity and moderation.  “Surely this must be the season 
that the devil was turned loose,” commented the editor of the Murfreesboro News in the latter 
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part of August, “and these are only evidences of his presence in our midst.”  Reenfranchisement 
and the collapse of Radicalism were not enough; the Klansmen sought also to restore white 
supremacy.  Their targets included not only politically active freed people, but also teachers—
black and white—working in the freedmen’s schools.16  
Local authorities proved powerless, and often unwilling, to prevent the Klan resurgence.  
Senter, attempting to hold together the coalition that had elected him, chose not to reactivate the 
State Guard or request federal troops for fear of driving the Conservatives into the arms of the 
hard-line former Confederates.  The unchecked violence prompted some blacks to abandon the 
state.  In Maury County, a hotbed of Klan activity, hundreds of freed people left for Florida 
within weeks of the election.17   
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Amid the political confusion and uncertainty that marked the two-month interim between 
the election and the convening of the new legislature, Senter’s hope of forging a centrist 
Republican party began to fade.  Meanwhile, the Democrats and Conservatives began to split 
over issues thought to have been resolved by the election.  The ex-Rebels urged Conservatives to 
take bold and swift action to redeem Tennessee, and many of the newly elected Conservative 
legislators were persuaded by this call.  Other incoming Conservative legislators, however, 
listened to Conservative leaders who advised them to exercise restraint, lest they provoke the 
federal government to meddle in the state’s political affairs.  Tennessee’s political atmosphere 
was turbulent and unclear as the incoming legislature convened.18 
Examining the backgrounds and personal characteristics of the lawmakers who served in 
the Thirty-sixth General Assembly is instructive.  Conservatives dominated both houses, holding 
twenty-two of twenty-five seats in the Senate and sixty-three of eighty-four seats in the House.  
Senter Republicans held ten seats in the House and three in the Senate, while the Radicals held 
ten in the House but none in the Senate.  (The party affiliation of one House member is 
unknown.) 
The Thirty-sixth General Assembly included few experienced state legislators, but many 
of the members had served in other state or local offices.  Conservative and Senter Republican 
legislators were, on average, much more politically experienced than their Radical counterparts.  
Seven of the thirteen Senter Republicans had previous legislative experience—all but one had 
held both local and state office.  A majority of the Conservative legislators also had political 
experience at both the state and local level; however, nearly 30 percent of the Conservatives 
                                                 
 






were serving their first term in political office.  The Radicals lacked any legislative experience, 
with the exception of a single Radical incumbent who won reelection.  In fact, a majority of the 
Radicals elected had not previously held any political office. 
Seventy-six of the 107 legislators whose place of birth is known were natives of 
Tennessee.  Twenty-seven were born in neighboring Southern states, primarily North Carolina 
and Virginia, while three hailed from the North.  Senator John Cubbins, a native of England, was 
the sole foreign-born lawmaker.  All but a few of those born outside Tennessee had come to the 
state prior to the Civil War.  There were no Yankee carpetbaggers to be found in the Thirty-sixth 
General Assembly.   
At an average age of thirty-nine and a half, the Radicals were six and a half years 
younger than their Senter Republican and Conservative colleagues.  Collectively, there were 
twenty-four legislators thirty-five years old or younger.  Few members had held public office 
prior to 1860; fewer still had honed their skills on the stump during the political wars waged 
between the Whig and Democratic parties in the decades prior to the Civil War.  The Thirty-sixth 
General Assembly was, for the most part, composed of a younger generation shaped not so much 
by the social, economic, and political conditions of antebellum America as by the tumultuous 
years of Civil War and Reconstruction that followed.  The great number of wartime Unionists 
and former Union soldiers among the legislators suggests that loyalty and service to the nation 
were virtual requirements of a successful candidacy.  Nevertheless, two former Confederates 
managed to win their legislative races in spite of a proscriptive candidate’s oath.  The lawmakers 
represented an array of occupations; nearly half engaged in more than one occupation.  A 




businessmen.  There were also quite a few physicians and newspapermen, along with nine school 
teachers and a railroad agent.19 
When the legislators arrived at the capitol on October 4, 1869, they found the building’s 
interior and exterior in excellent condition.  For several weeks, a squad of prisoners laboring 
under the state’s new convict lease system had been sprucing up the landscaping, while another 
had painted and varnished the interior.  Democratic and Conservative newspapers proclaimed 
that the tidy and clean capitol reflected the character of the incoming legislature, unsullied by a 
Radical majority.20 
The Senate organized swiftly, naming as speaker Dorsey P. Thomas, a Conservative who 
represented the counties straddling the lower Tennessee River dividing Middle and West 
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Tennessee.  In many respects, Thomas’s speakership symbolized Tennessee’s redemption.  (It 
also represented a personal redemption: Thomas had won a seat to the U.S. Congress in August 
1865, only to lose it after Governor Brownlow set aside the voter registration in five of the 
district’s eight counties, thereby handing the election to Samuel Mayes Arnell, Brownlow’s 
faithful lieutenant and author of the Franchise Act of 1865.)  The Senate, having the advantage of 
a good number of experienced lawmakers, completed its organization in less than two days with 
little or no controversy.21   
The House, however, was anything but harmonious.  The representatives put forth six 
nominees for speaker—four Conservatives and two Senter Republicans (the Radicals declined to 
make a nomination).  The Conservatives soon whittled their list down to two candidates, John M. 
Fleming and William O’Neil Perkins, both pre-war Whigs.  During the war, Fleming had 
become disillusioned with President Lincoln’s policies and supported General George B. 
McClellan’s 1864 presidential bid.  Following the war, he became an outspoken critic of 
Brownlow and founded the anti-Radical Knoxville Daily Press and Herald.  Many feared that 
Fleming was a Conservative in name only and that his true allegiance was to the Rebel 
Democracy.  Perkins, on the other hand, was a moderate Conservative.  With previous legislative 
experience (in the state’s pre-Civil War Senate) and a generation older than Fleming and most 
other legislators, Perkins projected an image of statesmanship and magnanimity.  As Fleming’s 
candidacy gained momentum during the balloting, Senter Republicans and Radicals aligned with 
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moderate Conservatives to support Perkins, who won the speakership on the seventh ballot by 
fifty-three votes to twenty-five.22   
Following Perkins’s election, the House proceeded to name its other officers, a process 
that took three days as the two Conservative factions (hereafter referred to as moderate 
Conservatives and Democratic Conservatives) struggled for control of the House.  In the end, the 
moderate Conservatives, with Republican support, managed to stave off a Democratic-
Conservative takeover of the House leadership, but this first week of the session revealed the 
depth of the Conservatives’ factional split.  Moreover, time was wasted as lawmakers quibbled 
over frivolous matters such as the starting and closing time of the daily sessions and whether 
representatives should have subscriptions to two or three newspapers.  It was an inauspicious 
beginning for the Thirty-sixth General Assembly.23 
On October 12, Senter transmitted his message to the General Assembly.  Invoking 
President Grant’s maxim, “Let us have peace,” Senter urged legislators to renounce rankling 
partisanship and animosity in favor of compromise and goodwill.  Although he stopped short of 
calling for a constitutional convention, he recommended the immediate restoration of voting 
rights to all former Confederates.  As for the Fifteenth Amendment, he declared that ratification 
would “inspire confidence with the Northern people, create a friendly interest in Congress, and 
perhaps win the strong helping hand of the General Government in our many wants.”  Having 
addressed those key issues, Senter turned to the much-needed reforms in the state’s free-school 
and penitentiary systems.  Moreover, he implored lawmakers to take action against the Klan and 
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other vigilante organizations whose terrorist attacks, he said, discouraged immigration and 
economic progress.  In closing, he addressed the state’s mounting debt crisis and the cash-
strapped railroads.  He rejected debt repudiation; full payment of the debt, he argued, would 
bolster the state’s credit and the value of its securities.  He recommended the sale of defunct 
railroads and the retirement of the railroad bonds.24           
 Reaction to Senter’s message was generally positive, but his call for compromise and 
goodwill had little impact.  In the days following the governor’s message, the division among 
Conservatives became even clearer.  The Democratic Conservatives became emboldened, 
whereas the moderate Conservatives remained ever conscious of the bogeyman hovering over 
the General Assembly—the specter of federal intervention—and therefore tempered their 
demands.25   
Many anticipated that the legislature would repeal all Radical laws in short order.  The 
editor of the Nashville Republican Banner predicted that “there will be a perfect avalanche of 
bills” once the lawmakers began the regular business of legislation.  But the first two weeks of 
the session were unproductive due to delays in organizing the House, an occasional lack of 
quorums, and the diversion of attention by the governor’s inauguration ceremonies.  This left 
numerous lawmakers chomping at the bit to propose a bevy of anti-Radical bills.26 
Yet another critical item on the agenda delayed legislative business.  Joseph S. Fowler, 
whom the Radicals sent to the U.S. Senate in 1865, had chosen not to seek reelection, and his 
vacant seat needed to be filled immediately.  With the election over, newspapers turned 
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increasingly toward this senatorial question.  Andrew Johnson appeared to be the leading 
candidate.  But as the Conservative coalition divided, Senter Republicans and moderate 
Conservatives put forth a number of alternate candidates, most of them with Whiggish roots.  
Two particularly strong candidates were former governor Neill S. Brown and pre-war U.S. 
congressman Balie Peyton.  The Radicals nominated Secretary of State Andrew J. Fletcher 
despite his public break with Brownlow over the franchise law; but they were willing to 
compromise with Senter Republicans and moderate Conservatives to prevent Johnson’s 
election.27   
Rounding out the list of leading candidates mentioned to succeed Fowler was Emerson 
Etheridge.  For those old-line Whigs unwilling to forgive Johnson for his antebellum partisanship 
and ex-Rebels who still resented his actions as wartime military governor, not to mention the 
Conservatives who feared that if the former president won he would renew his bitter war against 
Grant and the Republicans in Congress, Etheridge became the preferred candidate.  He was a 
pre-war Whig who had served in the Tennessee House before being elected to three successive 
terms in the U.S. House.  He aligned himself with the Conservative Unionists when the Lincoln 
administration announced in favor of emancipation.  After the war, he became an outspoken 
critic of Brownlow’s administration and ran against him unsuccessfully in 1867.  Having arrived 
in Nashville well in advance of the Thirty-sixth General Assembly, Etheridge began currying 
favor with the Democratic and Conservative press, and as Conservative legislators trickled into 
the capital Etheridge buttonholed them.  Johnson’s advisors, aware of Etheridge’s maneuvering, 
urged the ex-president to make a beeline for Nashville.  As the balloting for the Senate drew 
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nearer, the various factions of the legislature understood that there was more at stake in that 
contest than Johnson’s political ambitions and thirst for personal vindication; control of the 
Thirty-sixth General Assembly and the future of Tennessee hung in the balance.28   
The balloting began on October 19.  Johnson gained momentum with each successive 
vote and at the end of the day held a comfortable lead over his nearest competitor, Etheridge.  He 
was two votes shy of victory in the Senate, however, and even further from the mark in the 
House.  Because it seemed unlikely that the House Radicals would support a non-Republican, 
both the Johnson and Etheridge camps concentrated their lobbying efforts on the Senter 
Republicans and moderate Conservatives who had split their votes among the less popular 
candidates.  Prior to the second day of balloting, the two chambers agreed to meet in joint 
convention and to continue balloting until one candidate received a majority.  The balloting went 
on for two more days as bottom-tier candidates fell by the wayside.  Johnson was by now within 
four votes of winning.  Meanwhile, the Radicals remained unwavering in their support of 
Fletcher, while the supporters of less contentious candidates such as Neill Brown and Balie 
Peyton failed to attract more votes.  At this point, some of Johnson’s enemies launched a 
campaign to put forth a compromise candidate to thwart him.29 
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On the evening of October 21, Etheridge and several of his staunchest legislative allies 
met in secret conclave with thirteen lawmakers representing the House Radicals, Senter 
Republicans, and moderate Conservatives.  The purpose of the meeting was two-fold—to defeat 
Johnson and avert federal intervention.  The sticking points were convincing Etheridge to 
abandon the race and finding a suitable candidate all could agree on.  After much deliberation, 
the group ironed out a deal.  Etheridge agreed to withdraw and proposed that anti-Johnson 
legislators unite behind Henry Cooper, a moderate-Conservative jurist who had not practiced 
politics long enough to make many enemies.30  
On the morning of October 22, the joint assembly met to commence the seventh ballot.  
But before it began, Senator Needham Autry D. Bryant stood up from his desk and nominated 
Henry Cooper.  Johnson’s supporters in the legislature, along with his loyalists who had packed 
the galleries to view what they presumed would be the historic vote, were shocked, for Bryant 
had been faithful to the former president on all of the previous ballots.  Once the balloting 
commenced, the plan hatched in secret unfolded as expected.  With 106 of the legislature’s 109 
members present, fifty-four votes were necessary to win.  As each member cast his ballot, he did 
so for only Johnson or Cooper; no one deviated from the plan.  While Johnson picked up some 
votes that he expected in the House, he did not gain all of them.  In the end, Johnson had fifty-
one votes, Cooper fifty-five.31  
Cooper’s victory sent shockwaves that reverberated across the nation.  The news soon 
arrived by telegraph at the White House, where President Grant and his cabinet were waiting.  
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The Nashville Republican Banner, a sharp critic of the former president, reveled in Johnson’s 
defeat: Goliath, it declared, had met his David.32 
The Senate election revealed deep fractures in the legislature.  The Conservatives were 
split between Johnson and Etheridge until the very end of the balloting.  Meanwhile, until that 
final ballot, the Radicals remained doggedly in Fletcher’s corner and the Senter Republicans 
parceled out their votes among the moderate-Conservative candidates.  Even at the end, most 
Conservatives backed Johnson, the most extreme candidate, and rejected the compromise 
candidate; Cooper garnered only a little over one third of the Conservative votes.  Moreover, the 
Senate contest pitted Middle versus West Tennessee, as opposed to East versus the rest.  In the 
final ballot Johnson and Cooper won the votes of Middle and West Tennessee’s legislators 
respectively, while splitting the votes of East Tennessee’s.  The Thirty-sixth General Assembly 
was a divided body, its various factions at war with one another amid ever-changing political 
alignments.  It seemed a body adrift and without focus.33   
Charges of conspiracy flourished in the wake of the election, circulated by Johnson’s 
loyalists.  For days on end, newspapers in and beyond Tennessee printed accusatory letters and 
denials of wrongdoing.  Amid these charges and countercharges there was also sober analysis.  
The New York Times attributed Cooper’s victory to a third-party movement of moderate 
lawmakers sufficiently strong and well organized to wrest control of the General Assembly from 
the Democratic Conservatives.  This editor’s judgment was, however, off the mark.  The 
combination of factions that produced Cooper’s victory was not a solid political alignment based 
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on the principle of reconciliation, but rather an ad hoc coalition built on negativity toward 
Johnson.  The editor was not the only one who misjudged the political situation.  The Radicals 
mistakenly believed that Cooper’s moderate-Conservative supporters, all of whom were wartime 
Unionists, would eventually drift back into the Unconditional Unionist (i.e. Radical Republican) 
church.  In the days following the Senate election, newspapers carried reports of Radicals 
celebrating with brass bands in the streets of Nashville and Memphis.  Though all the anti-
Johnsonians reveled in Johnson’s defeat, the Radicals’ exuberance in the election’s aftermath did 
not sit well with the Senter Republicans and moderate Conservatives.34  
With the senatorial election behind them, the lawmakers got to work on legislation.  
Although many Democratic Conservatives reasoned that the necessity of wiping out every 
vestige of Brownlowism naturally bound the Conservative legislators together, such a 
Conservative coalescence did not immediately ensue and, consequently, the work of demolition 
did not proceed apace.  There were fits and starts along the road to redemption.35 
Among the most pressing and divisive issues on the agenda was legally reenfranchising 
the ex-Rebels.  While the legislature could repeal the Radicals’ franchise laws, it could not repeal 
the 1865 constitutional amendment by which the legislature was empowered to determine voter 
qualifications.  This fact was the main impetus for calling a constitutional convention.  A number 
of perplexing questions, such as whether the 1865 convention and subsequent amendment were 
legally binding, could be resolved by a new convention.  Three factions quickly surfaced as 
lawmakers argued over whether to have a convention and what powers it would have.  The 
majority of Conservatives wanted a convention with no restrictions, so that it would have a free 
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hand to create a new state constitution.  Some moderate Conservatives and the Senter 
Republicans, however, favored a convention with the power only to amend the existing 
constitution.  The Radicals opposed any convention.  The battle lines were drawn for yet another 
showdown; however, this time the Radicals, deluded by the senatorial election into thinking that 
they might wrest control of the legislature from the Democratic Conservatives, were relegated to 
the sidelines.36         
On October 26, Abner A. Steele, the acting chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
reported a bill calling for a state convention, its delegates to be elected by the voters for the 
purpose of amending the existing constitution or creating a new one.  Steele, who along with 
eleven other Conservatives had resigned his seat in the legislature in 1866 to protest the franchise 
law, managed to kill a rival House bill that would convert the legislature into a convention.  
Although the Senate passed its own convention bill, its Judiciary Committee recommended 
Steele’s bill.  Two members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, issued a lengthy 
minority report in opposition.  Moderate Conservative Edmund Cooper and Senter Republican 
Philip P. C. Nelson argued that the legislature could legally resolve itself into a constitutional 
convention and submit its proposed amendments directly to the people for ratification or 
rejection; they cited the January 1865 convention as a precedent.  While they failed to win over 
the other five members on the committee, their report offered several well developed arguments.  
First, they insisted that the present legislature was at least as reliable and well intentioned a body 
as could be assembled under an election for delegates.  Second, as a convention the legislature 
would be composed of one body, not two independent bodies on whose concurrent action the 
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enactment of laws depended.  Third, the legislators had been recently elected by the people and 
had a thorough knowledge of their wants and needs.  Fourth, the work of the convention could be 
accomplished both rapidly and effectively in strict accordance to the law.  Finally, by avoiding 
the costs of a separate election for delegates, this plan could save Tennessee’s taxpayers a lot of 
money.  The Cooper and Nelson report suggested a concern shared by most moderate 
Conservatives and Senter Republicans—that if a separate constitutional convention was created, 
ex-Rebel delegates might be elected in large numbers and hijack it.37   
Foiled in his bid to avert a separate convention, Cooper then proposed a package of 
amendments to the Constitution in lieu of a convention.  The Senate rejected the amendments, 
however, by four votes.  Cooper then proposed an amendment to Steele’s bill limiting the action 
of the convention to matters involving the suffrage, the judiciary, and taxation.  The Senate 
approved these three significant restrictions by two votes.  The Steele bill then became tied up in 
both houses as members debated the number of delegates to be elected to the proposed 
constitutional convention.  Reports of public discontent over the protracted debates soon 
surfaced in the papers, prompting lawmakers to reach a compromise.  The bill passed both 
houses after the legislators agreed to the fix the number of delegates at seventy-five.  The third 
Saturday in December was designated for the election of delegates.  Though the franchise laws 
technically remained in effect, the convention act ignored those restrictions and provided for 
universal manhood suffrage.  A joint effort by Senter Republicans and moderate Conservatives 
                                                 
 
37 Tennessee General Assembly, House Journal, 36th General Assembly, 1st sess. (1869-1870), 34, 53, 
93, 98-99, 110-19; Tennessee General Assembly, Senate Journal, 36th General Assembly, 1st sess. 
(1869-1870), 87, 96-105; Nashville Republican Banner, October 27, 29, 1869; November 5, 1869; 
Memphis Daily Appeal, October 29, 30, 1869, November 1, 1869; McBride and Robison, Biographical 






to limit the electorate to those eligible to vote under the Staten decision failed by a fifty-two to 
seventeen vote.  Moreover, the legislature prohibited the administration of test oaths to 
prospective candidates or election officials.38   
 Once the issue of a constitutional convention was resolved, the legislators took up the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which would enfranchise black men throughout the nation.  With the 
threat of federal intervention looming over Tennessee, moderate Conservatives and Senter 
Republicans implored Democratic Conservatives not to take a hard-line, state-rights stance.  In 
the House, James Harris Agee of Campbell County, a Senter Republican, introduced a resolution 
calling for the amendment’s ratification.  The House passed the resolution and referred the 
matter to its Committee on Federal Relations.  But on November 15, the chairman of the 
committee, Conservative Elbert Abdiel James of Hamilton County, submitted the majority report 
rejecting ratification, denouncing the amendment as “class legislation of the most odious 
character.”  The report further contended that the amendment “leads inevitably to a concession of 
all sovereign power to the legislative branch of the Federal Government, and consequently is 
destructive of the rights of the States.”  Senter Republican Joseph M. Baker of Hancock County 
drafted a minority report warning that “the days of colored suffrage [in Tennessee] are 
numbered” if the federal amendment was defeated and Rebel delegates to the upcoming 
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Tennessee constitutional convention carried out the will of their constituents.  Baker warned also 
of the likelihood of federal intervention if the amendment was defeated.39 
Undeterred by Baker’s arguments, the House defeated ratification on November 16 by a 
vote of fifty-seven to twelve.  That body then forwarded the Agee resolution to the Senate, which 
referred it to its own Committee on Federal Relations.  There the matter remained for nearly 
three months, by the end of which time it seemed likely that neither President Grant nor 
Congress intended to intervene in Tennessee’s affairs, at least not over the amendment issue.  In 
late February, the Senate rejected the Fifteenth Amendment by a vote of twenty to four.  
Interestingly, some moderate Conservatives were among those voting against the amendment, an 
indication that as the session wore on, moderate Conservatives were growing closer to 
Democratic Conservatives and moving Tennessee ever closer to thoroughgoing redemption.40     
The pace of the Conservatives’ dismantling of Radicalism quickened once the legislature 
had settled the senatorial question and passed a convention bill.  Among the legislature’s 
subsequent enactments was a law safeguarding Senter’s registrars from prosecution for any 
action they took during the 1869 state election.  Another enactment nullified state printing 
contracts with Republican newspapers.  (Nearly all Republican journals in the state disappeared 
within six months of this bill’s adoption.)  The Conservatives did not, however, rush headlong 
toward redemption.  A few Democratic Conservatives sought to wipe out four years of 
Brownlowism abruptly in a single omnibus bill, but most Conservatives preferred a deliberate 
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pace less likely to provoke federal intervention.  They proceeded by designating a particular 
Radical law as a special order of the day, with debate set typically to begin at noon, and thus 
undertook the destruction of Radical Reconstruction one piece at a time.41  
Over the course of nearly five months, from October 1869 to early March 1870, the 
pillars that bolstered the Radical state came crashing down.  The Ku Klux Klan Act and the State 
Guard Act were among the legislature’s targets.  Other Radical laws swept away in toto included 
the common carrier law that banned racial segregation in public transportation, an act that 
protected the rights of laborers, and an act that abolished the boards of county commissioners 
established in Nashville, Memphis, and Chattanooga in conjunction with the Metropolitan Police 
Act, which was also repealed.  This last action, which restored county control to a commission of 
justices of the peace elected from each civil district, adversely affected the nascent black political 
leadership elected to those offices in county-wide races and the freed people protected by 
Radical police forces under gubernatorial control in the state’s major urban centers.42   
The Conservative capture of the legislature also doomed the state’s free-school system.  
The Radicals had raised taxes during the Brownlow administration to fund the school system, 
which provided schooling for black as well as white children on an equal basis and was thus 
loathed by Conservatives and Democrats.  Also motivating the legislature’s abolition of the 
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school system was a desire to restore local autonomy and reduce state taxes and debt.  
Responsibility for educating the children of the state was now placed solely in the hands of 
county authorities.  Moreover, the legislature did not mandate that the counties provide any 
public schools on their own.  Consequently, education for whites and blacks, a cornerstone of 
Republican free-labor ideology, suffered.  To further cut the state debt and reduce the tax burden, 
the legislature repealed all laws granting state aid for internal improvements, eased penalties for 
failure to pay taxes, and dismissed all pending lawsuits against those indebted to the Bank of 
Tennessee.43  
The Conservative legislative juggernaut dismayed Republicans.  “There is a general 
overturning of old landmarks here,” wrote one despondent Nashvillian, “& a tendency to 
extreme & partisan measures.”  Republicans were particularly concerned about the repeal of the 
anti-Klan legislation, for Klan attacks continued unabated.  Even some Democrats shared this 
concern.  The editor of the Nashville Republican Banner warned that Tennessee would be 
scorned by “the people of the whole continent and of the civilized world . . . if cut-throats and 
jail-birds in disguise are permitted to ply their murderous avocation on our highways.”  A surge 
in Klan violence in January 1870 prompted legislators to consider a new enforcement act, not 
only to punish masked marauders but also to avert the threat of federal intervention.  While nine 
House Democratic Conservatives defiantly opposed any such measure, other Conservatives and 
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Republicans came together to pass an anti-Klan bill.  This measure was, however, considerably 
different from the Radical Klan act.  The latter had vested enforcement power in the governor; 
the new legislation, embodying the Conservatives’ goal of reestablishing local autonomy, 
empowered local authorities.44   
Continuing Klan violence, including incidents in which five blacks in Carroll County and 
two in Wilson County were forcibly removed from jail and subsequently murdered, threatened to 
undermine the new anti-Klan law.  Local authorities seemed helpless to prevent the violence—
perhaps even compliant in it—and arrests were seldom made.  At this point Senter decided to 
step in.  On February 2 he submitted a special message to the General Assembly recommending 
that it authorize him to appoint special officers and prosecuting attorneys to suppress the Klan.  
The legislature ignored this recommendation, however, and the governor remained powerless to 
curb Klan violence.45  
After its opening weeks, the Thirty-sixth General Assembly avoided getting bogged 
down in parliamentary procedure, unproductive debates, or rancorous factional strife.  By the end 
of the session on March 4, 1870, it had passed 125 public and private acts and ninety-three joint 
resolutions.  The majority of the public acts repealed or amended Radical legislation.  At the 
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beginning of the session, Governor Senter and his supporters had entertained high hopes of a 
political realignment by which Radicals, Senter Republicans, and moderate Conservatives would 
come together and preserve the best of what the state government had achieved since the war’s 
end.  But the moderate Conservatives had other ideas.  Though initially at odds with the 
Democratic Conservatives, the moderates gradually repaired the breach and set about undoing 
the work of Radical Reconstruction.  Thus a Conservative-dominated legislature, composed 
almost wholly of Union men, took every step but the last in restoring the government of 
Tennessee to the ex-Rebels and the Democratic party.  All that remained to complete the work of 














                                                 
 






REDEMPTION: DECEMBER 1869-NOVEMBER 1870 
 
As he did every New Year’s Eve, seventy-eight-year-old Maury County farmer Nimrod 
Porter ended his journal for 1869 by reflecting on the events of the past twelve months.  
Although pleased by the downfall of Brownlow’s regime, he was troubled by the lawlessness 
that pervaded much of Middle and West Tennessee.  A period of relative peace had followed the 
heinous abduction and murder of Detective Barmore on the outskirts of Columbia, where Porter 
lived; but in the aftermath of the August state election a wave of banditry and Ku Kluxism 
washed over the region.  The chaos in Maury County reached epic proportions, with five 
murders in four days around Christmas.  Concluding his chronicle of lawlessness, Porter closed 
his journal.  Then, as midnight approached, a heavy rain began to fall.  Unable to sleep, he 
reopened the journal and took up his pen to begin the first entry for 1870: “Fare well to the year 
1869.  The people all over the state of Tennessee will long remember the many tryals and 
dificulties the people both white and black have indured during the year 1869.  The many (day & 
night) Roberies, the cold blooded murders all over our county & all over the State.  The many 
R.R. accidents & deaths, the burning of houses and sinking & burning of boats & the many lives 
lost during Roberies, departing after all.  [T]his year past 1869 will long be remembered.  I say 
fare well 1869.”1 
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 While many Tennesseans shared Porter’s apprehensions about the crime wave, some—
the ex-Rebels—had reason for optimism about the future.  On December 18, 1869, sixty 
thousand Tennesseans went to the polls.  They approved the call for a constitutional convention 
by a five-to-one margin and overwhelmingly elected Conservative and Democratic delegates to 
the gathering.  The chief objective of the great majority of the voters was to remove all 
remaining restrictions on voting, thus restoring to full citizenship the former Confederates, who 
had been disfranchised by the Radical Republicans.  But the threat of federal intervention still 
hung over Tennessee.  Congressional Republicans had not hesitated to return Georgia to military 
rule in late December 1869, after that state’s legislature expelled its black members.  In addition 
to demanding that the Georgia legislature purge its ineligible ex-Confederate members and reseat 
its eligible black members, Congress stipulated that the state must ratify the Fifteenth 
Amendment as a condition of its readmission.  This action stood as a warning to those delegates 
elected to Tennessee’s constitutional convention who opposed a biracial democracy.  All but the 
most unrepentant Rebels understood the need to proceed cautiously.2     
 The activity of Tennessee Radicals in Washington likewise discouraged any attempt to 
use the convention to disfranchise blacks.  Despite having failed to secure federal intervention to 
stave off the Conservative takeover of the state government, the Radicals managed to persuade 
President Grant to replace several Conservative federal appointees in Tennessee with Radicals 
loyal to Stokes.  As the election for the constitutional convention neared, Tennessee’s Radical 
congressmen renewed their efforts to block redemption.  On December 11, William J. Smith of 
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West Tennessee introduced a resolution in the House to annul the August state election.  Though 
it failed to pass, it signaled the Radicals’ fierce determination not to surrender Tennessee to the 
redeemers.  In the meantime, the Radicals kept an eye on events at home for any evidence of Ku 
Kluxism or other illegal acts that might bolster their argument for federal intervention.3 
  With this in mind, Tennessee’s Conservative and Democratic newspaper editors 
demanded that only sensible and moderate men be considered as delegates to the convention; 
“the architects of ruin,” that is, the reckless ex-Rebels unwilling to forget the past, should be 
shunned.  Once the convention bill passed both houses of the General Assembly, petitions were 
printed in the newspapers calling on some of the state’s most distinguished figures to announce 
their candidacy.  Several Confederate military officers and politicians were among those 
persuaded to run.  The Radicals cried foul, pointing to section three of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which barred Rebels from federal or state officeholding if they had taken an oath to 
support the U.S. Constitution before the war.4  
 Surely Tennessee’s Radicals expected the Republicans in Congress to take immediate 
action against such an egregious violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; but the ensuing silence 
was deafening.  A group of black leaders meeting in Nashville called on Stokes to renew the call 
for an investigation into the validity of the August election and the constitutionality of all laws 
passed by the Conservative-dominated legislature.  Writing from Washington, Stokes shared 
their outrage: “The whole movement in the way of a convention is illegal, unconstitutional, void, 
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and revolutionary; the constitution and laws having been wholly disregarded in the late election, 
necessarily making void all laws passed by that illegal and unconstitutional body.”  Moreover, he 
criticized Republicans who sought seats in the convention and thereby made themselves 
complicit in the legal transgression and undermined his and other Radicals’ efforts to make the 
case for federal intervention.  “They should have stood aloof and took no part,” he fumed.  He 
closed his letter by advising Tennessee’s Radical voters to boycott the election.  Stokes’s 
instructions were quickly circulated among his followers and a copy of the letter was printed in 
several newspapers in the state.  For the most part, Middle and West Tennessee Radicals heeded 
Stokes.  “The Radicals and colored voters,” according to an anonymous correspondent of the 
Nashville Republican Banner, “ignored the election with religious obedience to the dictation of 
their political advisers from Washington.”  The Klan’s resurgence may also have factored into 
the decision of most Middle and West Tennessee Radicals to stay home on election day.  Only in 
East Tennessee and other sections of the state free of terrorist violence did the Radicals—black 
and white—cast ballots.5 
The constitutional convention that met in Nashville on January 10, 1870 was, in the 
words of one historian, “probably the most intellectual body of men that ever assembled in 
Tennessee for any purpose.”  At least one of the delegates, James Fentress of Hardeman County, 
who had served under General Nathan Bedford Forrest and would become perhaps the most 
hostile opponent of black suffrage during the convention, agreed.  Writing to his wife as he sat in 
the upper hall of the Davidson County courthouse, where the convention was held, Fentress 
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confessed to being in awe of some of the veterans of Tennessee politics who were among the 
delegates.6 
On average slightly older but far more politically experienced than the legislators, the 
delegates to the constitutional convention represented a bridge between Tennessee’s past and 
present.  A majority had either legislative or judicial experience prior to the war, among them a 
former governor of the state, a U.S. senator, and three congressmen, not to mention a number of 
prominent jurists.  As in the legislature, old-line Whigs turned Conservatives were plentiful; but 
they only slightly outnumbered their antebellum political rivals, who, since the August 1869 
election, were beginning to openly refer to themselves as Democrats. 
The number of delegates who had served the Confederacy was the most obvious sign that 
Reconstruction in Tennessee was on its deathbed.  Four had held seats in the Confederate 
Congress.  At least nine had been high-ranking Confederate military officers while many others 
had held lesser rank.  One Wilson County Radical’s survey of the convention’s personnel 
indicated that forty-one of the seventy-five delegates had served in some capacity in the Rebel 
army.  In contrast, only four had served in the Union army.7 
While the Radicals and the ex-Rebel Democrats clearly constituted the two extremities of 
Tennessee’s political spectrum, party lines had not yet been fully defined and the convention was 
divided into various factions.  The Radical Republicans were led by Henry R. Gibson and Joseph 
H. Blackburn, the latter a Union and State Guard officer who, at the eleventh hour, had surprised 
the two Conservative candidates for delegate by announcing his candidacy and marshaling local 
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Radicals and some of his former soldiers to secure his victory.  With only seven delegates, the 
Radicals were virtually powerless against their opponents in the convention.  Their only hope 
was that Stokes and his supporters in Washington would manage to convince congressional 
Republicans to put the state under military rule.  The Conservatives comprised two factions 
distinguished by their wartime allegiances.  The Conservative Unionists had held the balance of 
power during the gubernatorial canvass and subsequently seized control of the legislature 
following two critical state Supreme Court decisions.  But power was shifting toward the 
extreme Conservatives, many of whom had been old-line Whigs and reluctant Rebels but had 
joined the Confederacy once Tennessee seceded.  Influential prior to the war, this group now 
positioned itself as Tennessee’s political center.  Among its leaders in the convention were 
former governor Neill S. Brown, his brother John, Joseph B. Heiskell, and James D. Porter.  A 
few Conservative Unionists had become moderate Republicans; however, the bulk of the 
Conservatives gradually fused with another group represented at the convention, the moderate 
secessionist Democrats such as A. O. P. Nicholson.  Unrepentant Rebel Democrats, including 
James Fentress and William Henry Williamson, comprised yet another faction; they shared the 
views of the fire-eating Confederate leaders still in exile such as former governor Isham G. 
Harris and former Rebel officers William B. Bate and Peter Turney.  Finally, there was a very 
small faction of men loyal to former president Andrew Johnson—a mixed bag of Unionist 
Democrats, Whigs such as Absalom A. Kyle, and Confederate Democrats like George W. Jones, 
an old Jacksonian who rigidly adhered to the party’s antebellum core principles.8  
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Which faction or factions would gain control of the convention was the question of the 
hour.  Speculation had begun even before the election of delegates.  The unreconstructed Rebel 
editor of the Memphis Avalanche wanted the convention’s leadership to be firmly committed to 
the notion that theirs was a white man’s government.  Such demands drew the ire of 
Conservatives, who feared federal intervention if Tennessee appeared intransigent.  The fear that 
“hot heads and theorists” would take over the convention also prompted moderate Democrats 
such as A. O. P. Nicholson to speak out.  “Let us be careful,” advised Nicholson; “let us do no 
more than is absolutely necessary.”9   
Another Democratic delegate who chose the path of moderation was former Confederate 
captain John Allen of Smith County.  An ardent secessionist who bore the scars of several 
battlefield wounds, Allen had watched helplessly, like so many other disfranchised ex-Rebels, as 
Brownlow’s Radical regime sought to create a biracial democracy.  Though inclined to adopt the 
extreme course favored by many other Confederate veterans, Allen had second thoughts after 
taking his seat at the convention and receiving a letter, dated January 10, from John W. Bowen, 
one of Radical Reconstruction’s fiercest Conservative critics.  Bowen urged Allen to refrain from 
giving into his passions and prejudices; failure to do so might jeopardize all that had been 
accomplished through the wisest statesmanship.  “A fierce, malignant, and despotic party, in 
possession of all the power of the Federal Government, is watching with evil eye,” Bowen 
warned, “anxious to find in some act of the convention excuse to place upon our people the 
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crushing heel of military power.”  Heeding Bowen’s advice, Allen took a stand with the 
moderate Democrats.10   
The first task of the delegates was to elect a president, and the choice was obvious.  Since 
responding to the call of voters to represent Giles, Lincoln, and Marshall counties in the 
convention, former Confederate officer John C. Brown had risen to prominence.  Although he 
had never held governmental office, he had been active in state politics.  As his older brother 
Neill S. Brown assumed the governorship in 1847, the younger Brown established a successful 
law practice in Giles County.  An ardent Whig, he seemed poised to follow in his brother’s 
footsteps; however, his health took a turn for the worse and he left his law practice for a year to 
travel abroad.  Returning in 1860, he found Tennessee, like the nation, torn asunder.  Despite the 
demise of the national Whig party, the remnants of Tennessee’s Whigs clung to the Union in 
opposition to Governor Harris and the Democrats.  This “Opposition” aligned with other border 
state Unionists to form the Constitutional Union party, which nominated John Bell of Tennessee 
as its presidential candidate in 1860.  Brown took his place on the political stage when he was 
named an elector on the Bell ticket.  As the nation teetered on the brink of civil war, he took to 
the stump from town to town across Middle and West Tennessee, denouncing the fire-eating 
Democrats as disunionists bent on civil war.  While Bell carried his native state thanks in large 
part to the efforts of Brown and countless other old-line Whigs, Abraham Lincoln won the 
election.  When Governor Harris and the legislature submitted the question of secession to a 
popular referendum in February 1861, Brown took to the stump again in defense of the Union.  
Tennesseans rejected secession—but only temporarily.  Lincoln’s April 1861 call for troops to 
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suppress the rebellion in the wake of the firing on Fort Sumter galvanized Middle and West 
Tennesseans and the state soon left the Union.  Like many other old-line Whigs in those regions, 
Brown now cast his lot with Tennessee.  He enlisted in the Confederate army as a private and 
was thereafter repeatedly promoted for battlefield gallantry.  He surrendered in May 1865 with 
the rank of major general.11   
After the war, Brown returned to his home in Pulaski, resumed his law practice, and kept 
a relatively low profile.  As a high-ranking Confederate military officer, he fell under the third of 
fourteen exclusions specified in President Andrew Johnson’s 1865 Amnesty Proclamation.  
Hence, he was required not only to swear an oath of allegiance to the United States but also to 
appeal for a pardon, which, if granted, removed all civil and political disabilities incurred by 
participation in the rebellion.  But Brownlow’s Radical regime had deprived Tennessee’s former 
Rebels of their political rights by passing a series of franchise laws.  Thus Brownlow had little to 
fear from recommending pardon for Brown—which he did, just as he did with nearly half of the 
other applications he reviewed before forwarding them to the president.  Johnson delayed 
fourteen months, however, before granting Brown’s pardon.  Meanwhile, Brown and other 
disfranchised ex-Rebels in Giles County organized the Ku Klux Klan.  He became an active 
leader of the secret fraternal society and sanctioned many of its activities, including political 
obstruction and intimidation to thwart Radical rule in Giles and surrounding counties.  In 1868 
the state’s former Confederate leaders selected Brown to address the Democratic national 
convention and present a memorial setting forth the grievances of the disfranchised men of 
Tennessee.  Subsequently, while Tennessee’s Republicans feuded among themselves following 
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Brownlow’s departure, Brown and other disfranchised Rebels waited patiently for the Radical 
regime to fall.12  
As an old-line Whig and staunch opponent of secession turned Rebel general and Klan 
leader, Brown was well-suited to appeal to both Conservatives and Democrats.  He represented a 
young, vigorous, rising class of Tennessee political leaders and yet won the approval of many 
elder statesmen.  “[H]e is emphatically a man of the times,” said the editor of the Nashville 
Republican Banner, “and the times naturally enough demand him.”  Brown, not Senter, seemed 
to be the man who would bridge the political divide in Tennessee and his unanimous election as 
president of the constitutional convention marked yet another critical step in Tennessee’s 
redemption.13  
Following his election, Brown addressed the convention.  He expressed the sentiment of 
the majority of delegates, cautioning against extreme measures that might provoke the federal 
government to intervene: “Let us raise ourselves above the passions and prejudices of the hour, 
and dare to be just and generous regardless of the temptations prompting a contrary course.  We 
cannot, we must not, be unmindful of the great changes that have impressed themselves upon our 
history.  Let us accept the situation, and not seek to alter circumstances which have passed 
beyond our control.”  In the subsequent debates, Brown participated very little.  He considered 
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his role to be nonpartisan, to maintain order or restore it when debate grew unruly.  The primary 
aim of Brown and his supporters was to curb the extremism at both ends of the political 
spectrum.14   
The question of its legitimacy hung over the convention from the outset.  As the delegates 
commenced their work, Tennessee’s congressional delegation, with the exception of Isaac 
Hawkins, presented a memorial charging that the August 1869 election had been carried by 
fraud.  Ineligible men and even youths under twenty-one had voted, they claimed, and loyal and 
legally registered voters had been deterred from casting their ballots by threats of violence.  
Moreover, some of Senter’s registrars were ineligible to hold office under the laws of the state as 
well as the U.S. Constitution.  A plurality of illegal voters, the memorialists argued, had 
determined the results of the election and the character of a majority of the General Assembly.  
Subsequently, that illegal body had unlawfully elected a U.S. senator, passed legislation in 
violation of the laws of the state, and wrongfully set in motion a convention to alter the state 
constitution.  In closing, the Tennessee delegation called on Congress to protect the loyal and 
law-abiding citizens of the state by guaranteeing them a republican form of government.15   
Senator Brownlow, with some reluctance, also signed the memorial.  This followed a 
speech delivered a month earlier in the Senate in which he expressed his displeasure with the 
recent turn of events in Tennessee.  The ever-shifting political situation continued to make for 
strange bedfellows as Brownlow distanced himself from Senter’s policies and found himself 
working side by side with Stokes to secure congressional support for military intervention in  
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Tennessee.16   
On the heels of the memorial, Congressman Roderick R. Butler launched the first serious 
movement for federal intervention in Tennessee.  He submitted a number of petitions from his 
Radical constituents asking Congress to investigate the 1869 state election.  Then, on January 17, 
he introduced a bill in the House that would nullify the actions of any state officer who served in 
violation of the political disabilities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As Butler’s bill was 
taken up by the House Judiciary Committee, Tennessee’s Conservatives and moderate 
Democrats moved to combat the charge of disloyalty by requiring each convention delegate to 
take an oath to support the U.S. Constitution.  Though a few of the more extreme Democratic 
delegates protested, the convention’s leadership endorsed the oath for the sake of political 
expediency and the motion was approved.17   
On the second day, the delegates addressed the primary question before the convention—
the revision of the franchise provisions of the constitution.  While there was a consensus in favor 
of enfranchising all those disfranchised under the Radical regime, there was serious 
disagreement on black suffrage.  Fearing that an intransigent stand against it by Democratic 
extremists would ruffle feathers in Washington, the Conservatives and moderate Democrats 
sought a compromise.  Neill Brown and John C. Thompson of Davidson County and John Baxter 
of Knox County each introduced a resolution providing for universal male suffrage but also 
mandating payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting.18   
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The poll tax had a long history in Tennessee.  The constitutions of 1796 and 1834 had 
instituted a poll tax but in neither case was payment of it, or of any other tax, made a requirement 
for voting.  Those now arguing for it in the convention claimed its purpose was to provide 
revenue for public schools, but it was generally understood to be a means of reducing the black 
vote.19   
Democratic hard-liners, however, were in no mood to compromise.  On the third day of 
the convention, they introduced a series of resolutions that would explicitly restrict the franchise 
to white males.  Their arguments were openly racist.  Alexander Campbell of Madison County 
launched the opening salvo, declaring that “this government was made for the white man and his 
posterity forever.”  James Fentress’s resolution asserted that “The white man is and ought to be 
the controller of the political affairs of the State.  Any attempt to incorporate in the body politic 
laws compelling or authorizing social or political equality of the negro with the white man, being 
contrary to truth, is dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the Government and the general 
good, and has a tendency to create estrangement and ill-will between the races.”  The hard-liners 
also moved to submit the question of black suffrage to the people as a separate referendum, in 
which those favoring universal suffrage would be required to mark their ballots “negro suffrage” 
while those favoring disfranchising blacks would mark “white suffrage.”20           
Meanwhile, President Brown fulfilled his most critical assignment, appointing standing 
committee members.  He did so methodically and shrewdly, parceling out the extremists—
Radicals and fire-eating Rebel Democrats—among the various committees while assigning the 
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majority of positions to Conservatives and moderate Democrats.  Moreover, he selected 
pragmatic men from among this last faction to serve as committee chairs.  His appointment of 
men such as A. O. P. Nicholson, who would head the all-important committee on elections and 
the franchise, served to check the Rebel Democrats bent on defying the federal government.21 
After studying various proposals for nearly a week, Nicholson’s committee found itself 
unable to reach a consensus.  Instead, Nicholson presented a majority report recommending that 
the elective franchise not be denied to blacks, that the proposition to submit the question of black 
suffrage to the people as a separate clause be rejected, and that the payment of a poll tax be 
required of voters.  The convention’s Rebel Democrats were enraged.  The following day a 
minority report was submitted, signed by three members of the committee, that reiterated Rebel 
arguments on race and the franchise and urged the convention not to kowtow to the 
congressional Republicans: “We hold that the inferiority of the negro to the white man, in race, 
color and capacity for permanent, well-ordered government, has been fixed by [God].”  
Furthermore, the minority noted, the voters in several Northern states had recently cast ballots on 
black suffrage; it was only fair that Tennesseans should “have the right to consider this 
tremendous question for themselves.”22 
On January 24, the convention began considering the majority and minority reports and 
vigorous debate went on for a week.  The opponents of black suffrage spoke forcefully and often.  
John C. Thompson of Davidson County proclaimed emancipation “the greatest crime that had 
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been precipitated in the name of humanity.”  William Blount Carter of Carter County suggested 
that if the convention enfranchised blacks it might as well give the vote to five-year-olds.  The 
threat of federal intervention, “a sword suspended over [the convention],” did not intimidate such 
men.  “If the sword falls,” said Thompson, “let it fall; we shall have lost all but our honor.”  
Wearied by these lengthy tirades, Conservatives and moderate Democrats attempted to limit 
speeches to as little as fifteen minutes per delegate, but President Brown ruled against them.  
Confident that he had the votes to carry the majority report, Brown permitted the extremists to 
blow off some steam.23   
Supporters of the majority report generally accepted the notion that blacks were inferior 
to whites; yet they also accepted the results of the war—emancipation, citizenship, and voting 
rights for blacks—“though whipped into the acknowledgment.”  Several moderate Democrats 
bemoaned the death of the Old South and the loss of its peculiar institution.  William Thompson 
of Maury County considered slavery “one of the greatest blessings to the country.  But Uncle 
Sam came along and took [my] negroes.”  Thompson favored universal suffrage not because he 
wanted blacks to vote but because he desired a peaceful and permanent settlement of the conflict.  
He and many others were simply sick and tired of “the black question.”  William F. Doherty of 
Benton County recounted a meeting with a constituent who spoke for many other Tennesseans 
when he pleaded, “For God’s sake, settle this question.”24   
While black suffrage remained the primary topic of debate, the poll tax also generated 
much discussion.  Its opponents held that voting was an inherent right, not a privilege extended 
to the affluent.  They argued also that the potential for corruption of the political process grew 
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exponentially with such a tax.  Furthermore, a poll tax, which would deprive thousands of white 
Tennesseans of the vote, did not guarantee black disfranchisement.  The poll tax had supporters, 
however, among various factions and across the state’s three geographical divisions.  Many 
delegates favored it because it could help fund the public schools.  Some maintained that the tax 
would not actually disfranchise many potential voters.  Others, such as William H. Stephens of 
Shelby County, lauded it as a means to disfranchise the unworthy “scum and riff-raff” who had 
no permanent residence.  Although most Conservatives adhered to a code of silence regarding 
the racial implications of a poll tax, a few were forthright.  Bolling Gordon of Hickman County 
reaffirmed his belief in black inferiority and called for a poll tax that would “cut off a great many 
irresponsible voters.”25 
On the evening of January 27, Nicholson addressed the issue.  He warned the advocates 
of black disfranchisement that they were courting danger.  “This [is] not the time to talk about 
States’ rights or the inferiority of the negro,” he said.  “This [is] the wrong time to apply these 
great truths and principles.”  Congressional Republicans were watching these proceedings, 
seeking justification to meddle in Tennessee’s affairs.  Let us give more thought to political 
expediency, Nicholson advised, and less to racial doctrine.26   
Following his speech, Nicholson moved to consider the minority report.  By a 54 to 20 
vote, the Conservatives and moderate Democrats soundly defeated black disfranchisement.  
James Fentress then proposed that black enfranchisement be submitted to the people as a 
separate referendum; however, the motion was tabled by a 52 to 20 vote.  East and Middle 
Tennessee delegates generally opposed both of these efforts to disfranchise blacks.  West 
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Tennesseans, on the other hand, overwhelmingly supported them.  Tables 2 and 3 show that the 
greater the proportion of blacks in a delegate’s home county, the more likely he was to favor 
black disfranchisement.27   
 
Table 2. Vote on Minority Report (Prohibiting Black Franchise/No Poll Tax), 1870 
Constitutional Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ Home Counties* 
 
           Average Percentage of Blacks 
        in Delegates’ Home Counties, 1870 
 
Delegates for minority report (white franchise/no poll tax)   30.9 
East TN (1); Middle TN (7); West TN (12) 
 
Delegates against minority report (white franchise/no poll tax)   16.0 
East TN (22); Middle TN (27); West TN (5) 
 
 
Table 3. Vote on Black Franchise as a Separate Referendum, 1870 Constitutional 
Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ Home Counties* 
 
           Average Percentage of Blacks  
        in Delegates’ Home Counties, 1870 
 
Delegates for black franchise as a separate referendum   30.5 
East TN (1); Middle TN (8); West TN (11) 
 
Delegates against black franchise as a separate referendum  19.2 
East TN (21); Middle TN (24); West TN (6) 
 
* Sources: A Compendium of the Ninth Census of the United States, 1870 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1872), 88-91; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Elected by the 
People of Tennessee, to Amend, Revise, or Form and Make a New Constitution for the State (Nashville: 
Jones, Purvis, & Co., 1870), 159-61. 
 
                                                 
 





The following morning, the delegates vigorously debated the poll tax before voting on the 
majority report.  George Jones of Lincoln County offered an amendment that removed the poll 
tax provision from the majority report.  But former Confederate congressman Joseph Heiskell, 
one of the few West Tennesseans not allied with the hardline Rebel Democrats, moved to table 
Jones’s amendment; Heiskell’s motion carried by a 45 to 28 vote.  Having defeated the efforts to 
disfranchise blacks and to remove the poll tax provision, the Conservatives and moderate 
Democrats brought the majority report to the floor for a vote.  Before the roll could be called, the 
Radical Republicans made a last-ditch effort to strike out the poll tax, but President Brown held 
that that question had been settled.  Further debate went on through the late afternoon and into 
the evening before the convention approved the majority report by a 56 to 18 vote.  In contrast to 
the two previous votes on the franchise, in these two votes West Tennessee’s delegates aligned 
with Middle Tennessee’s to support the motion to table the amendment to eliminate the poll tax 
and to support the majority report.  East Tennessee’s delegates, however, mostly rejected tabling 
the amendment to delete the poll tax and mostly favored the majority report.  The opposition to 
the poll tax and the majority report, as shown in Tables 4 and 5, stemmed from the whitest 
counties, those in which the tax could potentially disfranchise more whites than blacks.28 
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Table 4. Vote on Tabling Amendment to Remove the Poll Tax Provision from the Majority 
Report, 1870 Constitutional Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ 
Home Counties* 
 
            Average Percentage of Blacks  
        in Delegates’ Home Counties, 1870 
 
Delegates for removing the poll tax from the majority report  15.2 
East TN (14); Middle TN (11); West TN (3) 
 
Delegates against removing the poll tax from the majority report 26.1 
East TN (9); Middle TN (22); West TN (14) 
 
 
Table 5. Vote on Majority Report (Universal Franchise and Poll Tax), 1870 Constitutional 
Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ Home Counties* 
 
            Average Percentage of Blacks  
        in Delegates’ Home Counties, 1870 
 
Delegates for majority report (universal franchise/poll tax)  23.5 
East TN (15); Middle TN (29); West TN (12) 
 
Delegates against majority report (universal franchise/poll tax)  17.5 
East TN (8); Middle TN (5); West TN (5) 
 
* Sources: A Compendium of the Ninth Census of the United States, 1870 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1872), 88-91; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Elected by the 
People of Tennessee, to Amend, Revise, or Form and Make a New Constitution for the State (Nashville: 
Jones, Purvis, & Co., 1870), 169-70, 177. 
 
 
The debate among Tennesseans and delegates prior to and during the convention, along 
with the votes on the franchise and poll tax provisions as shown in Table 6, indicate a racial 
motivation in favoring a more restrictive franchise.  Defeated in their efforts to eliminate black 




black population (greater than 30 percent on average) overwhelmingly supported the poll tax, 
voting 18 to 2 to table the motion to delete the tax and 18 to 3 for the majority report.  
 
 
Table 6. Votes on White-Only Franchise and Poll Tax Clauses, 1870 Constitutional 
Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ Home Counties* 
 
         Average Percentage of Blacks   
      in Delegates’ Home Counties, 1870 
 
For white-only franchise; for poll tax    32.6 
For white-only franchise; against poll tax   27.8 
Against white-only franchise; for poll tax   23.5 
Against white-only franchise; against poll tax  10.6 
 
* Sources: A Compendium of the Ninth Census of the United States, 1870 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1872), 88-91; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Elected by the 
People of Tennessee, to Amend, Revise, or Form and Make a New Constitution for the State (Nashville: 
Jones, Purvis, & Co., 1870) 161, 169-70. 
 
 
The Radical Republicans responded to the adoption of the poll tax by submitting the first 
of several written protests issued during the convention.  Drafted by Henry Gibson of Campbell 
County and signed by four others, the Radical protest reaffirmed suffrage as a right and not a 
privilege, and warned that assuming “the right to restrict the elective franchise implies the right 
to destroy it.”  The Radicals were not alone in protesting the tax.  A small clique of pro-Andrew 
Johnson men also objected to it for the same reasons.  They further insisted that the tax 




odious system of oaths and certificates that the Brownlow regime had required for voting.  The 
payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting was too much for George Jones, who stormed 
out of the convention hall, went home to Fayetteville, and brought his four decades of public 
service to an end.29         
Once the franchise question had been disposed of, the delegates addressed other clauses 
of the constitution.  Race continued to play a significant role in issues important to blacks.  
Delegates who had supported a white-only franchise and who represented counties with the 
largest black populations generally favored restricting black Tennesseans’ access to juries and 
public offices.  The same was true regarding public education.  The legislature had recently 
abolished the Radicals’ free-school system, which had provided equal schooling for black and 
white children.  Most convention delegates favored restoring local autonomy by placing 
education solely in the hands of county authorities but Conservatives and moderate Democrats 
feared that doing so would effectively wipe out black public education and thus provoke federal 
intervention.  In two close votes, efforts to turn all responsibility for public education over to the 
counties, and to give the legislature an option (but not a mandate) to establish a common school 
system, failed.  After further debate, the delegates struck a compromise, requiring the legislature 
to establish a perpetual common school fund derived from poll tax revenues.  This fund would be 
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used to assist counties that created a local school system to benefit both races, provided that they 
maintained segregated schools.30     
 
 
Table 7. Votes on Various Issues of Concern to Blacks and Support for White-Only 
Franchise, 1870 Constitutional Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ 
Home Counties* 
       
                         Average Percentage of        Percentage of  
                                                                       Blacks in Delegates’                   Delegates for 
               Home Counties, 1870         White-Only Franchise 
         Yes   No      Yes   No 
 
 
Exclude blacks from juries       30.5  15.4                     75.0  10.0                                      
and public office                                                               
Legislative option on establishing         30.4  16.1                 70.0  25.0                                                   
a common school system 
County control of public schools      31.0  13.6      80.0  15.0  
  
* Sources: A Compendium of the Ninth Census of the United States, 1870 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1872), 88-91; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Elected by the 
People of Tennessee, to Amend, Revise, or Form and Make a New Constitution for the State (Nashville: 
Jones, Purvis, & Co., 1870) 159-60, 312, 314, 341. 
 
 
Race also played a role in debates over the Tennessee Supreme Court.  Joseph B. 
Heiskell of Shelby County moved that the Supreme Court judges be popularly elected.  
Alexander Campbell of Madison County offered an amendment to Heiskell’s motion that would 
permit only whites to vote in such elections.  Campbell’s amendment was rejected by a vote of 
58 to 8.  The convention then adopted Heiskell’s motion by a vote of 46 to 25.  All but one 
Radical Republican joined the Conservative majority, while the Democrats and those in favor of 
                                                 
 





the white-only franchise divided almost equally.  Although they detested Brownlow’s policy of 
appointing judges, the Democratic delegates from the state’s blackest counties perhaps remained 
apprehensive regarding the potential strength of black voters in their counties (see Table 8).31    
 
 
Table 8. Vote on Popular Election of Supreme Court Judges, 1870 Constitutional 
Convention, Showing 1870 Black Population of Delegates’ Home Counties* 
 
                   Average Percentage of  
                      Blacks in Delegates’  
                                                                                                 Home Counties, 1870 
 
 
Delegates for popular election of Supreme Court judges   17.33 
East TN (14); Middle TN (22); West TN (10) 
 
Delegates against popular election of Supreme Court judges  29.19 
East TN (8); Middle TN (9); West TN (7) 
 
* Sources: A Compendium of the Ninth Census of the United States, 1870 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1872), 88-91; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates Elected by the 
People of Tennessee, to Amend, Revise, or Form and Make a New Constitution for the State (Nashville: 
Jones, Purvis, & Co., 1870), 219. 
 
 
On February 7, James D. Porter, Jr., of Henry County introduced a measure providing 
that all public offices, with the exception of the governorship and legislative seats, should be 
vacated upon ratification of the constitution.  This provoked a fierce response from the Radical 
Republicans.  In spite of warnings that a wholesale turning out of office might trigger federal 
intervention, Democrats and many Conservatives aligned to adopt Porter’s amendment.  The 
following day, the Radicals submitted a protest, arguing that the measure constituted an act of 
                                                 
 





“petty persecution” intended to oust recently elected Republican officeholders.  The protest left 
the Democrats and Conservatives unmoved.32    
The work of redemption continued during the last few weeks of the convention.  The 
delegates imposed certain checks and balances on the state’s governmental departments to 
prevent the arbitrary exercise of power that had characterized Tennessee Radicalism.  The 
legislature was forbidden to give state aid to private enterprises.  No General Assembly or 
convention could act on proposed federal amendments unless elected subsequent to the 
submission of the amendment by Congress to the state.  These measures were responses to the 
Radicals’ extravagant state aid to railroads and the irregular ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The delegates also limited the pay of legislators to seventy-five days for a regular 
session and twenty days for an extra session, to discourage protracted and costly legislative 
sessions.  Regarding the executive department, the convention conferred the veto power on the 
governor (albeit a weak power—a bare majority of the legislature could override) and restricted 
the governor’s use of the militia and martial law.33   
Constitutional provisions regarding the judiciary were significantly revised.  Besides 
mandating the election of Supreme Court judges, the delegates enlarged the court to five 
members, allowing no more than two from any single grand division.  To forestall any quarrel 
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about the initial makeup of the court, as well as to help clear the huge backlog of cases consisting 
primarily of unresolved legal disputes stemming from the Civil War, the new constitution 
provided for a court of six judges initially, two from each grand division; the first judge to vacate 
his seat after January 1873 would not be replaced.  The judges were empowered to choose a 
chief justice from among themselves and to appoint the state attorney general, whose term was 
extended from six to eight years.  The delegates amended the impeachment article to provide that 
the chief justice preside over impeachment trials.  Furthermore, additional state officers were 
made liable to impeachment.  In a move that angered the Radical Eaton-Lewis camp Memphis, 
the delegates required all judicial officers to have resided in the state at least five years.  This 
provision was designed to exclude many of the Republican carpetbaggers who held office in 
West Tennessee.34    
In the course of six weeks, the delegates had accomplished their primary task of wresting 
control of the state government from a minority party and restoring the former Confederates to 
power.  The work of redemption seemed complete.  But then William Thompson of Maury 
County rose from his seat on February 23 to point out that the convention had failed to address 
one of Brownlow’s infamous election tactics—the appointment of commissioners of registration, 
who, by law, were supposed to be elected.  After some discussion, Nicholson proposed a 
measure to prevent the governor from arbitrarily naming someone to fill any county office 
created by the legislature.  The rules were suspended, the amendment was quickly adopted, and 
the convention adjourned sine die.35 
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All but eight of the delegates signed the new constitution.  Except for George Jones, who 
had left Nashville a week earlier, the non-signers were Radical Republicans.  Though the Rebel 
Democrats all signed, none was fully satisfied.  James Fentress filed a protest on their behalf, 
declaring that allowing black suffrage “is a direct encouragement of a party whose object is, by 
usurpation, to destroy our republican system and to establish in its stead a consolidated 
despotism.”36   
Many had expected the delegates to finish their work in a week or two at most.  However, 
it became evident during the debate over the franchise that even if the convention adjourned by 
early February there would be insufficient time to submit the proposed constitution to the people 
at the regular county elections scheduled for the first Saturday in March.  Therefore, the 
delegates adopted a resolution urging the legislature to postpone the county elections until the 
last Saturday in March.  The legislature promptly obliged.  With a little more than a month to 
review the document, Conservative and moderate Democratic leaders took to the stump to rally 
popular support for the new constitution.  One was former governor Neill Brown, who traveled 
through Middle and West Tennessee urging the voters to support ratification: “Reject it and they 
would have back again test oaths and certificates of registration and taxation without 
representation,” he warned.  “Adopt it and all men would be set free.”  What Brown and others 
learned as they addressed the crowds was that, although many white Tennesseans detested the 
inclusion of black suffrage, most resistance and anger stemmed from the poll-tax clause.37   
Radical and moderate Republicans responded to the proposed constitution by attempting 
to reconcile with each other.  Even the Radicals in Memphis decided to bury the hatchet.  
Alarmed by the belligerent attitude of Conservative and Democratic lawmakers and delegates, 
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Secretary of State Andrew J. Fletcher spearheaded the reconciliation movement.  One of the 
earliest proponents of universal suffrage, Fletcher now admitted his error.  In a series of letters to 
Congressmen Stokes and Lewis Tillman, he recounted how the Klan had warned him and other 
Republican leaders “to keep silence . . . or abide the consequences.”  Rather than be silenced, 
Fletcher vowed “to take the field [in] the service of the sorely tried and meanly betrayed union 
people of my native state.”  Throughout January and early February, he reached out to numerous 
Republicans in the hope of organizing a state-wide Republican meeting.  At no point did he 
attempt to include Governor Senter in his plans.38    
The efforts of Fletcher and others bore fruit on February 16, when Republican notables 
from across the state met in Nashville to reorganize their party.  Among the speakers were 
Fletcher and Judge James O. Shackelford, who urged Republicans to put aside factional rivalries 
and work together to resist “a corrupt, proscriptive and oppressive [Rebel] Democratic party.”39   
Tennessee’s black leaders viewed the current legislative session, the new constitution, 
and the resurgent Ku Klux Klan with great alarm.  They responded by reviving the State Colored 
Men’s Convention, the first to meet since September 1867.  This assembly convened in 
Nashville on February 21.  One of the first speakers was Nashville city councilman Randal 
Brown, a moderate Republican, who declared that Tennessee blacks wanted legal protection but 
not the imposition of military government.  He called on his fellow blacks to go to the polls and 
reject the proposed constitution, which was oppressive to the poor of both races.  The next day, 
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the tone of the convention changed, as several Radical hardliners demanded federal military 
intervention.  At the close of the third and last day of the convention, the assembly 
commissioned a delegation to meet with President Grant and congressional Republicans and 
offer a detailed report on the egregious situation of blacks in Tennessee.40   
The ultimate fate of Reconstruction in Tennessee was now in the hands of men in the 
nation’s capital.  Tennessee’s Republican congressmen welcomed the black delegation with open 
arms, accompanied it to meet with the president, and scheduled it to appear before Chairman 
Benjamin F. Butler’s Committee on Reconstruction.  The delegation’s testimony drew the ire of 
the anti-Radical press, which feared that the accounts of exploitation, oppression, and violence 
might push Congress to remand the state to military rule.  “[E]very murder or hanging is a 
godsend to them,” remarked the editor of the Nashville Republican Banner.  Reports of increased 
Ku Kluxism moved Northern anti-Radical newspapers such as the New York Metropolitan 
Record to advise Tennessee’s ex-Rebels to “keep still. . . .  [E]very unlawful act . . . is an 
obstacle to the restoration of Democratic power in Washington, and consequently a 
postponement of the release of the South from military and carpet-bag domination.”41    
Along with the black delegation, Tennessee congressmen Horace Maynard and Samuel 
Arnell testified before the Committee on Reconstruction.  They confirmed the reports of electoral 
fraud and violent attacks on loyal Unionists, white and black.  Maynard argued that the ex-
Rebels had revolutionized the state constitution.  Both he and Arnell compared Tennessee with 
Georgia, which Congress had recently remanded to military rule.  Like those in Georgia, 
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Maynard claimed, Tennessee’s Rebels had broken faith with the federal government.  “There [is] 
no remedy,” he concluded, “except the prompt interference of Congress.”42  
By now Senator Brownlow had joined the chorus of Republicans calling for federal 
intervention.  In a statement published in the Knoxville Whig, he informed those who supposed 
that his advocacy of universal suffrage during the 1869 canvass meant that he was willing to see 
the loyal people of Tennessee persecuted that they were mistaken.  He advocated deposing the 
present state government, annulling the actions of the current legislature and recent constitutional 
convention, and appointing a military governor backed by federal troops.  Governor Senter, he 
added, should likewise “call upon the President for troops to suppress these masked assassins 
who are acting far worse than they ever did at any time when I called out the state militia to 
suppress them.”43 
Although Senter was disappointed by many of the actions taken by the legislature, he had 
maintained cordial relations with its leaders.  The Conservative and Democratic press had 
applauded him for not interfering with the legislature or the constitutional convention.  However, 
the surge in Ku Kluxism and the legislature’s refusal to grant his request for power to call out the 
militia tested his patience.  His coalition in shambles, he had come to understand that he was a 
man without a party.  Secretly he dispatched his private secretary, Frank Hyberger, to 
Washington to request federal troops to maintain law and order in Tennessee.44   
When Tennessee’s anti-Radical press caught wind of Hyberger’s March 18 visit to the 
White House, an alarm was raised.  “Dark and gloomy forebodings of our future have come over 
us today,” Eliza Fain recorded in her diary.  “News comes to us that he, who should have stood 
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up for our rights as a state, has been in league with the dark spirits of Radicalism.”  The editor of 
the Nashville Republican Banner charged that “Senter has ‘gone back’ upon the people who 
elected him.”  Conservatives subsequently sent their own spokesmen to Washington to combat 
the Radicals’ charges of lawlessness and Senter’s application for military aid.  Among them were 
House and Senate speakers William Perkins and Dorsey Thomas and Senator-elect Henry 
Cooper.  “Henry has gone to Washington to see what he can to do to save us from 
reconstruction,” William Cooper informed their father.  “Our home radicals are, with the aid of 
[Benjamin] Butler, making a desperate effort to return us to the hands of the Philistines, and the 
worst of it is no one can feel certain that they will not succeed.”45    
In their testimony before the Reconstruction Committee, Thomas and Perkins denied that 
Tennessee was lawless.  However, Butler, known for his rigorous cross-examination of 
witnesses, managed to get Thomas to admit that some parts of the state were disorderly.  The 
anti-Radical press in Tennessee criticized Butler, accusing him of insulting and badgering 
Conservative witnesses while handling the black delegation and white Radicals with kid gloves.  
Meanwhile, Senator Joseph Fowler and Representative Isaac Hawkins contradicted the claims 
read on the floor of the U.S. House by Stokes that former Union soldiers in the Nashville area 
had been told by the Klan leave the state and that one had been dragged off into the night and 
lynched.46    
Furthermore, news reached Washington that Senter had denied any intention to get 
Tennessee placed under the Reconstruction acts.  “I am not in favor of reconstruction and never 
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have been,” he said.  “All I desired in calling for troops was the protection of our people, and not 
with any view of furthering any reconstruction scheme.”  In the face of such conflicting 
evidence, many moderate Republicans in Congress threw up their hands and lost interest in 
remanding Tennessee to military rule.47 
 As the impulse for federal intervention waned, many Tennessee Radicals continued to 
hope that President Grant would send troops as he had done in the case of Georgia when its 
governor asked for aid.  Privately, Grant held Senter and his moderate Republican friends 
responsible for handing the state over to the Rebel Democracy; however, he did not want to risk 
starting a second civil war.  He sought to bring Reconstruction to an end without the conflict that 
had marked his predecessor’s administration.  Moreover, the case of Tennessee presented a legal 
dilemma.  Unlike Georgia, Tennessee had never been subjected to congressional Reconstruction 
and the extent to which the federal government could properly intervene there was unclear.  
Thus, Grant forwarded Senter’s request for troops to U.S. Attorney General Ebenezer R. Hoar 
for his opinion.  The nation’s chief legal officer, however, was not deeply committed to 
Reconstruction and opposed federal intervention to combat Southern terrorism, convinced that 
“responsible” white Southerners could protect the freed people.  Hoar believed, moreover, that so 
long as the Tennessee legislature could be convened, there was no legal ground for federal 
intervention, and he so advised Grant.  Grant therefore decided not to intervene in Tennessee.  
He did, however, quietly reinforce the federal troops at Ash Barracks in Nashville.  This token 
                                                 
 





gesture did nothing to reassure Tennessee’s Radicals.  The movement for federal intervention 
thus continued to lose momentum.48  
Republicans across the country closely monitored events in Tennessee as the new 
constitution was submitted to the people on March 26.  “If the present government stands, the 
State is lost to Radicalism,” proclaimed the editor of the New York Herald.  Despite heavy rains 
that swept across the state, more than 130,000 Tennesseans (compared to 175,000 in the 1869 
election) cast votes.  In East Tennessee, Radicals turned out in large numbers to oppose the 
constitution and defeat Conservative and Democratic candidates for various county offices.  In 
Middle and West Tennessee, however, the scene at the polls was very different.  The experience 
of Maury County farmer Nimrod Porter was perhaps typical.  He observed a strong Klan 
presence as he entered Columbia to vote.  Undisguised Klansmen stood guard over the ballot 
box, deterring many Radicals, particularly blacks, from voting.  “If they voted at all,” wrote 
Porter, “[they] voted to please [the Klan] through fear.”  Consequently, Middle and West 
Tennessee voted overwhelmingly in favor of the constitution.  With a few exceptions where the 
Conservative-Democratic coalition split, the Radicals were swept from office.  Statewide, the 
new constitution was approved by a vote of 98,128 to 33,872.  The editor of the Columbia 
Herald proclaimed the state redeemed: “The issues out of which grew animosities between the 
different peoples of our commonwealth are settled, and disposed of forever, never to be  
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resuscitated.  The disfranchised citizens are enfranchised, and the ‘State is [at] peace.’”49  
Subjugated and powerless, Radical Republicanism retreated for the most part into the 
mountains and valleys of East Tennessee.  For those Radicals in the highlands and central basin 
of Middle Tennessee and the plateau slope of West Tennessee, there was no refuge to be found.  
In a letter to John Eaton, Jr., Gibson County Radical William H. Stilwell begged for protection: 
“Don’t forget us here in poor rebel ridden Tennessee.  Tell President Grant our woeful story.  He 
will, he must believe.”  But there would be no aid from Washington.  Tennessee was for all 
intents and purposes now redeemed, and most Radicals grudgingly accepted that truth.  “Well,” 
said one, “we have got to submit & come under Rebel rule once more.”50 
For Tennessee blacks, especially Civil War veterans, this was a dark and perilous time.  
William Arnold was on his way to visit his mother-in-law in Christiana, a small town southeast 
of Murfreesboro, when he encountered a group of three white brothers who recognized him as a 
former Union soldier.  He attempted to run, but the men caught him and brutally beat him.  He 
managed to escape and to avoid being shot by one of the men who fired his pistol repeatedly, 
shouting that he “would kill ever d—d Yankee nigger.”  Many others were not as fortunate as 
Arnold.  The Klan roamed unchecked through the Middle and West Tennessee countryside, day 
and night, terrorizing and maiming blacks.  White mobs seized black prisoners from county jails 
and carried them off to be tortured or lynched.  Alexander Newton, who came to Pulaski in 1870 
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to serve as the minister of an African Methodist Episcopal church, later wrote that “The unrest 
and the mental suffering of these times were as severe a strain almost as the period of the war 
itself.”51  
Benjamin Butler made one last push to get Tennessee put under military rule.  He 
subpoenaed Governor Senter to testify before the Committee on Reconstruction.  Despite 
suffering the lingering effects of a bout with pneumonia, Senter appeared before the committee 
on April 9 and answered questions for two days.  His request for military aid, he said, had been 
prompted by the legislature’s repeal of laws empowering the governor to call out the militia to 
preserve the peace.  He admitted that there had been outrages in Tennessee since the war, but he 
maintained that they had become less and less frequent.  Cross-examined closely by Butler, 
Senter admitted that random acts of violence against loyal Unionists persisted, but he fervently 
rejected congressional legislation as a remedy.  A few members of the committee asked about 
allegations of electoral fraud and the governor’s appointment of men of questionable loyalty as 
registrars for the 1869 state election.  This drew the ire of Senter, who defended his appointments 
and maintained that he followed the Staten decision of the state Supreme Court in issuing 
instructions to his registrars.52 
 The Butler committee investigation generated little congressional support for federal 
intervention in Tennessee.  Butler announced that he would introduce a bill to reconstruct 
Tennessee; however, when it came, his own committee voted eight to five to reject it, and Butler 
gave up.  Senator Brownlow, however, refused to acknowledge defeat.  He chastised “tender-
                                                 
 
51 Statement of William Arnold, June 17, 1870, J. L. Parkes to Frank Hyberger, July 20, 1870, Francis M. 
Lavender to Frank Hyberger, August 5, 1870, Senter Papers; Alexander H. Newton, Out of the Briars: An 
Autobiography and Sketch of the Twenty-Ninth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers (Philadelphia: A.M.E. 
Book Concern, 1910), 99; William H. Stilwell to William G. Brownlow, April 10, 1870, Brownlow 
Papers; William H. Stilwell to John Eaton, Jr., April 6, 1870, Eaton Papers. 




footed Republicans” in the House for demanding further proof of atrocities while ex-Rebels ran 
roughshod over Tennessee’s loyal Unionists.  He introduced a bill in the Senate to divide the 
state into two judicial districts, splitting Middle Tennessee at the point where the central basin 
and the eastern highland rim meet, thus expanding the Radicals’ political base beyond its East 
Tennessee stronghold.  But nothing came of the Parson’s efforts.53      
Following his testimony, Senter returned to Tennessee a pariah to most Tennesseans, 
including many of his former moderate Republican supporters.  Conservatives and Democrats, 
outraged by his application for federal military aid, had no further use for him.  Most 
Republicans refused to forgive him for selling out the party in the 1869 election.  Privately, 
Senter cursed the Conservative-dominated legislature.  He accused the legislators of going back 
on their pledge to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, criticized their repeal of the more admirable 
acts of Radical Reconstruction such as the common school law, and damned them for failing to 
cooperate with his efforts to forge a centrist party.  The legislature “has succeeded in one thing & 
that is making all preceeding [sic] ones respectable,” he quipped.  To those who held him 
responsible for the collapse of Reconstruction and the restoration of Rebel Democratic rule, he 
insisted that “under no circumstances will I ever join hands with that rotten defunct party known 
as the Democratic party.”  With no hope of obtaining the Republican gubernatorial nomination, 
Senter quietly served out the remainder of his term and then retired to private life on a farm near 
Morristown.54 
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On August 4, the first judicial election held under the new constitution took place.  
Conservatives and Democrats won most of the offices in Middle and West Tennessee, while 
Republicans won most of those in East Tennessee.  More importantly, the state Supreme Court 
fell under the control of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Conservatives.  Five of the six 
members of the new court had served in the Confederate army or at least had been ardent Rebel 
sympathizers (T. A. R. Nelson was the exception).  They set out to reverse many of the rulings of 
their Radical predecessors and thus contributed their part to Tennessee’s redemption.55        
The next state election scheduled according to the new constitution was the general 
election of 1870, to be held on the second Tuesday in November.  Few expected the Republicans 
to pose a serious challenge to the Democratic-Conservative coalition; but as the election 
approached, cracks appeared in the coalition.  John C. Brown, the odds-on favorite for the 
governorship, was challenged by William Bate, a staunch, old-line, fire-eating Democrat, and 
William Quarles, a Johnsonian Democrat.  Bate dropped out of the race in mid-August after 
discovering that Congress had not yet relieved him of the political disabilities imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  As the nominating convention neared, many Democrats began to 
suspect that Brown, an old-line Whig, sought to avoid the Democratic convention in a bid to 
build a third party led by Conservatives.  Brown stumped across the state, trying to reforge the 
fragile Democratic-Conservative coalition and conciliate anxious Democrats.  Furthermore, he 
issued a public statement declaring himself a firm Democrat and a candidate for that party’s 
nomination at the convention.  It was at this juncture that all but a few Conservatives began 
openly referring to themselves as Democrats.  The day after Brown’s announcement, Quarles 
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withdrew from the race in return for a leadership role in the convention.  This cleared the path 
for Brown’s nomination as the Democratic standard-bearer.  Meanwhile, Andrew Johnson 
dispatched his lieutenants Arthur Colyar and John Williams, Jr., to press the Democratic party to 
renounce secession and to restructure the debt to reduce the tax burden on small farmers, 
artisans, and laborers.  When the Democrats rebuffed Johnson, Colyar declared himself an 
independent candidate for governor.  Brown soon yielded and accepted Johnson’s demands, 
whereupon Colyar withdrew from the race.56  
 The Republicans never seriously challenged Brown’s bid for the governorship.  They had 
hoped to exploit the divisions in the Democratic-Conservative coalition, but Brown managed to 
restore harmony.  Hoping to attract Conservatives to their ranks, the Republicans held an 
overwhelmingly white convention and once again took for granted the black vote.  Their 
platform called for payment on the state debt, endorsed a statewide public school system, and 
urged the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  Their gubernatorial nominee was William H. Wisener, an old-line Whig and 
former speaker of the Tennessee House.  Canvassing the state, Wisener denounced the poll tax 
and the Ku Klux Klan, while Brown upheld his party’s platform.  The results were never in 
doubt; Brown won by a vote of 78,979 to 41,500.  In addition to securing the governorship, the 
Democrats increased their majorities in both houses of the legislature and won all but two of the 
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congressional races.  Defeated in his bid for reelection, Stokes returned home to Alexandria, 
Tennessee, where he abandoned politics in favor of a new career as a lawyer.57    
The Democratic party was now in firm control of Tennessee’s government.  Party leaders 
had managed to stitch together a broad coalition based on antipathy to Radical Republican rule.  
Old-line Whigs and Democrats turned Conservative Unionists and Confederates had set aside 
their differences and distrust of one another to overthrow Radicalism.  Contributing to their 
victory were shrewd party leadership and shadowy acts of intimidation by the Ku Klux Klan and 
other groups of white Southerners bent on reestablishing a white man’s democracy.  Also 
contributing to the collapse of Reconstruction in Tennessee was Republican intraparty conflict 
and loss of support from the Northern public and federal government.  Efforts to reunite the 
Republican party came too late to prevent the Democratic takeover of the state government.  
With the election of Governor Brown and the restoration of Democratic rule, Tennessee’s 
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In a period of less than two years, the Democrats, in cooperation with the Conservatives, 
had recaptured the state government and redeemed Tennessee from Radical Republican rule.  It 
was expected that the legislature (now overwhelmingly dominated by the anti-Radicals, all 
calling themselves Democrats by this time) and Governor Brown would work together 
harmoniously to pass much-needed legislation.  But with the overthrow of Radicalism a split 
developed in the coalition’s ranks.  The legislators enacted a number of laws but most dealt 
simply with redrawing county lines or creating new counties.  They failed to reach a consensus 
on a number of pressing issues highlighted by Brown.1   
Among these was the staggering state debt—in excess of thirty-two million dollars.  
Democrats divided rancorously over the issue, which came to dominate Tennessee politics for 
more than a dozen years following redemption.  Two factions emerged: “low tax” Democrats, 
who opposed full funding of the debt; and “state credit” Democrats, who supported full funding 
of the debt.2      
In addition to the state debt controversy, the inability of some ex-Confederate lawmakers 
to let bygones be bygones further complicated Governor Brown’s first administration.  Rather 
than tackle needed reforms, these unrepentant Rebels targeted Republican congressional districts 
in a flagrant gerrymandering of the state aimed at effectively disfranchising their enemies.  
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Spearheading the scheme, Senator Jesse J. DuBose of Shelby County unapologetically 
proclaimed that “I believe in the law of revenge.  The Radicals disfranchised us, and now we 
intend to disfranchise them.”  The reapportionment law, passed in March 1872, represented no 
sharp break with the state’s bitterly partisan recent past.  A thirst for retaliation persisted in 
Tennessee politics.3    
On the evening of September 10, 1872, several hundred East Tennessee Republicans 
packed into the Knoxville courthouse to hear state senator Henry R. Gibson launch the party’s 
campaign to reclaim the state government from the divided Democrats.  Gibson, a rising star 
among Republicans and one of the few Radicals to have been elected to the constitutional 
convention, chose as his theme the hypocrisy of the Democrats.  “I will now proceed to show 
you how these Democrats have kept their promises,” he declared.  “They said we were ‘too 
proscriptive,’ that we kept up the ‘war issues,’ and prevented ‘peace and reconciliation.’  But 
when they got into power, did they lay aside the ‘war issues?’  Ah, no!  They called a 
Constitutional Convention, composed almost exclusively of Rebel officers.  They turned every 
Union man out of office, and put rebel soldiers in their places.  And to-day all of the principal 
officers of our State Government are graduates of Jeff. Davis’ army.”  Gibson’s fiery speech 
helped rally the Republicans, who subsequently made a strong, though largely unsuccessful, bid 
to unseat Democratic officeholders by using essentially the same argument put forth by 
disfranchised Confederates during Brownlow’s regime.4  
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Despite this rhetoric of blame, some Republican leaders privately acknowledged that the 
severity of Radical Reconstruction perpetuated strife in Tennessee, thereby hindering 
reconciliation and reunion.  Writing to Leonidas Houk shortly after John C. Brown’s 
inauguration, Alfred A. Freeman admitted that “There are thousands of honest men in Tennessee 
who were never Democrats at heart, men who are conservative in their feeling and have been 
driven to act with that party by what was regarded as the proscriptive policy of our party.”  
Winning Conservative voters was the key to preserving Republican political power in Tennessee, 
but neither Brownlow nor his Radical followers at the January 1865 convention to reorganize the 
state government were interested in currying favor with those who were ready to forgive the 
defeated Rebels, enfranchise them, and welcome them back into the Union.  To Brownlow, 
Conservative Unionism had become synonymous with treason and the Rebel Democracy.  Thus 
he waged war on both Conservatives and former Confederates to ensure they were subjugated 
and rendered politically impotent.5     
From the outset of Reconstruction, Brownlow was determined to establish thorough 
Radical control of the state.  To that end, Radical lawmakers enacted a sweeping franchise law 
that barred an estimated 80,000 ex-Rebels from voting.  There was simply no other viable option 
available at that point to the Radicals, who numbered only 40,000 potential voters.  But 
Brownlow went further, publicly championing the politics of retaliation in a series of editorials 
and speeches marked by the vitriolic prose and scathing wit that had become his trademark.  He 
encouraged Radical Unionists to seek retribution through courts of law, social ostracism, and 
even physical violence.  Although he had no legal means to deprive his Conservative enemies of 
the vote, Brownlow managed to effectively disfranchise many of them with the aid of a 
                                                 
 





compliant legislature that granted him the power to manipulate voter registration and the ballot 
box.  Even then, Brownlow was not satisfied that Radical rule was secure.  For political rather 
than idealistic motives, he pushed black enfranchisement through the General Assembly.  
Moreover, he adopted a paramilitary strategy.  The Radical militia he created not only battled the 
Klan but on occasion intimidated peaceful opponents of his regime.6 
Brownlow’s ruthlessness provoked more resistance.  Bent on reestablishing a white 
man’s democracy, the Klan and other terrorist groups targeted the freed people and white 
Unionists who actively supported the Radicals’ efforts to establish a biracial democracy in 
Tennessee.  The State Guard, though largely successful in suppressing Klan activities during its 
1867 and 1869 deployments, nevertheless failed to destroy the clandestine society, which went 
underground to evade capture and to wait out Republican lawmakers bent on disbanding the 
costly militia.  Once the smoke had cleared following the election of 1869, the Klan reemerged 
from its hiding places and resumed its campaign of violent counter-Reconstruction.  Some of the 
state’s freed people responded by packing up their belongings and leaving the state; others chose 
to make the best of a bad situation and, to avoid antagonizing whites, refrained from exercising 
their right to vote.  This not only thwarted black political aspirations but also weakened the 
Radicals’ base of power.  Unopposed and unprosecuted, Tennessee’s Klan kept up a reign of 
terror well beyond the collapse of the Radical regime. 
Klan violence exacerbated the Republican party’s factional discord.  Dissension over how 
to suppress the Klan first surfaced during the 1868 extraordinary legislative session.  Other 
issues also divided the party.  Brownlow’s autocratic leadership riled a number of Radicals who 
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were excluded from or defeated in political races by the governor and his chosen friends.  
Jealousy and ambition plagued the party.  Embittered Republicans rallied around William 
Stokes, who had been blindsided by Brownlow’s last-minute decision to enter the 1867 race for a 
U.S. Senate seat—a seat Stokes felt he had earned by campaigning tirelessly for the governor’s 
reelection.  After Brownlow won the seat, the Stokes Radicals organized in opposition to the 
Brownlow Radicals.  A third faction soon developed, comprising those who adopted moderate 
positions on several key issues in an effort to attract anti-Radical support.  Echoing Ulysses S. 
Grant’s election promise of peace after years of war and political conflict, these moderates 
Republicans called for universal suffrage as a means to achieve reunion and reconciliation.  The 
desire among Northerners for a cease-fire after a decade of strife in the South hastened the 
downfall of Radical Reconstruction in Tennessee.  As he dwelt on the past and the ruins of the 
party his father had built, John Bell Brownlow remarked that “Our Northern brethren desired 
Tenn. to be Republican but were too timid to sustain us in the only measures by which it could 
be kept Republican.”7 
On tendering his resignation as governor, Brownlow ceded control of his Radical regime 
to his handpicked protégé, DeWitt C. Senter.  It was at this precarious juncture, with the 
Republican party plagued by factionalism and reactionary violence, not to mention a staggering 
state debt and numerous scandals, that Senter faced the decision whether to continue, modify, or 
abolish Brownlow’s Radical policies.  He chose to walk a tightrope by aligning with the 
moderate Republicans and extending an olive branch to Conservatives in the hope of winning 
them to his side.  Privately, Brownlow questioned Senter’s course of action but publicly he 
                                                 
 





continued to support him.  The Stokes Radicals refused to go along with Senter, leaving the party 
torn asunder on the eve of the 1869 gubernatorial canvass.   
With the Republicans’ house divided between Senter Republicans and Stokes Radicals, 
Andrew Johnson interjected himself into Tennessee’s political affairs.  Embarking on an 
ambitious speaking tour across the state’s three grand divisions, he proclaimed himself the 
Moses who would lead the disfranchised out of bondage.  Johnson was not a declared candidate 
for state office; however, he privately coveted the soon-to-be vacant U.S. Senate seat of Joseph 
Fowler as a means to satisfy his personal quest for vindication.  In the end, Johnson’s enemies 
conspired to deny him a seat in Congress, but in the meantime he managed to energize the 
Conservatives and Democrats.  
As Johnson departed from the stump, the Conservatives and Democrats adopted an 
electoral strategy that set the stage for victory.  Conservative leaders advised against fielding a 
gubernatorial candidate or candidates for local or legislative offices in races where a bolting 
Republican candidate emerged, a policy of “masterly inactivity” in which eligible Conservative 
and Democratic voters would back the more “conservative” Republican candidate.  By 
embracing disaffected Republicans, the Conservatives and Democrats hoped to achieve their 
great end—the restoration of voting rights to disfranchised Conservatives and former 
Confederates.        
The tumultuous May 1869 Republican state convention failed to restore party harmony.  
Rather, the proceedings drove a deeper wedge between the Senter Republicans and the Stokes 
Radicals.  Each faction nominated its namesake as standard bearer for the August election.  As 
Senter and Stokes undertook a joint canvass of the state, the Conservatives and Democrats 




election pivoted.  Neither seemed willing to be the first to openly declare in favor of universal 
suffrage, but at that point two franchise cases before the state Supreme Court abruptly altered the 
course of Tennessee’s Reconstruction. 
As the Radicals celebrated an overwhelming victory in which they swept the judicial 
offices across the state and secured control of the Tennessee Supreme Court, the lame-duck 
court, appointed by Governor Brownlow, ruled (in State v. Staten) that his setting aside of voter 
registrations was unconstitutional.  This decision, which reenfranchised twenty to thirty thousand 
Conservatives, represented the entering wedge in the demolition of the edifice of Radical 
Reconstruction.  It also tipped the balance of political power to the Conservatives, who became a 
formidable force in the 1869 election. 
When Stokes rejected the offer of Conservative votes in return for his support for 
universal male suffrage, Senter seized it.  His declaration in favor of universal suffrage during 
the opening speeches of the 1869 gubernatorial campaign generated a political earthquake that 
shook the Republican party to its core.  Moving cautiously, Senter employed the Radical 
electoral machinery against the Radicals to help ensure his victory.  He resorted to a wholesale 
removal of Brownlow’s Radical registrars and appointed, in a number of cases, Conservatives to 
take their place, hoping to curry favor with the Conservatives and Democrats as he worked 
toward the recruitment of “respectable” white Southerners into the Republican party.  Seemingly 
assured of winning the election in his own right, Senter did not fully grasp the consequences of 
his actions until it was too late.  In a matter of weeks, his registrars handed out voter certificates 
to nearly eighty thousand legally disfranchised ex-Rebels, a move that Senter did nothing to stop.  
The Radicals attempted to block Senter’s appointments by seeking injunctions, but in the pivotal 




removal.  This case was the key turning point in Tennessee’s journey toward redemption.  An 
opinion subsequently issued by the state attorney general held that anyone holding a voter 
certificate granted by his county registrar could not be indicted for illegal voting.   
The Conservatives and Democrats now set out to remake a white man’s democracy 
according to their own vision, not Senter’s.  They deemed the governor’s usurping party 
untrustworthy, un-Southern, and illegitimate.  They were interested in Senter only as a vehicle to 
secure universal suffrage and their own political ascendency.  With the ballot box virtually open 
to all, the Conservatives shifted their strategy and, at the eleventh hour, nominated candidates for 
the legislature.  Barred in many cases from holding elective office under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the former Confederates aligned with the Conservatives to repudiate the Senter 
Republicans and Stokes Radicals at the polls.  The defeated Stokes Radicals appealed to 
President Grant and Congress to investigate the legality of the election; however, their request 
fell on deaf ears.  As the legislature passed into the hands of the Conservatives, Senter’s coalition 
began to unravel.  Conservative lawmakers rejected the Fifteenth Amendment, passed a 
constitutional convention bill, and expunged every vestige of Radical Reconstruction from the 
statute books.  Thus, a Conservative-dominated legislature, composed almost wholly of Union 
men, took all but the last step in completing the work of redemption. 
That last step fell to the delegates elected to the constitutional convention.  Although the 
convention comprised several factions among Radicals, Conservatives, and Democrats, 
Democratic-leaning Conservatives dominated the proceedings.  Under the leadership of John C. 
Brown, the convention charted a conservative, albeit at times unsteady, course.  There was a 
consensus in regard to the enfranchisement of all those who had been disfranchised under 




vehemently opposed black suffrage and sought to reestablish a white man’s democracy.  
Eventually, cooler heads prevailed; Conservatives and moderate Democrats derailed the 
movement for black disfranchisement, repeatedly warning of the threat of federal intervention.  
The delegates did approve a poll tax; however, no immediate action was taken by subsequent 
legislatures to implement such a tax.  The delegates also mandated that all state offices be 
vacated upon ratification of the new constitution, a measure designed to purge Radicals.   
   The fate of Reconstruction in the Volunteer State was now in the hands of the federal 
government.  Tennessee Republicans appealed to Washington to intervene in their state militarily 
and halt redemption.  But neither Congress nor the White House was interested in pursuing the 
matter.   
In the judicial and general state elections of August and November 1870, Democrats and 
the Democratic-leaning Conservatives (now openly referring to themselves as Democrats) were 
swept into office.  Radicals retreated to the mountains and valleys of East Tennessee.  Many of 
the freed people continued bravely to seek justice and exercise their political rights, but many 
others gave up in fear and frustration, some even emigrating from the state.   
 Tennessee’s road to redemption was marked by bloodshed and political strife.  Senter’s 
attempt to build a centrist coalition of moderate Republicans and Conservatives was doomed 
from the start because no real middle ground existed in Tennessee politics.  The notion that a 
more skilled, conciliatory, or ethical governor could have governed the state more successfully 
or fairly is certainly wrong.  The former Confederates would accept nothing less than their own 
reenfranchisement and the total disfranchisement of blacks.  Radicals insisted on punishing the 




and joined hands with the ex-Rebels.  The struggle culminated, as it would eventually culminate 
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